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THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
HUMAN NATURE,

CONTAINING
A COMPLETE THEORY
OF
Human Interests.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,
AN ESSAY
ON THE
ORIGIN OF EVIL.

By John Duncan.

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PREFACE.

IN explanation of the following Treatise, it may be said, that moral science may be divided into two parts: 1st, The theory of *Evidence*; 2dly, The theory of *Morality*, or of human interests. The former of these subjects has already been sufficiently discussed; and the present Treatise is an attempt to give a new view of the latter.

CHAP. I, as the title expresses, is merely introductory; and contains general observations on Philosophy, or a theory of reasoning. The Reader must not be discouraged by the abstruseness of this Chapter, as he will find the Work less abstruse as he proceeds. Chapter II, after an attempt to prove the difference between mind and matter, contains an enumeration of the most distinguishing phenomena of the former. This Chapter, which was a necessary foundation to the system, the Author flatters himself, will be found valuable from its completeness, and, he trusts, not devoid

of novelty. The Chapter on Self-love forms the only complete theory on that subject with which the Author is acquainted; and, as far as he can discover, contains no portion of that abstruseness which is so little congenial to the taste of the Readers of the present day. The Chapter on Variety is the keystone of the system, and will be found to explain all human interests.

THE arrangement, adopted with regard to the subordinate parts of the Work, may appear singular; but it was necessary for the purpose of putting every thing in its proper place, and shewing how secondary principles are connected with primary.

THE Author has only farther to observe, that if he did not conceive the present Work to contain a system, in no small degree, both new and interesting, he should not have troubled the World with a Metaphysical Treatise.

STONEHAVEN,)
20th March, 1815. }

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PART I.

Philosophy
OF
HUMAN NATURE ;
CONTAINING
A COMPLETE THEORY
OF
HUMAN INTERESTS;
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CHAP. I.

Introduction.

THOSE general causes which actuate nature, denominated principles, whether moral or physical, operate with undeviating uniformity. However much the force of one may be diminished or diverted by the opposition of another, each preserves its original nature unchanged until it be entirely destroyed.

The purpose of philosophy is to analyze and simplify nature ; to reduce the huge mass and endless diversity of the particular events and objects which it contains to a few principles, to which all may be refer

red ; and to recognise and detect the same principle under every form, and in every variety of combination. Hence every thing will become distinct ; demonstration, discrimination, and argument, will be simple and easy ; and knowledge will acquire perfection.

Principles are few ; but particulars and cases infinite. A perfect knowledge, therefore, of the few principles which move the machinery of nature is far preferable to the most enlarged experience of the longest life. By it, we learn the precise force and value of each event ; and have the certainty of demonstration instead of that doubtful knowledge of futurity which can be derived from experience alone. When the parts of any piece of machinery are thrown together in confusion, the eye cannot comprehend it, nor the mind form an idea of its purpose. But when every wheel is put in its proper place, the use of each is immediately perceived. From an inspection of their combined movements, we acquire a conception of their mutual dependance as far superior to that which could be derived

from individual inspection, or the result produced, as demonstration is preferable to conjecture.

The modern method of philosophising is to prefer the examination of facts to the constructing of systems. But, as the importance of the knowledge of facts depends upon drawing the proper inference, a perfect knowledge of them, if they are not systematized, is of no value. The universal approbation of experiment can, therefore, surely mean no more than that we should begin the construction of system with the examination of fact, and that its perfection will ultimately depend upon the accuracy of our knowledge of particulars. It is absurd to make a distinction between theoretical and experimental philosophy. To draw general inferences from experience is to conclude from experiment; and to form theories from experiment, is to reason from experience. There is no difference between the principle or manner of reasoning in one case and in the other, but merely a difference of means or experience. Difference of correctness of data will no

doubt have a corresponding effect on accuracy of conclusion. But as much depends upon the correctness of the mind as upon that of its information. More erroneous conclusions have not, perhaps, been drawn in theoretical than in experimental philosophy. We have seen numberless experiments absurdly made, and numberless conclusions absurdly drawn, from them. They deceive themselves, therefore, who trust to experiment alone for that which should be the joint produce of reasoning and experience. No species of philosophy, it is to be thought, will ever be invented which will supersede the necessity of mental exertion, of reasoning and comparison. In every employment of the mind, the justness of its conclusions will chiefly depend on the expansion of its view, and the accuracy of its discrimination.* To ren-

* This is proved by the circumstance of some persons having attained a just conclusion by hypothesis; while others have drawn erroneous inferences from experiment. In all reasoning, natural sagacity is of the first importance. There are indeed, a multitude of facts established by experiment or experience, the proper arrangement of which we are daily employed to discover.

der philosophy perfect, theory must be conjoined with experiment. He who studies only particulars adds little to the facility of his reasoning ; but he who understands a general principle can solve many particulars by it.

Nature is a compound of principles or general causes, which, from mutual connection and intercourse, are mixed and thrown together in every mode of variety. Principles resemble lines drawn from different points, intersecting each other in every possible direction. Each angle of intersection forms a particular ; and particulars form different connections, and relations with regard to each other. As each angle becomes, to a spectator placed at it, a point of view, it is easy to pass from one to another, to form arbitrary lines, and to perceive a partial connection between opposite principles, by that relation which is formed by their intercourse alone. Each principle is crossed, separated, and divided, by another. If the parts, therefore, of one principle intervene between those of another, its connection seems, to persons who see but a

part, to be dissolved, and the whole to be one confusion of jarring particulars.

It is seldom that the same principle can be combined twice with another in the same manner, or that two cases can be found entirely parallel. To those, therefore, whose views are contracted, one principle, when found joined with a different, is entirely new, each fact seems distinct from another, and nature appears an infinite variety. Such persons must acquire a large stock of experience before they can be qualified to decide upon any subject; and after that is attained, their reasoning must still be but very imperfect.

The wheels of nature, in order to accomplish and complete its movements, are opposed to each other. Although the whole system of things moves in perfect harmony, each particular contradicts and acts against another. Qualities are, therefore, as different as varieties of relation are frequent. If two persons happen to be placed at a distance from each other, with an object intervening, that object stands in different respects, and bears on contrary points of

the compass, towards each. It is the same with regard to good and evil. The same event which destroys one person may enrich another, and that wind which is a moderate and useful breeze on one coast may be a destructive storm on the opposite.

A skilful rhetorician, at whatever point of view he open, can easily pass from one angle of intercourse, or partial connection, of different principles to another. With the hand of a juggler, he can change the state of objects, and reverse the nature of interests. His purpose is not to convince, but to deceive, and to obtain the same end from the influence of passion as from the conviction of reason. He endeavours to raise an interest in his hearers, to make men animate particulars, spectators become combatants, judges parties, and to induce the mind to change the neutrality of reason for the heat of passion. It is in the power of a rhetorician to place the imagination of those who can conceive only one particular in whatever situation he pleases. But those who can view the whole relation of the parts of any principle, or set of ob-

jects, are beyond the reach of his art, without the prejudice of situation, free from passion, and engaged in no contest on either side; but are left fully to perceive, and calmly to decide, their difference. He who can conceive but a portion of any subject must have very confused ideas concerning it. To be able to form a just opinion of the nature and value of individual objects, we must have a view of the whole extent of their connections.

The purpose of declamation is to inflame the passions, and influence the instincts of the body; and those who submit to its impression are unconsciously determined to the end for which it is used. Passion depends upon every difference of temper, every casual circumstance, and every variety of combination in nature. He, therefore, who is determined by passion is right only by accident.

All the power of declamation arises from imperfect similitude and unnatural association; for there is nothing so high that it cannot be degraded, nor any thing so low that it cannot be exalted by the insidious-

ness of false analogy.* By such means, any character can be stripped of its good qualities, or ornamented with others which do not belong to it; or the consequences of any action may be represented as the most dangerous and destructive, or as the most useful and beneficial, whether it be essentially so or not.

When those who do not know the precise effect of any cause, and who are unable to trace that cause distinctly from all others, find it united with a different, they take such connection for a continuation of the principle with which they commenced. Weak minds are so dazzled by every incidental intercourse which one principle forms with another, that they can make no distinction between them. Hence, in attempting to generalize, they, at length, draw every idea, by the power of assimilation, into the same focus, and, from one

* False analogy is when things, which agree in one respect or quality, are united in another in which they do not agree. But as that which is good becomes bad by excess, and that which is bad good by moderation, exaggeration, the heightening or depressing of qualities, or in short giving wrong names to things, is the chief instrument of declamation.

cause, account for every phenomenon in nature.

But not a less frequent source of false reasoning is, to consider the variations of the same principle as contradictions. It is very natural for a person who has no idea of principles to take generosity for want of self-love ; for, without an extensive view, no one can believe that two contrary actions could proceed from the same motive. But all errors of judgment arise merely from want of comprehension. The ideas of a small mind are easily disordered, and put into confusion. Among those who can view but a limited portion of things, it is nowise uncommon to mistake the principle of decision, and determine according to some quality which has only an incidental connection with the distinction to be made. The greater number of parts into which any thing is divided, each of these parts must be the less. But if a weak or ignorant person were asked whether one fourth or one sixth is the greater, it might reasonably be expected that, because six is greater than four, the answer would be one sixth.

Without an enlarged sphere of reflection, it is impossible to conceive distinct ideas. Ignorant persons and remiss thinkers join heterogeneous and distinguish related qualities, merely as they find them accidentally associated or casually separated. Hence nothing contributes so much to the facility of our reasoning, and to its conviction upon others, as the arrangement of things in the order of their natural dependence.

It is difficult, indeed, to analyze any cause, or to separate one principle from others, and to produce it pure and unmixed. The mind may be led away by slight connections, and often its conclusions may deviate so far from the principle with which it commenced as to have no resemblance to it. But if certainty of deduction and readiness of decision are to be attained, it can only be by extensive classification.

A mind which traverses merely the surface of things, meets, at every step, with objects seemingly different. To it all nature appears a confused mass. While such must compare event with event, and watch the

continual change of facts, to obtain an imperfect knowledge of the nature of things; that which penetrates farther sees all the machinery of nature, and perceives the wheels which produce every motion. He who knows that all virtue is utility, can distinguish between virtuous and vicious actions at a glance; he who knows that all evidence is derived from experience, as no set of facts can be so equally balanced that one side will not preponderate, finds no hesitation in determining his belief; and he who knows that all actions proceed from self-love, is at no loss to account for every variety of human conduct. But he who is acquainted with these principles only in the more immediate form of facts, has his knowledge and reasoning interrupted by the most confined barrier, and must be contented to wait, with patience, until the mysteries of futurity unfold themselves, without being able to form even a conjecture concerning them. Shall we, therefore, continually talk of virtue and vice, truth and falsehood, taste and insensibility, without knowing what they are? or are these

the Deities of our reasoning powers, the incomprehensibility of which must oblige us to remain in contented ignorance of them? are they principles so original as to be incapable of definition or analysis? or is our knowledge so complete that it cannot be extended?

How despicable is that indolence of mind which induces us to make others reason for us, which renders it necessary to support our opinions by the authority of a great name without thinking for ourselves, or producing arguments of our own; which compels us to subject our judgments to the dictates of men rather than the decisions of reason, and to the laws of custom rather than to the principles of nature! Such conduct resembles that of children who accomplish the calculations of arithmetic without understanding the rules by which they are performed.

Abstract knowledge uniformly operates as an addition to certainty, and never opposes common ideas. Every mind must be, to some degree, extended; and no other limits can be fixed to our reasoning powers

than the extent of our knowledge. The advocates for common sense are necessitated to fix the boundaries of the materials of reasoning some where. But what must be the rule of their conclusions, if it be not reason? and what the conclusion of reason, if it be not the extent of our knowledge? Reason, in this, as well as in every other case, is our only guide, and can chuse no other data for its operations than those within the extent of our comprehension.

It is absurd to make a distinction between the philosopher and the man. Every person thinks in some degree; and a philosopher is only a thinker on a more extensive scale than other men. Common sense is a part of the most abstracted philosophy. Every true system is but an arrangement of connected facts; and no abstract philosophy which is just, although indeed it may sometimes have the appearance of being contrary to what is called common sense, will, in reality, be more than an addition to it. But a person would be incapable of pushing his discoveries farther than the lowest of mankind, if he did not

leave common sense, and rise above common ideas. By making those opinions, which antiquity or custom has established among men, the rules of thinking, when once an error is committed, it may be perpetuated from one generation to another, and mankind may, in this manner, continue in deception to the latest ages. It is impossible that Sir Isaac Newton could have excelled other men, or made those discoveries which have raised his name to so great a height of fame, had he made common sense and common opinion the principles of his reasoning, and had he not soared above the world and the prejudices of mankind.* But as he was a natural philosopher no sect was alarmed for the consequences of his philosophy, and all concurred in applauding the discoveries which he made.

Great allowance ought to be given to abstract theories. Distant causes must unavoidably be very different from common

* Nothing is more contrary to common sense than the motion and convexity of the Earth, or that men are capable of standing with their feet opposite to ours.

events, and the ideas formed on them contrary to familiar opinions. As first impressions cannot extend far, they can form proof only with regard to each other. But general principles and familiar ideas undoubtedly have a relative dependance; and when the connection is traced, it produces mutual elucidation.

Every additional acquisition of knowledge tends to confirm that which we already know, as the more points light is reflected from, the more its force is increased. While, therefore, abstract ideas are consistent with common, they undoubtedly add to the strength of each other.*

The farther our view is extended, the better we become acquainted with the situation † of objects within its compass; the more extensive our knowledge is, the more convincing must be our reasoning, and the more satisfactory our conclusions. A person who sees but a part, can have only a partial idea; and as facts arising from the

* As all abstract ideas are, in other words, only enlarged views, those who argue against them praise ignorance.

† All reasoning regards only *situation or relation*.

same principle are often contradictory, two antagonists, who do not reason upon principles, may wage the war of disputation to eternity, without the one gaining any perceivable superiority over the other.

But the greatest error to which the advocates for common sense are liable is, that, where they do not perceive the cause of any event, they imagine that it has happened without one. Nothing is, therefore, more frequent than to hear causeless events contended for, by those who live without enquiry, and rest in contented ignorance. From the same source of error, may be traced many superstitions; judicial astrology, fabulous predictions, omens, and all those fancies which haunt the imagination of the ignorant.

Every principle extends over all nature, and, by mutual commixture, every one, in a manner, partakes of another. Now, as there must be some degree of similarity where there is connection, the same danger of running principles into each other may arise from their too great extension, as that which is occasioned by arbitrarily uniting

them when found in casual association. Theory has two laws—conjunction and separation. All false reasoning arises from uniting heterogeneous, or separating homogeneous, things. In the construction of theory, as great attention ought to be paid to distinguish the parts of different principles, as to unite the different parts of the same principle. The effects of the most distant causes, when far extended, may have some degree of similarity. Hence, to account for the phenomena of one principle by another to which it has only a remote similitude is a common error among theorists.

It should therefore always form a presumption against the truth of any hypothesis, when slight causes are represented as producing great effects. Nothing, indeed, discovers a greater deficiency of mental energy than the conduct of those who imagine that philosophy consists in refinement, and who are not contented with any hypothesis of their own forming unless the causes from which they deduce their conclusions be too slender to support them. The principle of electricity pervades every

body; and an electrician may ascribe to it every effect which is produced in nature. Heat is diffused through all things; and a person devoted to that subject may assert that heat is the *primum mobile* of Nature. All nature is in motion; and an atheist may imagine motion a sufficient Deity. All nature is, at one time or another, in a state of organization; and all things may, therefore, be said to be produced by organization. Matter is known to us only by its qualities: all nature assumes certain appearances and faces; and a physiognomist may, therefore, conclude that physiognomy is the first principle in nature.

That all these principles exist is certain; but why should one be greater than another? or why should it be allowed to assume superiority, and hold others in subjection? The vanity of man is also a principle from which may be accounted for his giving the preference to whatever belongs to himself, his raising himself above other men, and his own hypothesis above all nature.

One cause can produce only one effect,

however much varied that effect may be by its different connections, relations, and varieties of intercourse with those of other principles. We ought not, therefore, to allow our parental fondness for our own productions and discoveries to betray us into the attempt of accounting, from one principle, for all the variety of events and appearances in nature. Sometimes effects may run parallel without having any connection, or may be perfectly similar when proceeding from different causes.* Hence, in all reasoning, it is as necessary to separate, as to unite, things. It is as necessary, in the tracing of a principle, to preserve distinction as to generalize at all; for if this caution be neglected, the mind easily begins, but does not perceive where to stop, till, at last, it confounds principles, and turns every thing into a disorder much more difficult to be overcome, and which is a greater obstacle to the discovery of truth, than that which arises from particu-

* Cold, sometimes, produces the effect of heat. By freezing, it expands liquids. Water also, sometimes, produces the effect of fire. By union with lime, it occasions combustion.

larizing, or the method of reasoning by single facts. When qualities are far extended, the connection between them is too slight to be regarded, or the distinction too small to be perceived. As, therefore, generalizing has a natural tendency to annihilate distinction, there is a point at which we must stop to prevent the utter destruction of every principle and all fact.

But to account for one effect from one cause, is entirely different from accounting for all effects from one cause. Although ideas too general may be sometimes adopted, general ideas are not, on that account, to be rejected. An idea cannot, in reality, be too general, nor any system too extensive, if it be just; and it is only when, by one unnatural union of things, a false similarity between them is continued, that mistakes in systematical reasoning arise.

It is certain that causes and events are connected, that nature is linked together in the same chain, and that an impulse which affects one part will extend its influence over all. By viewing the whole, we are able to estimate the value of a part;

and by estimating each part, we obtain an idea of the whole. By proceeding from one remark to another, we ultimately reach a truth which we could never attain from one single remark or idea.

Common events furnish no great strength of argument with regard to their original cause. There must be the same dissimilarity between the first and the second as there is distance. Custom is often considered a sufficient criterion of good and evil; but custom can be a rule only in familiar cases, where it is not necessary that reason should decide. The most general opinion forms the principle of common sense; but common sense can be allowed to impose no law upon that which is uncommon. The sentiment of ridicule arises from generality or fashion, and the common sense of one country often forms a subject of entertainment to an individual of another; for the same reason that a coxcomb laughs at a philosopher—because they are different from each other. But where all are the same, or where each is but the copy of another, common opinion is but as a single

opinion. Hence truth is seldom determined by majority.

The accuracy of the judgment uniformly depends upon the expanse of the mind; but the bulk of mankind, on whom the labour of managing the business of the world falls, have not leisure for speculative correctness. As the affairs of life require activity and dispatch, the greater part of mankind must be governed by habit and imitation. But general ideas are not, therefore, to be despised. There can be no doubt, that, although they are not seen, yet they are felt by the mass of mankind, that they reach all the transactions of life, and give industry its proper application.

Whatever improves our rational faculties, or enlarges the expansion of our minds, increases our importance in the scale of existence, and tends to render every part of our conduct more correct, and better adapted to the end of our being. Knowledge can never be possessed without being useful. In nature there is a universal intercourse. What we acquire upon one subject, we, in some measure, acquire upon another.

Any high degree of science, or intimate acquaintance with principles, is not, perhaps, absolutely necessary to common purposes; but certainly, as we extend our views, we simplify our conduct. Before the discovery of the magnet, sailors found their way in the ocean with difficulty and danger, but since that event the art of navigation has acquired certainty as well as safety. What the compass is to the sailor, principles are to all men. Without a knowledge of general causes, our ideas of things must always be confused, and our pursuits unstable and indeterminate.

As, again, all causes are linked together in the same chain, it is to be expected that the mind of an acute man, by incessantly fixing itself on one set of objects, will trace any phenomenon, if within nature, to its source.

Beyond nature, or the limits of our knowledge and experience, we cannot go. Those, therefore, who lay down imaginary data to themselves, and attempt to account for the formation of the world, or to render conceivable the boundaries of space, are the abstruse reasoners who are properly the ob-

jects of contempt. By such wild undertakings, they forfeit every claim to the protection of reason, and ought to be given up to the tribunal of common sense, and punished with every torture of ridicule.

CHAP. II.

The Mind.

NEITHER the intellectual faculties of man, nor his means of knowledge are infinite. It, therefore, leads only to scepticism to inquire for infinite proof of any thing. In the common affairs of life, we must be satisfied with knowing the nature of things by their consequences. Even when we inquire into any thing in a more abstracted manner, we are under the necessity of judging of essence by qualities. Every definition, it is said, requires a definition. However deep we penetrate, or however far we push our researches, we ultimately arrive at something, of the nature of which we must remain in ignorance, and find a barrier to our knowledge which we cannot go beyond.

There has not, perhaps, been a question which has given rise to a greater variety of those doctrines which different degrees of strength of intellect, different means of knowledge, modes of education, and views of

things, generally produce, than the subject of the materiality or immateriality of the mind, nor has any philosophical discussion exhibited more revolutions of opinion. Hence, however, is not to be inferred the impossibility of attaining a distinct conclusion upon this point, but only that deficiency of comprehension and acuteness will always produce corresponding difficulty, discussion, and error, upon a matter so remote from human investigation.

After those great men who have bestowed their attention upon the subject, it would perhaps be presumption in any one to attempt to produce any thing new upon it, or to exhibit it in a clearer light than that in which it has already appeared. Their labours seem to prove the vanity of endeavouring to settle any controversy in which men of all descriptions are engaged, and who bring with them to the discussion so great a variety of knowledge, and so many different degrees of ability. There has been a theory of probability written, and yet we find that even probability itself has suffered a variety of attacks.

Although mankind, in all ages and in all circumstances, have been struck with the difference between mind and matter, yet there has been an inconsistency in their ideas on the subject, perhaps because a slight knowledge of mechanical philosophy composes the whole education of the greater part of mankind, and because most men are incapable of even conceiving an idea of anything different from physical operations. It ought not, therefore, to appear wonderful, that, while they acknowledge the difference between mind and matter in general terms, they have, when they come to particulars, or endeavour to account for intellectual operations, recourse to mechanical principles. Neither is it to be doubted, that, although one system of materiality were overthrown, another would soon spring up in its stead.

In the present case, we may take the existence of matter for granted without adopting the notions of Berkley. But as all our ideas are furnished by external objects, it is certain that we are much more affected by the qualities of matter than by

those of mind. It is equally certain that there are many things in matter which men allow to impose upon their imaginations, and which they may take for the mind, as it is easier to unite than to separate. The various opinions, however, of those who have endeavoured to explain the operations of the mind on material principles exhibit only desperate attempts to assimilate them to physical phenomena. In the extravagance of conjecture, some have called the mind a principle, a power, or the sum of powers, without any distinct idea attached to these terms; others have called it a vibration of the nerves, harmony, or all in all. It is, in fact, astonishing that no person has said that it is an attraction, or what is more in vogue in the present day, the electrical fluid; for as long as men look for it among material objects, they must be deceived by fancy.

There is, however, one position which it is thought no sect will oppose, or deny the truth of, that is the existence of such a thing as mind. The proof of the existence of our own minds is almost infinite; at least

it is so in comparison with that of the existence of matter; for the latter depends upon the former, and if the one is taken away the other must fall of course. Our own existence is a truth beyond which we cannot go. As we cannot easily perceive the arguments by which it could be opposed, for their strength must depend upon its admission, it has little chance of suffering from controversy. Archimedes found it necessary to have some place to rest upon before he could raise the world, and, in all reasoning, something must be taken for granted, as a basis. As the existence of the mind is the foundation of evidence, it must be assumed in every case where reasoning is employed. The nature of mind only can afford room for difference of opinion where mind becomes the subject of speculation.

That the mind is either a substance or a quality is here taken for granted, and to ascertain which of the two is the purpose of the present inquiry. Whether the mind be merely a quality of matter, or a distinct substance, is certainly the most important

of all questions regarding it ; but one which apparently admits of a satisfactory solution. The belief of the immateriality of the mind is, indeed, inseparable from the belief of its existence ; for while we prove its existence we prove its immateriality. If we prove that the mind was ever in existence, we, at the same time, prove that it must continue always to exist ; and if we prove that it does not exist in matter at one time, we also prove that it never existed in it.

The only evidence of the existence of matter, and the only knowledge of it which we have, are derived from its qualities. Now, as we cannot conceive how it can, without annihilation, be deprived of any of these, or what it would be without extension or form, we are necessitated always to conceive the existence of its qualities while we conceive that of its essence. Hence, the unavoidable conclusion is, that, if mind be a quality of matter, the former must be universally attached to the latter, and that matter can never exist or be found without possessing the quality of thought. For, no stronger analogy can be conceived than

that which is formed between two qualities of the same body, nor any stronger conclusion drawn than, that if matter cannot be deprived of one quality it cannot be deprived of another. If these premises are granted, the conclusion must be that, if matter be ever found without thought, thought can be no quality of it.

Matter is held to be infinitely divisible; but no philosopher believes that it can be annihilated, or that the smallest particle of it has not all the qualities of the greatest. If mind, therefore, were a quality of matter, or if all matter possessed the quality of thought, mind would undoubtedly hold the same rank as the other qualities of matter, be attached to matter at all times, and in all circumstances, and follow every particle of it in every variety of decomposition which it undergoes, in such a manner as to be capable of being discerned by our senses, or by its usual indications,—pursuit of pleasure and aversion to pain. To conceive the existence of matter without its common qualities, such as extension and form, is impossible, but we can easily

conceive it to exist without mind; and, therefore, the latter can have no necessary connection with the former. That every common quality of matter is inseparable from the essence, and accompanies it in every variety of decomposition, we have the evidence of both sense and reason; but that the mind is universally attached to matter, we have no evidence whatever. It is, perhaps, sufficient proof against the existence of any thing that there is none for it. But if there be any positive evidence on this subject, it is obviously on the other side. For, to contend that matter may, at the same time, possess contrary qualities, passiveness and self-motion, is to assert an absurdity as great as can well be conceived. Granting, however, that matter may, occasionally, possess mind, the phenomena of the latter are so contrary to those of the former, that, whenever matter appears in this manner, it must be considered as having divested itself of its usual properties and assumed others entirely different, which necessarily includes a change of essence. But to use arguments against those who believe that

the mind is a universal quality of matter, or that rocks and stones think, “is, perhaps, to imitate the conduct of those adventurers who rode round the world in search of hydras, griffins, and other monsters.” The fancy must, therefore, be employed on something more plausible before it be adopted by the understanding. That, however, which is shocking to the weakest understanding in one shape, becomes capable of deception in another. Those who do not believe mind to be a universal quality of matter, yet believe that it may be produced by a combination and relation of qualities the most contrary to its nature.

SECTION II.

It is difficult, however, to conceive how any thing could be formed out of nothing : or, if thought does not exist in matter in every state, how a substance so different from matter could be produced by any modification of matter. All the qualities which are found in matter in any state of combination, are to be found in any single object of it. Matter, in a perfect state of orga-

nization, makes no nearer approach to mind than in its rudest form. The growth, foliage, and appearance of vegetables, and the construction and operation of the senses, exhibit no quality of the mind, and nothing which has any resemblance to it.* All the phenomena of organization are but the usual qualities of matter, such as form, solidity, and extension; the operation of the senses amounts to nothing without the mind; and something must be added to the body before it can contain the power of thinking.

As the operations of matter are universally the same, whether in immense bodies or minute particles, whether in the internal senses or the mechanical powers, it is

* The reason why we say vegetables possess life is, that they strictly resemble the vegetable part of animals, their bodies. Because life produces motion, we say, figuratively, that every thing which possesses motion has life. Thus we say beer is alive when it is in a state of fermentation. The phenomena of many plants have, indeed, a resemblance to voluntary motion; but at the same time, every motion which they exhibit is evidently compulsory; as they are incapable of deviating from a fixed mode, and seem to have no interest in any thing which concerns them.

impossible to conceive how the action of one material body upon another, could create consciousness, or render either capable of sensation ! How a certain relation or combination of solidity, or extension, could form thought, reason, and memory, or, in short, produce a new substance, which, unlike other material substances or qualities, is not an object of the senses, although the proof of the existence of such a substance is greater than that of the existence of the objects of sense. The proof of the existence of the mind is the proof of sensation, and is as strong as pain is exquisite.

Motion can, in reality, add nothing to matter. All that the action of one material body or particle upon another is capable of producing, merely amounts to giving it a change of place or form ; altering its density, by compression or expansion ; or reversing the angles of its surface, so as to vary the operation of the rays of light on the sense of seeing. All the skill of an apothecary, in compounding drugs, can produce only a mixture of the same ingredients ; all the art of painting amounts on-

ly to mixing the same colours and shading them through each other, without producing any thing different from colour.

All the changes which can be made on matter amount to no more than modifications of those universal qualities which appear in the largest bodies and minutest particles, and which are attached to it in every variety of combination. Such qualities only are to be found in it, and these can never produce a new substance, and bear no relation to reason, thought, or consciousness. After analyzing the body, therefore, it will be found that something must be added to produce the conceptions of the mind. For, if we try the experiment, and examine the the parts of it individually, we shall perceive that thought, as a general quality of matter, is intrinsically inherent in none of them, and that they collectively* can never produce more than motion, that motion is nothing intrinsical, or more than an idea arising from the relation of the common

* They can produce nothing collectively which they have not individually. Matter has, in reality, none but general qualities.

qualities of matter, but that the mind is something intrinsic, or at least, if that be doubted, nothing else can be believed.

To confound the mind with the organization of the body, is to take relation for substance, and proceeds from a partial consideration of the operations of matter. We are, indeed, so much accustomed to the decomposition of the parts, to the change of form and relations of matter, in the various objects in which it appears to our senses, that, according to familiar notions, we must believe in the capability of the annihilation and re-creation of its qualities. But although the objects of matter change, the qualities do not. No organized body exhibits any new property of matter, or more than a certain direction and combination of its universal qualities. The qualities of matter are continually acting against each other, decomposing bodies, separating their parts, and changing their modification. But this is all that the operation of matter ever amounts to. The hardest granite is, in time, decomposed by the attacks of surrounding objects; and by a chain of im-

pulses, or flux of attractions, (which, when they have once received a certain direction from the hand of the original framer of nature, continue, as rivers flow in a perpetual stream from their source), it becomes an organized body. But does it make any approach towards thought in the one state more than in the other? or is the whole operation of organization, by which the appearance of things is changed to the senses, more than “hot, cold, moist, and dry, four champions fierce striving for mastery?”* At least it is clear that those different material phenomena, which affect us so variously, are not to be considered in the same light as the mind. We are certain that the mind is a real substance, and also that every *variety* of material phenomena consists only in different relations of the same

* The principle of vegetation, though evidently mechanical, and relating solely to change of form, is a mystery which inquiry has not yet been able to unravel. The rudiments of every plant are certainly contained in the seed, and unfolded by means of heat, moisture, and the appropriation of the finer particles of matter. But how the seed is formed in the mother-plant, or continued from one plant to another, has hitherto defied investigation.

few qualities. Those numerous organized bodies, which appear so dissimilar are, in fact, only different in the ideas of the mind. Every change of material substances, whether destruction of old or production of new, is but a change of the relation of the few universal qualities which matter possesses, the *principle* by which such change is effected, whatever was the origin of the impulse, is but another *name* for motion, and motion* is a mere abstract idea like that of time.

Motion is merely a change of *place*. It has no reference to feeling or thinking but merely to space. Its effect is an alteration of the arrangement of material bodies or particles ; and the term *principle* signifies only the *mode* by which that alteration is accomplished. When, therefore, we speak of the principle of organization, nothing more is meant than a uniform chain of causes, or train of impulses operating a certain succession of events, or general facts, on the common mass of matter.

* When the mind is designated as the principle of vitality, it is indentedified with motion, or reduced merely to a peculiar mode of impulse actuating matter.

Every variety of organization arises merely from the peculiar manner in which those qualities which are found universally attached to matter are actuated. It is, therefore, impossible, by any change of the relation of the qualities which matter already possesses, to add a new quality to it, or that any thing essentially, or more than ideally, new can be compounded from it. To build a house, or a ship, is only a more mechanical or imperfect species of organization than that which is performed by the natural bent of the qualities of matter, and without the impulse continued. But although such fabrics may seem to the eye, or appear, from superficial observation, to be things new, created by the composition of matter, it must become evident, on an examination by the understanding, that they contain nothing intrinsically or internally more than they did before receiving such form and connection, and that the qualities of the matter of which they are composed, are the same, with respect to each other, and to the qualities of other material bodies, as if they had never been parts of them.

Every change which it is in our power to make on matter is only to modify its qualities. When we imagine that we have created any thing new, we have, in reality, only diversified these qualities, or formed new combinations of them. We can, in short, never do more than change one form or one colour, &c. for another. It seems impossible, by any mixture of matter, to produce what is not in it, or, by any arrangement of its qualities, to create another entirely different. To assert, therefore, that any real substance, or even quality, could be formed from another, or that the mind is a composition, or production arising from the agitation of matter, is an absurdity not less apparent than to say that a part is equal to the whole.

It is inconceivable how matter can either acquire or lose a quality; or how it can ever appear without, or assume any different from those generally attached to it. The qualities of matter, in reality, never suffer any change even when they appear most to do so. All those peculiarities which natural philosophers and chymists remark

belong to matter, all those vegetables, minerals, and metals, salts, acids, and alkalis, which affect us so variously, will appear, on the slightest examination, to be only modifications of its few primary, or universal qualities. All these, together with the effects which they produce upon each other, are evidently referable to the common qualities of matter, and are merely certain relations of form, extension, &c.* But it is clear that the mind is not a relation of these qualities, because, it is a real *something*† existing in addition to the common qualities of matter. However much, therefore, men may vary their systems of matter with regard to the mind, there will always

* As the action of all material bodies upon each other, arises (setting aside their magnitude, or the quantum of matter) from their form, so must the operation of minute ones. Hence, all the different qualities which chymistry exhibits can be reduced to difference of form. May it not, therefore, happen that chymists, by giving matter a new form, often create those qualities which they pretend to discover? And is not the old idea of the alchemists, that any thing may be formed out of any thing, at least plausible? Chymistry, will, it may be prophesied, be a science of perpetual discovery.

† Lucretius is, in fact, reduced to this necessity.

be great difficulty in demonstrating a quality to arise from a combination of others which have no affinity to it. After explaining all the operations of the corporeal structure, the circulation of the blood, the irritability of the muscles, and the vibration of the nerves, it is evident that every effect produced is merely mechanical, that it does not approach the phenomena of the mind, and that with regard to sensation and ideas, there still remains a deficiency. If it be asserted that all those animal motions which we call voluntary are produced by the same physical laws as the operations of other mechanical combinations, by the reaction of external objects, it is evident that this, in effect, excludes the phenomena of the mind instead of accounting for them, has a tendency to deny their existence, and to produce merely a piece of mechanism without sensation or ideas.

The mind will always have a repugnance to mechanical principles. All the operations of the body may, perhaps, be apparently demonstrated to arise from physical laws. But, in that case, the mind cannot be ad-

mited; for when its existence is granted it must appear with principles very different from mechanical, and which can never be united with them. It is easy, indeed, to confound the mind with the mechanical motion of matter, but difficult to render them consistent. Men may talk of wheels, pullies, and levers, and form beautiful systems of fibres and vibrations; but where is life? where is sensation or thought, with all its long train of modifications which form the mind?

All the mechanical motions are referable to the general qualities of matter; and there are few phenomena in nature, excepting those of the mind, which have not been satisfactorily explained by their means. But, from the difficulty of uniting motion which exists only by impulse, with that motion which arises from pleasure and pain and other intellectual interests, even natural philosophers must feel a reluctance in referring the operations of the mind to the common laws of mechanism, and must be compelled to admit that the mind is *an addition* to matter, or at least a quality of mat-

ter different from others. Nothing can, indeed, be more evident than that the common laws of mechanism could never produce the mind, for it is a maxim which experience has long established in philosophy that every effect must have a relation to its cause. On this principle, it is apparent that mechanical combinations and operations can produce only mechanical effects. The operation of every combination of the common qualities of matter depends upon motion; and whatever term motion receives, whether undulation, elasticity, impulse, or pressure, its effect, in the most complex internal operations of matter, must uniformly be the collision of material particles. Now to say that the mind is collision, were to deny its existence, and affirm that it is nothing; because *collision** is only a remark which the mind draws from its

* This is a specimen of *combination*; but of combinations there are some simple, consisting of the union of only two objects, as of two metals; others complex, consisting of the union of many, as a piece of machinery. *Greatness*, or magnitude, again, may be given as a specimen of *relation*. Now an object is great or small only relatively, as the same object which is great compared to one, is small compared to another.

observation of the operation of material qualities. On the other hand to say that it is not collision but merely the result of it, would be to assert the previous existence of the quality of thought in matter.* For it is evident, that, if the intellect does

The quality of greatness or smallness is, therefore, nothing in either object, but merely a comparison between them existing in the mind. A *principle*, again, may be instanced in a species of vegetables. A portion of matter having originally received the form of a particular vegetable, the species is continued through nature, from the internal mould of the parent, by the original impulse received, in the same manner as a ball fired from a cannon would continue to move for ever, were nothing to interrupt its course. A *species* is, in fact, nothing more than a *succession of similar events*, flowing from an original *impulse*; and equally entitled to the term principle, is, not only the formation of metals and minerals, but even fevers, and other infectious poisons, these last being merely impulses communicated from the blood of one person to that of another. *Modifications*, again, are nothing more than the *degrees*, or less or more, of objects, or principles. The whole, *combinations, relations, principles, and modifications*, are, in short, nothing in addition to the single quality of matter, *extension*, and are merely remarks made by the mind on the manner in which matter is divided and actuated.

* Supposing mind to be merely the impression of one body upon another, without the matter, the body on which the impression is made must inherit the power of thinking; for an image or impulse impressed on the sensorium is, in no respect, different from an impression made by a seal on wax. Hence,

not arise from any relation of the ordinary qualities of matter, matter can possess it only as a distinct property, and that all mechanical systems of the mind can be rendered consistent in no other manner than by ascribing the power of thought universally to matter; an opinion, again, which would form a contradiction to the most extensive and uniform experience, and which no materialist ever yet ventured to maintain. The mind cannot be formed by a relation of the common qualities of matter, because the mind is something and such is nothing; nor can it be a simple, because it is not a universal quality of matter. The mind, in short, must be different from matter, or it must be nothing.

The construction and operation of the senses, and the sensations and ideas of the mind, bear no similarity or relation. The first are easily explained on common mechanical principles; but the latter have never received even the smallest degree of

it is clear, even on mechanical principles, that the variation of relation is not the mind, but only an accident which affects the quality of mind existing in matter.

illustration from mechanical philosophy, which is something wonderful, considering the progress which we have made in it, and the facility with which we solve every other phenomenon in nature by it. Intellectual and physical qualities form two distinct sciences ; and mechanical philosophy must stop when it comes to the mind.*

SECTION III.

THAT difference, however, between the nature of mind and matter, which appears from their being governed by distinct principles, seems to form an inconsistency with their intimate connection. The more proof we acquire of difference between them, the more difficulty we have in conceiving the nature of their union. The manner of the connection between the mind and body is, indeed, a mystery which all attempts to

* The mind is capable of containing ideas of every quality of matter, and all their relations ; and when we consider that its various principles, and extensive knowledge, form a science equal to that of matter, we are compelled to admit that they must have some foundation, some substance relative to their own nature to rest upon, at least as much as the qualities of matter have.

explain have hitherto proved abortive. We can easily trace the operations of mind and matter separately, but when we attempt to identify them we immediately fail. The mind can neither be brought down to matter, nor can matter be sublimated to mind. Every attempt to assimilate the former to the latter has been equally unsuccessful. Whether the nerves have been represented as operating upon the mind by vibration, by the afflation of pipes, or the circulation of subtile fluids, the effect has been equally mechanical, and remote from an intellectual nature. But such difficulty in explaining the manner of their connection still tends to strengthen the distinction between them. For, if their principles of operation had been similar, those of the one would have explained those of the other.* But that the mind affects the body in a manner

* Again, to identify the operations of the mind with the motion of the nerves would be to create an inconsistency between such motions and all other physical laws, or to grant that every change of state which the rudest and least organized part of matter undergoes is accompanied by an idea; that if a stone move, a spring bend, a fluid be agitated, or a rod vibrate, it thinks.—

different from that in which the body affects the mind, is as evident as the connection between them. The mind is affected by mechanical principles ; and re-acts by those of pleasure and pain.

In this extraordinary circumstance, which has hitherto been, and will always be, the stumbling block of philosophy, and a boundary to the extent of human comprehension, consist the difficulties of both materialists and immaterialists. For, such is the repugnance of mind and matter, and such the difficulty of conceiving the union of things so different, that the only question on this subject which has hitherto divided the Empire of Philosophy, is which shall swallow up and destroy the other. To include the principles of the one in those of the other is the only expedient which men have yet devised to obviate such an unconquerable difficulty. Sometimes this problem is solved by the denial of the existence of mind, and at other times by the denial of that of matter. In the dispute, however, immaterialists have, by evidence and knowledge originating with the mind, an appar-

ent advantage; for if a person be certain of any thing, it is that his own mind is something. While, therefore, the philosophy of Berkley has unanswerably proved matter to be a quality of mind, the mechanical philosophy of the mind is chiefly supported by deductions from remote and dubious circumstances, and the most precipitate of conjectural reasoning.

There appears no matter in thought or in will, yet thought and will have an effect on matter, and the mind no sooner purposes any thing than the members of the body obey it. How what is immaterial can have an effect on, or connection with matter, how matter affects the mind with sensations, or obeys its determinations, seems to be an inexplicable circumstance, and one of those difficulties in which the success of research is hopeless!

The thinker and the thing thought of, the actor and the thing acted on, seem, from the very terms, to require to be different substances. If, therefore, we suppose a connection between them, we must also imagine the manner of it to be incom-

prehensible. That substance, capable of thinking, judging, and determining, and which possesses qualities so different from those of matter, which we call immaterial, in order to be capable of communication and intercourse with the various objects of nature, must necessarily be provided with a material and organic apparatus. But because the connection cannot be traced, is it a sufficient reason to confound mind with matter, or to identify the thing acting with the thing suffering? That the mind cannot find ideas in itself to employ itself on; that it cannot be stimulated without matter, or some other external object, is certain; nor can matter be put in motion without the mind. This, however, in no manner affects the existence of either of these substances but merely the intercourse between them.

To dissolve the connection between mind and matter, would only be to strip the former of the senses, and deprive it of the means of exercise. To imagine that the mind could be hurt by being separated from matter, is to confound the means of

exercise with the substance of the mind itself; and we may as well suppose that matter would be injured by such a separation. As it is inconceivable that what is could be destroyed, as well as that any thing could be formed out of nothing, we must conclude that the mind, after being separated from matter, still exists independently of physical support, although it cannot think of matter independently of matter and the senses. But the variety of the application of its powers leaves little room to doubt, that, if it had the means of communication with any different species of matter, it would reason on its principles with the same^l facility as on those of the matter which we now perceive.

When the mind is separated from the body, it undoubtedly disappears in such a manner as to leave no trace of its existence. But it is to be remarked, that, without the knowledge of the existence of our own intellects, the existence of the intellect of another person can be proved only by the intervention of matter, and that when the body ceases to indicate the presence of the

mind, nothing more is evinced than that the imperfect state of the former has rendered it incapable of influencing, or of being influenced by the latter.

It is always, indeed, to be recollected that the mind is never seen or felt, never becomes an object of sense. It can only be present to its own contemplations, and even by these imperfectly comprehended; for how difficult must it be for any substance to perceive itself by its own qualities! It is only by matter, in reality, that the being of the mind is proved; for were it not for the impression derived from physical properties, it is difficult to conceive how we could arrive at the idea of our own existence.* While we are engaged in feeling and perceiving external things, we find it difficult to turn our eyes inwardly upon ourselves. The mind is totally unlike those objects by which its sensations are excited,

* We have no ideas of the mind but those which are furnished by external objects, and no other knowledge of the existence of matter than by its impression on the mind; so that the qualities of matter are the evidence of the existence of the mind, and the ideas of the mind the evidence of the existence of matter.

and always eludes the grasp of its own comprehension. If matter be a word used to signify what is, the mind may, indeed, be called matter; but at the same time it will be found a species of matter different from that which is the object of our senses. It is a substance between which and that which appears to exist externally we find it impossible to discover any analogy. Materialists furnish us with no greater knowledge of the essence of matter than that derived from its qualities. The same indulgence may, therefore, be lawfully claimed by, and naturally granted to, those who contend for the immateriality of the mind. If they can shew that the qualities of mind and those of matter are entirely different, it is not easy to conceive what higher proof of a difference between their substance materialists have a right to require. As second qualities are so must be first, and as mind and matter differ in operation so they must differ in substance. The qualities of

Motion, attraction, repulsion, &c. are evidently only secondary qualities of matter, or merely relations of its primary qualities.

matter are form, extension, bulk, gravity, solidity, colour, &c. those of the mind consciousness, thought, reason, memory, self-love, deliberation, will, pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c. To apply either the qualities of mind to matter, or the qualities of matter to mind, would be a shocking contradiction to that difference between them which is evident from comparison.

The great error which men fall into on this subject is to take the mind for a quality of matter (or even some unknown and incomprehensible—I do not know what to call it—a principle which is not a quality of matter*) instead of a substance different from matter which has a variety of qualities of its own. It is evident that whatever has more than one quality is not merely a quality itself but that it is a body.† Matter has no greater variety of qualities than mind. As, therefore, the qualities of matter have no resemblance to those of mind, nor the qualities of mind to those of mat-

* Matter has in reality none but general qualities.

† By body is here meant substance, or a collection of qualities.

ter, they are evidently two substances entirely different, and entitled to the same degree of respect. The qualities of matter have a distinct and evident dependence upon each other, and those of mind are, in the same manner, mutually connected. Can extension, form, or solidity, be divided? or can consciousness, reason, memory, pleasure, and pain, be separated? But have consciousness, reason, memory, pleasure, and pain, any dependence on bulk, form, and extension? more than bulk, form, and extension, have on consciousness, reason, memory, pleasure, and pain? Granting, therefore, that the mind is no more than a peculiar species of matter, it appears to be so different from other material bodies as to be only capable of being attached to, or mixed with, them. One body cannot be changed into another, although the difference be much less than between mind and matter. Some material substances possess such repugnance, that, although the parts of each may be mixed with those of the other, the one can never be changed into the other by any alteration of modification; the

particles of each body always remaining unchanged. Fire,* or at least heat, and water may be mingled; but, even when compounded, fire always remains fire, and water water. If these elements preserve such distinction, and are so little capable of uniting and changing their nature, how much less must the mind, which is so different from all material substances, not only in modification but in essence, be of assimilating with any material substance whatever. If mind, therefore, exist universally in matter, it must be in the same manner as fire exists in other bodies, by the particles of the one body being mixed with those of the other, without any other connection, and always preserving the same intrinsical nature and internal distinction.

We can easily conceive the manner of the operation of one of the common qualities of matter upon another, and clearly perceive its effect; but, by no stretch of imagination, can we conceive how any relation of the common qualities of matter could produce either sensation or thought.

* When this fluid appears to the eye, it is called *flame*, but when it acts unseen, in separating bodies, it is called *heat*

Hence, the only conclusion is that they are either qualities which matter possesses at all times, or which exist in a substance very different from matter. Experience is uniform in proving that matter does not universally possess the quality of thought, and in demonstrating that thought belongs to a distinct substance. That this substance is not less real than matter we have equal evidence.

When we pursue our researches into matter abstractly, and leave its qualities, we find nothing more substantial to rest on than when we do so with regard to mind. The essence of matter is either so subtle, or so far beyond the reach of our senses, that it escapes the grasp of conception equally with that of the mind. Perhaps, the only difference between our knowledge of matter and of mind, is that we know the outward or secondary qualities of the former, and the inward or primary of the latter. The reason, therefore, which induces us to imagine the mind less substantial than matter appears to be that we have a more abstract knowledge

of the component essence of the mind, by it being in ourselves, than of that of matter. All qualities seem to be nothing in themselves, but only the marks or effects of something; and it is to be feared man has neither the capacity nor the means of conceiving essences. But if it be contended that, as we can never arrive at the idea of substance, we ought, in strict reason, not to believe in its existence, this will reduce mind and matter equally to the condition of non-existence. If, again, we admit the existence of qualities, it will then appear that mind is an assemblage of qualities different from that which forms matter.

The qualities of matter are so similar that they evidently belong to one and the same substance, and not to different faculties, as a certain species of materialists or advocates for the principle of organization or vitality contend; but yet they are so different as to evince variety. How similar are consciousness and reason, pleasure and pain! and how naturally do pleasure and pain become qualities of, and arise from, the same body! How readily does will

couple with reflection ! How nearly connected is memory with judgment ! But how absurd would it be to join any of these with bulk, gravity, or any of the other qualities of matter ! and how ridiculous would it be to prescribe a form to the mind, or its sensations ! to think it or them round or square ! But if we push things to the extreme of simplicity both mind and matter may be said to possess, each, only a single quality. Thus all the qualities of mind may be reduced to modifications of *sensation* ; those of matter, to modifications of *extension*. The variety made out of each of these two, is, in reality, no more than different names for the same thing, or at most but different descriptions of it in different circumstances. We find it impossible, however, to conceive sensation to be a modification of extension, or, in short, to identify the former with the latter ; although it is not equally clear that extension is not a modification of sensation, or a mere idea. After all, as we are but ignorant beings, we cannot pronounce positively that the mind is not derived from matter ;

but this much is certain, that, if it is, we cannot conceive how.*

The operations of the mind and the body are singularly blended, as the means and the power must, of necessity, be. But to ascribe each faculty of the mind to a particular organ, is to take the effect for the cause. Passions are the impressions of the senses reverberated from the mind. They generally arise from abstract considerations, and are matter of opinion. They, therefore, originate in the intellect, and afterwards only affect the organs by which they are expressed. Those, however, who trace the operations of the mind no farther than those organs, do not perceive the passions to have a common centre or focus, and ascribe them to those parts of the

* All our reasoning on this subject, indeed, ultimately comes to the self-evident difference between intellectual and physical qualities, and the impossibility of identifying them. Here the subject may be said to be closed; but thus far it is distinct. Mind is certainly something; and if not a quality of a peculiar substance must be a quality of matter, which reduces the difference between materiality and immateriality to the trifle of an unknown essence; although still it is reasonable to consider the essence as of the same nature with the qualities.

body' in which they ultimately appear. But is it not more reasonable to say that a person trembles because he is afraid, than to say that fear is the consequence of trembling? and could there be any thing more absurd than to assert that love existed in the lips, or anger in the skin of the forehead, because a person smiles when he is pleased, and knits his brow when enraged! That benevolence and the agreeable passions exist in the heart, there is not even a physical reason for believing.

Another very great mistake which men generally fall into concerning the mind is to imagine that its essence is changed by the operation of its qualities; or that it grows as it extends its exercise, or as it acquires and corrects its knowledge. Hence, it is used as an argument against the immateriality of the mind, that it is, or seems to be, smaller when it first appears, than when it leaves the world.* A person's ex-

* The faculties of the mind of a child appear to be perfect as well as those of the mind of a man. The only difference between them seems to arise from difference of experience. The expansion of the mind is merely a figurative expression, taken from physical qualities. To increase or improve know-

istence may, on the same principle, be disputed when he is sent to a Greek Academy, because he knows nothing of that language; for it is as unreasonable to expect the mind to be learned in the affairs of this world, without having seen them, or correct in its knowledge, without experience, as it would be to expect that a person should understand a science which he never had an opportunity of studying. The mind appears only as it is stimulated. Its faculties are unfolded by slow degrees, and its exercise is long obstructed by the imperfection of its organs, by the manner of its connection with matter, and by the deficiency of its means of knowledge. But after the body has arrived at maturity, the ideas of the mind do not cease to expand, and it still proceeds in acquiring knowledge. Nothing can, indeed, be more different than the periods of corporeal and mental perfection.

ledge, is only to acquire or change ideas. It is not to be imagined that the thinking substance is altered by every new idea which it forms, or that it is extended by every acquisition of knowledge; for it is as easy for the mind to form an idea of an extensive as of a narrow portion of space. The mind grows only by thinking, if it may be said to grow at all.

When the person is in its bloom, intellectual attainments are very superficial. Youth is seldom accompanied with much understanding; and, in general, the mind does not possess great vigour till the body begins to decay.

SECTION IV.

WHERE two different principles of mind, or two different principles of matter, oppose each other, or where the one assists or retards the influence of the other, it requires great acuteness to perceive their separate effects, to prevent us from falling into confusion, and taking the one for the other; but much more acuteness is required, when the principles of the mind and the principles of matter act against each other, than when two principles of the same substance come in opposition. Sometimes the body assists, and sometimes retards, the operations of the mind, but such additions and deductions are, by those who possess acuteness, and bestow attention on the subject, easily distinguished from strength or weakness of under-

standing. At one time a person is more lethargic, and it costs him more trouble to bring his attention to things than at another, because he has then the labour of conquering indolence, in addition to that of reflection ; but, “ if he set doggedly to it,” he will think equally well at all times.

The apparent decay of the intellectual powers, which takes place along with that of the body, and which furnishes the chief objection to the doctrine of the immateriality of the mind, is certainly to be accounted for, from physical causes which affect the means of judging, and produce merely a deficiency of mental activity. Every person has experienced that he may be confused and stupified, by corporeal imperfections, while his abstract powers of discernment remain unimpaired. That loss of memory, therefore, which is consequent to bodily imbecility appears evidently to arise from no deficiency of mental capacity. Memory depends upon retracing ideas in a train ; but when the body does not possess sufficient stimulus to impress the mind

with lively sensations, the connexion between ideas is never commenced, or cannot be continued. It is apparent, therefore, that the mind, by the imperfections of its organs, may, in a manner, be separated from external objects without its capacity being impaired.

That much of the exertion of the mind depends on the state of sensation is evident. A lively state of sensation keeps the mind present to the objects which surround it, confines its attention always to the subject on which it is employed, and engages its powers in active operation ; while on the other hand, when the internal feelings are very much disordered, all its operations must be interrupted, counteracted, deranged, and rendered abortive.

Madness may be defined, either too great excitement or depression of intellect, or both, producing each other alternately. They have but one effect, that of fixing the mind to an individual object, and preventing it from ever getting to a sufficient distance from its notions to perceive their absurdity. This unnatural state of mind,

which is accompanied with continual anguish and despair, may arise, either from habits of thinking, such as Don Quixote acquired by reading books of chivalry until his imagination was engrossed by them, or from corporeal irregularities, which disorder sensation, and disturb the medium of ideas. But every species of madness, whether it has originated in the mind or the body, becomes the same by continuance. In madness, both the mind and the body must ultimately be diseased; for a disease of the mind soon produces one in the body similar, in every respect, to that which is the cause of mental derangement.* In this case, therefore, the difficulty will be to discover whether the disorder has ori-

* The reason why madmen seldom thoroughly recover is, that when the alimentary canal is once disordered by the agitation of the mind, the disease becomes incurable; the nerves of that part perhaps suffering something similar to a shock of paralysis. The effects of the stomach on the mind are incredible. The stomach may, indeed, be said to be the organ of the intellect. When it is strong, the mind is confident, and every thing appears agreeable; but when it is weak, the mind is timid, and filled with horror. In short, all happiness, as well as moral strength of mind, may be said to depend on the state of the stomach.

ginated in the intellect or constitution, whether the body has been affected by the agitation of the mind, or the mind disturbed by the diseases of the body. Experimentalists are certainly often deceived by the narrowness of their views. In this, as well as in other cases, they frequently take the effect for the cause ; but, without doubt, madness proceeds oftener from passions of the mind than from constitutional irregularities. Mental derangement is, however, always without any defect of understanding ; although the mind, in that state, is so much engrossed by the horrors of its ideas that it cannot attend to the propriety required by external circumstances, and is often driven to extravagant actions in the vain endeavour of escaping from those pains which are immoveably attached to itself. Madness is rather a disorder of the feelings than of reason, and more a want of happiness than of judgment, attended however always with the ultimate effect of misleading the imagination. But so far is it from being connected with imbecility of understanding that

those who possess the greatest talents are most liable to this dreadful calamity. Children, and persons of weak intellectual powers, are never subject to it; for how can a person despair who cannot think.*

The effect of dotage on the understanding serves to prove, that the similar imperfection of *idiotism* arises from the same dulness of sensation. It is said, that a person of the best understanding may, by the obtuseness of his sensations, be degraded to the condition of a cockle or an oyster. Yet it is observable that this does not reduce all intellectual difference among animals to the degrees of the acuteness of their senses. It has been remarked, that, from the nature of the external cover or envelope,† arises every difference among animals which sensation can produce on the mind; but with senses equal, and sometimes superior to those of man, brutes never approach him

* On this subject, Locke has a beautiful distinction. The difference, he says, between a madman and a fool, is, that the former reasons justly, from false data; and the latter, erroneously, from just data.

† See Buffon.

in intellectual excellence. It is not in acuteness of sensation, but in the power of abstraction that men excel beasts.*

The mind and the body are so intimately connected, that the one never fails to be affected by what the other suffers. A mutual sympathy exists between them; and man, in all his actions and affections, exhibits a mixed combination of intellectual and physical principles. The mind has sometimes an effect upon the body, and the body has sometimes an effect upon the mind. Sometimes the former affects the latter with diseases, and sometimes the latter brings them upon the former. When the mind is strong, by keeping the body in continual motion, it renders it lean; and when weak, corpulent, by allowing it to thrive like a well-planted vegetable. When the habit of the body is calculated to induce cheerfulness, it promotes the action; and when phlegmatic, it obscures the operations of the mind.

There is one phenomenon of the mind,

* Whatever the force of our sensations may be, the same relations may always be perceived between the same objects.

in no small degree, extraordinary, that is *sleep*. From sleep, we have an additional proof of the mind being different from the body. Were the action of any piece of mechanism to be interrupted, when that action again commenced, although the original and subsequent motions were similar, there would be no connection between them. In the same manner, if the mind were but a consequence of the motion of a particular part of the body, every time the action of that part of the body was suspended, a new mind would be produced, having no recollection of former transactions; experience and the acquisition of science would be vain, and every time we awoke, our identity would be destroyed and a new being produced. But it appears, from the same mind rising up again, with all its former ideas and opinions, that the connexion between its present and past thoughts is not dissolved; that it exists while it does not think, or endure sensation; that it is not destroyed while its operations are suspended, nor recreated when again called into action.

It has been remarked, that thinking is always, in a considerable degree, under the direction of will, that a person can think more or less intensely at pleasure, and that continual thought is no more necessary to the mind than continual motion to the body. But this is not altogether sufficient to account for the phenomena of sleep. For, although it is apparent that the mind, when weary, can forsake the senses, and retire within itself; yet it is obvious, from the effects of a blow which produces torpor and insensibility, and even from the frequent irresistibility of sleep, that this does not often happen by choice, but more commonly from necessity. It is, indeed, evident, that the mind is passive with regard to the sensations which it receives from the body. That suspension of thought, therefore, which arises from sleep, and the cessation of sensation, undoubtedly serves to give some countenance to the doctrine of materialists. Their error is, perhaps, not so much in believing a mechanical action of the corporeal functions requisite to mental operations, as in imagining, that, after having formed a

beautiful combination of vibrations and motions of the fibres of the nerves, nothing more is necessary to produce all the intellectual phenomena. If we correct these ideas, however, by supposing the necessity of a mind or recipient for the corporeal machinery to act upon, every intellectual peculiarity will then be accounted for, and the mental system rendered complete. It appears, therefore, that the mind is no more capable of beginning motion in itself than matter is, but that both receive it from each other. The mind never feels until acted upon: all our ideas, even the most abstract, are derived from sensation. As thought is always accompanied with sensation, and sensation with thought, it may be said that thought is merely a sensation, and, inversely, that sensation is a thought. The mind receives, no matter through what medium, an impression from the nerves, which produces a sensation of pleasure or pain, and induces a re-action; and thus the mutual operations of body and mind continue. The mind seems also to be as much within the power of necessi-

ty as the body.* It always yields to the strongest motive or impression†; but it is, at the same time, to be remarked that each is governed by its own principles, and that while the operations of the *mind* are directed by the interest of *pleasure and pain*, those of the *body* are regulated by impulse.

A difficulty, however, occurs here. If an idea be considered a quality of the mind, called into activity by the action of the nerves, how comes it that ideas of recollection, if they also arise from the impression of the nerves, are so very different from ideas of sensation? This circumstance seems to contradict the opinion that the re-action of the nerves is necessary to reflection; and suggests the idea that the mind may possess the power of continuing its operations, by means of its own facul-

* Hence, in accounting for intellectual operations, mechanical philosophers speak only of the brain, and metaphysical of the mind. Both seem right if they ascribe a certain degree of agency to each, but wrong if they ascribe the whole to either.

† What is *reason* but certain sensations, or the recollection of them, impelling us in a particular mode.

ties, after their motion is once commenced by matter.

Notwithstanding, however, the intimate knowledge which we have of our own minds, the majority of our opinions, concerning the peculiar nature of intellectual operations, must remain for ever, in a great measure, conjectural. Nothing is more difficult than for man to look at himself. While he is intent upon the qualities of other objects, he forgets himself, or is, in a manner, insensible of his own existence. As mankind are much habituated to thinking of sensible objects, although they always speak of the mind and body as two distinct things, they as constantly endeavour to account for the operations of both by mechanical means. Perhaps it is the easiest manner, and that which is most on a level with common faculties. All mental qualities, as they are objects of none of the senses, must certainly become less frequently the subject of attention than material. Hence demi-philosophers, as they are best acquainted with external phenomena, find mechanical reasoning easiest. But it is

evident that even all analogies between mind and matter are false, and when used to influence men to the best actions are but insidious means. Even the terms comprehension, recollection, and reflection, are taken from material operations, and have a deceitful tendency to induce the belief of a connection between things totally unconnected. Their fallacy can, however, be proved only by that self-evident dissimilarity which appears between intellectual and physical qualities; for it is impossible to demonstrate distinctly the difference between things which have no connection. The principles which govern the mind in reasoning are so different from those which govern matter in motion, that no comparison can be correctly drawn between them, shewing either resemblance or dissimilarity; although, at the same time, the mind may be likened to all the objects of nature, because it resembles no one more than another.*

* The mind is viewed as a balance, in which reasons are weighed; as a sea in a state of agitation; as a kingdom disturbed by factions. Sometimes it is a ship.—Hope is the

To endeavour to explain mental operations by physical laws always carries with it that absurdity which arises from the union of inconsistent things.* For, that the mind is a body, or substance, its qualities evidently shew, and their difference from those of matter prove that the former is different from the latter. However variously, therefore, the mind may be seen through matter, or however much intellectual faculties may be directed, governed, or repressed, by physical qualities, acuteness and attention are only necessary to enable us to separate the phenomena of the one from those of the other.

anchor, "Reason the card, but passion is the gale." At other times it is a landscape. We read of "the interior regions and recesses of the mind, the hollow caverns of deep thought, the private seats of fancy, and the wastes and wildernesses, as well as the more fruitful and cultivated tracts, of this obscure climate."

* Can any thing be more ridiculous than to say that a person has improved his brains by study; or that they are increased in quantity, or varied in form, by the acquisition of knowledge!

CHAP. III.

Self-love, or the Theory of Morality.

SELF-LOVE is a quality inseparable from the mind, as extension and form are from matter. In the contemplation of our own welfare, all our ideas are incessantly employed. When any event happens, or any object presents itself, the first reflection that arises is—"what may be its consequence to us?" and when any sudden or unusual appearance strikes our senses, we, by an involuntary motion, endeavour to provide for it.

Nothing is of any importance to a man but himself. All that falls within the reach of our knowledge is valued only as it has a tendency to affect our existence with pleasure or pain. The Stoics taught that pain is not an evil; but it seems, by the uniform tenor of the conduct of mankind, that nothing is now considered an evil but pain, and nothing a good but pleasure. Pleasure is, of all things, of the highest importance to the mind. Happiness, or that state of satisfaction which man is continually in

pursuit of, is but a succession of pleasing sensations or ideas. It is pleasure alone which regulates the whole system of his action, and which governs all his morality. Our pleasure is the primitive motive and first spring of our action ; and the pleasing or displeasing impressions of objects alone determine the manner of it. Hence arise the passions ; which are but different modes of acting towards objects according to their effects. As, again, all passions must be either agreeable or disagreeable, they may be divided into two distinct classes—loving and hating.

No object that can make itself known to us by any of our senses, can be wholly indifferent ; but as its consequences are strong or weak, immediate or remote, it is stamped with a greater or less degree of value. A subject of Great Britain joins in the emulation of his countrymen with the inhabitants of France, and participates in the pleasure arising from any superiority which the former gains over the latter. Every victory which his countrymen obtain over that nation, and every superior effort of

genius which they display convey a pleasure to him by the honour of his nation alone, although the consequences can no other way reach him. The effects of objects become stronger, when they are undivided, or as they approach ourselves. The inhabitants of England and Scotland contend with each other for the superiority of the respective places of their nativity; and the pleasure of an individual belonging to any of these nations, arising from the superiority of either, is greater than from their general and joint superiority over France. There is, again, a closer and nearer struggle for superiority between the inhabitants of neighbouring counties and towns; and still as interest contracts, it becomes stronger, till it end in personal honour and advantage. The pleasure of triumph, the pain of disgrace, and all other interests, are greater or less the nearer they approach, or the farther they are removed from, us. Hence, there is a variety of degrees of feeling from the honour and good of a person's nation to his own.

Every person exerts himself for his own good. All things are estimated as they produce pleasure ; and it is self-love which gives value to the useful qualities of others. To become powerful and rich, is the best way to obtain respect ; and to become generous, the best way to obtain friendship. A person is agreeable as he is generous, and disagreeable as he is parsimonious. But he who gives away has the same motive as he who retains, although he may be of a contrary opinion.

Passions are necessities. Nothing happens without a cause. Passions arise only from impressions, and must unavoidably be of the same nature as they are. If two contrary experiments be made upon the same thing, they must be attended with contrary effects. That which produces pain and that which produces pleasure, are equally important to self-love. Self-love is the parent of both benevolence and malignity ; and good and evil actions arise from the same motive.

Pleasure produces love, and pain hatred. We are loved and hated according to the

qualities which we possess. If we have no valuable qualities, we are of no value; if we have no disagreeable qualities, we can be the object of no hatred. Passions are never fixed upon inanity. He who has neither good nor bad qualities, can be the object of no affection of the mind, neither of love nor aversion, as he possesses no quality capable of raising it.

One passion is as justifiable to those who feel its force as another. It is no less difficult to us to resist the impulses of some passions, than it is to others not to hate us for possessing them. Hatred is as necessarily the consequence of an injury, or of that which is disagreeable, as love is of a benefit; and envy arises as naturally from superiority as contempt from inferiority. But however detestable any person may be to others, he is not hateful to himself. If we could imagine ourselves in his situation, we would feel his sufferings, and engage in his passions with the same warmth as he does. There is, however, seldom any pity felt for the sufferings of envy. An envious person must be destitute of abilities and valuable

qualities, otherwise he would have no cause for envy; and bad qualities, without any mixture of good, can engage no interest but what is disagreeable, and move no passion but hatred.

When objects change their qualities, men must change their passions. If we would use this obvious solution for the imperfections of friendship, and the inconstancy of attachment, much circumlocution of argument might be saved, and many superfluous reflections spared. It is no wonder that when we lose fortune we lose friends; that a person should have no regard for one who changes the principles of honest men for those of rogues, who forsakes fidelity for perfidy, honour for knavery, and truth for falsehood; or that those who were loved when they were beautiful or cheerful, are disliked when they become homely or melancholy, more than that men cannot change pain into pleasure. A person may change the object of his pleasure; but pain can never become pleasure to him.

SECTION II.

EVERY person grasps as much pleasure as he can; but where there is a number of competitors, it must be divided among them. We are restrained from the immediate gratification of many of our desires, even when it is in our power, by the danger of interfering with the enjoyment of others, and the dread of incurring their resentment, or of sacrificing lasting good offices to trifling immediate advantages. "In the first ages, men may be supposed to have acted without any other rule than the impulse of desire; practising violence, and suffering it in return. But a mutual forbearance would soon take place, and they would be content to forego the power of giving pain for the privilege of not suffering it."

All *virtue* is, indeed, artificial, and forced upon us. A human being has, originally, no other idea than that of unlimited gratification; and is taught to restrain his inclinations only by the resistance of others. Virtue, with regard to individuals, is generally the effect of education. A young man is honourable and honest, as he is

taught; a young woman modest and delicate, as she is instructed. A different mode of education would have rendered the one worthless, and the other shameless. There is nothing natural in the modesty of a woman more than in the honesty of a man. Both are assumed from motives of duty.

Virtue is, however, of two kinds, positive as well as negative; and consists as much in exerting our talents, as in restraining our passions. Virtues may, again, be divided into two classes; those which we owe to our neighbours, and those which we owe to ourselves. Both are founded on the principle of *utility**; penances and mortifications being excluded from the catalogue.

Virtue, as it regards ourselves, is what is most beneficial to us; as it regards society, what is most beneficial to the whole. But since that which is conducive to our

* Usefulness always refers to our pleasure. When an animal is useful, it is useful to us; when it is of no use, it is of no use to us. Some are harmless because they do no harm to us, whatever they may do to others; and some are useful even by destroying others. In short, we never carry our ideas farther than our own good; and it is evident that other animals do the same; for they prey upon each other without remorse.

own happiness tends also to recommend us to the esteem of mankind, virtue may be shortly defined *that conduct which is agreeable to others*. It is true, the same action which receives the approbation of an individual may not receive that of society.* But the terms universally used to describe virtue express merely the pleasure we receive from certain actions, and those used to describe vice our hatred of another set of actions.

All virtue, so far as it regards society, is but an extension, and all vice but a contraction, of self-interest. In this respect, the difference between a virtuous and a vicious disposition, is solely that between expanded and narrow self-love. Virtue is the good of others comprehended in our own. The more useful we are to others, or they are to us, the more valuable we are to each

* An individual may be useful to another for a quality which is pronounced base or mean by the world. Yet we often feel a sense of shame from the disapprobation of another, even when our conduct is proper or calculated for general advantage ; which shews that all virtue consists in pleasing our neighbours. Helvetius remarks that the sentiments of those present, whether fops or philosophers, fixes the idea of propriety. Hence we blush when we do what is right when others do what is wrong.

other ; the more the affairs of mankind are mixed together, and the more dependant men are upon each other, the more they are concerned for one another's prosperity. We must mingle our labours and desires, and become borrowers and lenders, in order to extend and unite our interests.

General utility establishes general virtue. But the utility of each is the rule of the conduct of individuals. Each, therefore, serves the community only as he is interested in it. The good and honour of a person's country very frequently yield to his private advantage. Public spirit can never equal that interest which we take in our own concerns, unless we place our whole desires upon the prosperity of our country, or the happiness of mankind, and in that case our gratification depends upon the accomplishment of their welfare, or, according to the common expression, we make their cause our own. Men, in all situations, will be governed by their own interest, and the conduct of individuals can be conducive to the public good only by tending to their own.

Every virtuous action is performed to obtain good, or avoid evil ; to acquire pleasure, or escape from pain. Moral goodness, or the virtue of performing those actions which meet with recompense, and avoiding those which incur punishment, is a political conduct obviously dictated by our own good. For what other end does a person wish to obtain Heaven, but to enjoy pleasure? and why do some attempt to persuade us that every duty of devotion is performed from a principle of generosity which has no self-interest in it, unless they imagine, that, because heaven is different from the earth, pleasure is not there the same. “ Doth Job serve God for nought?” or would the best of men be virtuous if vice produced more pleasure than virtue?

As “ every man would be a coward if he durst,” so would every man be a rogue. But, as men are esteemed, served, honoured, and respected, according to the utility of their qualities to others, prudence, in the pursuit of happiness, dictates the choice of a virtuous conduct in preference to a vitious; as the one is as easy as the

other, and the difference between them, with respect to ourselves, merely that of good and bad habit. Habit is always of the utmost importance, even supposing appearances to be the sole object. Conduct to be consistent must be uniform. For if we indulge ourselves in private, we must sometimes betray ourselves in public. The saying of a celebrated author should never be forgot—" I would be virtuous although nobody should know it, as I would be clean although no one should see it."

They are, therefore, most selfish who are most virtuous. No man, indeed, who has capacity sufficient for the calculation of advantage will be vitious. Vice is as contrary to wisdom as to pleasure, to individual as to general good. The compact of society is founded upon a conviction of its tendency to individual happiness, and he who is an enemy to the whole, is, for the greater part, one also to himself. Vitious conduct most commonly arises from that imbecility of intellect, which prevents men from distinguishing temporary from lasting good; or from that perversion of habit which com-

pels them to persist in actions contrary to their conviction. But when a person is vicious, it is unfortunate both for himself and society. Rectitude of conduct is the best means of happiness ; for the sacrifices of virtue resemble seed sown in the ground from which we reap an accumulated return.

But, to endeavour to procure the reward of virtue without its inconvenience, and the gratification of vice without its punishment, is a species of conduct frequently met with in the world. The easiest virtues are always most readily undertaken. Among the uneducated, nothing is more common than to attempt to substitute the smaller for the greater. But false virtues are the easiest of all. Hence arises the temptation to all hypocritical vices, and hence the motive of counterfeit virtues. Hypocrisy is a sort of compound vice which doubles criminality, satirises virtue, and degrades good qualities by rendering them subservient to bad. While it is one of the most advantageous vices for those who practise it successfully, by not only affording them the indulgence of guilt, but also the reputation

of virtue, it is the most injurious of all to society. The sanctimonious pretender, who ostentatiously performs the ceremonies, and rigidly conforms himself to the exteriors of religion, that he may the more securely neglect the duties, and deviate from the essentials of it; the false friend, who assumes extraordinary zeal, the better to ensnare; the traitor, who declaims furiously against the enemies of the state while he betrays its interests; and the prude, who covers indulgence by outrageous pretensions to virtue, form the basest and most despicable of mankind.

False virtue is, however, for the greater part, false wisdom. To sacrifice general principles of utility to temporary convenience, is to gain little and lose much. The advantages of confidence and respectability are incalculably superior to those of deceit and dishonesty. A single instance of moral turpitude is sufficient to forfeit a person's character for life; a single deviation from integrity is sufficient to shew that his principles are radically unsound. The same rule of conduct which he applies to

trifles he will apply to things of importance, and the maxims which he uses in one case he will use in every other.

Those qualities which are valued by mankind would not be virtues if they were not of universal benefit. Every person ought, therefore, for his own sake, to be virtuous. The good of the world is, in reality, so closely connected with our own, that nothing can be a more certain criterion of the tendency of our conduct towards our own happiness, than its tendency towards that of society. As the services of our neighbours are brought with that only which contributes to their advantage, our happiness depends so much upon that of mankind that we are incessantly obliged to consult their interest while we pursue our own. Virtue may, indeed, be said to consist in doing good to others; although we never do good to others but with the intention of doing good to ourselves. It may be for the interest of two persons to serve each other; but, in this case, each is influenced by self-advantage, and loves the other for his own sake.

We are forced, by our own good, to moral rectitude : prudence compels us to virtue, as much by the fear of impairing worldly interest, as by the dread of future punishment ; and we can no more be without useful and honourable principles than we can dislike pleasure. The most abandoned being cannot divest himself of all virtue ; nor can we imagine how any one could receive benefit from others without returning benefit to them. Morality is necessary even to the devil ;

“ For neither do the spirits damn'd
Lose all their virtue—————
————— Devil with devil damn'd
Firm concord holds.”—————

It is impossible to conceive how any society could subsist without general rules of right and wrong, and a regard to mutual advantage. “ Justice is in itself so excellent that it is necessary even among thieves.” In like manner, is virtue. Good offices are as indispensable as friendship is desirable. If benefits were not conferred on one side, there would be no return on the other. Independently, therefore, of the

dread of punishment, the desire of pleasure renders the want of virtue impossible.

What is called *Friendship*, is but a mutual exchange of things, qualities, or services, which circumstances render of little value to those who give, but of great to those who receive. The situations of mankind are so much diversified, and their relations so fluctuating, that nothing is more different or variable than the importance of things. Hence arises the necessity of exchange, and hence the universal intercourse of society. Friendship, like *Commerce*, is merely *a barter of superfluities*.*

By friendship, individual interests are combined and extended; and by the general compact of society, every member receives the assistance and protection of the whole. But all friendship depends upon that coincidence of pursuits or necessities which produces a union of interests;

* Those superfluities which form the object of commerce must always, from the nature of things, be equivalents. The discoverers of America exchanged, with the natives, iron for gold. Each party gave what was common for what was rare; what was superfluous for what was useful; each thought they had cheated the other; but in fact both gained.]

and it never continues longer than it is productive of mutual benefit.

As there can be no profit without some expenditure, in friendship it is necessary to sacrifice a little to gain much. Mutual services and sacrifices are necessary to obtain mutual benefits, and forbearance and fidelity to beget reciprocal trust and confidence. The greater self-denial we practise, the more agreeable we are. But every sacrifice which we make of our own good to others is a virtue which we expect will be recompensed by a like sacrifice on their part. Men are not only compelled, by the practice of others, and their dependence on them, to actions generally useful, but sometimes, in a certain degree, even to contradict their own choice, to deviate from their own pursuits, and to conform themselves to the opinions and follies of their neighbours. But they are more valuable to each other, as their interests coincide and unite. That conduct which tends to mutual good is always most estimable, because it has most the appearance of drawing forth exertion, and of being productive,

Friends are rendered valuable to each other merely by that exchange of services and confidence which produces mutual benefit and dependence ; and nothing is more illustrative of the principle of self-love than the caution with which friendship is contracted, and the severity with which its duties are exacted. Friendship increases only by small degrees of generosity and confidence on the one side which beget similar virtues on the other ; and an equality of good offices is absolutely necessary to its endurance. For, as friends are under mutual obligations, every breach of trust, or neglect of assistance, is an offence equal to the value of the friendship of the one towards the other. From the same cause, if two persons who had interchanged trust, should become enemies, their hatred would be equal to their disappointment, and their resentment to the obligations which they owed to, and the benefits they expected from, each other. But self-love, at no time, and in no case, willingly loses any thing ; its calculations are as minute as those of a miser. That persons who have

been once friends may still retain some degree of mutual good opinion, or at least of external respect, they often refrain, after they become enemies, from betraying the trusts or divulging the secrets which have arisen from their mutual confidence.

In proportion as any thing is valuable, a person will venture his safety, welfare, or property, to obtain it. In proportion as men are of value to, and love, each other, or as they expect mutual support and advantage, they risk their safety for, and give their assistance to, each other. Whatever affects the interest of a friend affects our own. We engage our wishes in the prospects, feel part of the anxieties and disappointments, and participate in the successes of those with whom we are connected in friendship. The loss of a friend is always the loss of interest, and a subject of grief as sincere as that interest is real.

But it is so well understood that every degree of concern which we take in the welfare of another is on our own account, that the language of affection is thought to be sincere as it discovers self-interest. The

most passionate professions of love, the warmest assurances of regard, the most benevolent wishes, and the most public spirited declarations, express merely modes of self-love, and bear an allusion to the gratification of the individual who makes use of them. But what can prove our sincerity and stimulate our exertions, if it be not our own advantage! The most benevolent actions and refined instances of generosity, are, in like manner, merely a particular species of selfishness, or a singular manner of gratification. By assisting us in our distresses, our friends hope, if we are ever restored to prosperity or reach a situation of importance, to participate in our good fortune, and to engage and enjoy a friendship in us towards them equal to their services; or, should their efforts prove abortive, they sometimes continue their attention for the pleasure arising from humanity alone. In every case, therefore, we are attached only to our own interest, and seek our own gratification.

As it is impossible not to love that which has given us pleasure, gratitude is involun-

tary as well as hatred. But the return of good offices is a duty which we are often compelled to perform, by that diminution of esteem which we would suffer by neglecting it, the destructive tendency of such conduct to benevolence, and the detestation which would be inspired against us. The praise of generosity is, indeed, of a very different nature, and is performed without reluctance; as it is merely a bait for additional favours, and a profitable exchange of words for things.

In every mode of intercourse with each other, we endeavour that the balance of exchange shall be on our own side. We perform no service but with the prospect of a return, and cultivate no friendship without the hope of advantage. Self-love is the principle which directs every form of conduct, and all our actions tend to one single point. This instinct governs the conduct of even the most stupid and ignorant of mankind with a dexterity truly admirable. Such is the uniformity of its operation, and so much does it preserve its consistency, even in the most intricate transactions of

life, that we pursue good and avoid evil without the consciousness of endeavour, and are even sometimes selfish when we design to be generous. It seems impossible, were man to make the attempt, to act from any motive different from his own good; for, take away self-love, and nothing remains to influence his conduct.

Self-love appears always under the double motive of obtaining good and avoiding evil; and this, again, as applicable to other men, corresponds with one quality called their *importance*. Hence every person enjoys those privileges and that respect from others which his merit and ability enable him to exact. The *power* which one person has of influencing another is, indeed, the sole criterion of *right*, whether that power arise from good or bad actions. All our virtues are exerted, and all our vices restrained, only by the influence of the qualities of others. Hence, some men are respectable from their virtues, and others formidable from their vices; some govern us by the prospect of advantage, and others by the dread of punishment; and some obtain

the same end from fear that others do from esteem. The only study of mankind, in their intercourse with each other, is to adopt that mode of conduct which is best calculated to direct the passions, and employ the talents of others, to their own advantage. Every person is, therefore, as virtuous as he dare be, and is no farther virtuous than he is compelled.

The respect which we pay to others arises entirely from the degree in which they possess the capability of influencing our happiness, or of affecting us with pleasure and pain. Every interesting quality of others, whether physical or moral, must act as a compelling cause. We are as much governed by wisdom as by violence, and, on the other hand, vigour of body is as much respected, in the degree to which it extends, as energy of mind. But of power, there are many kinds. Thus wealth is power. The rich claim a respect as necessarily flowing from their opulence; and, through the whole gradations of society, rank is settled with the most scrupulous punctuality. What also strength is in a

man, beauty is in a woman. Women even convert their weakness into a source of power; and often presume upon that established impunity which arises from the generosity of the other sex to be insolent and domineering. All means are, in short, resorted to for the purpose of coercion, and of subjecting the will of others to our own.

In morals, as in physics, there is a mutual attack and resistance. Every privilege is established by force, and those who have no power have no rights. It may be asked, what right has a man to take away the life of a brute? Merely that the latter can make no resistance. If man did not fear retaliation, he would pay no more regard to the life of his neighbour than to the life of a beast. The horror, therefore, which we have at murder is nothing more than a horror at our own destruction.*

Every man seems to have a right to do that to another which he can do. The idea is, indeed, generally acted upon. Thus, a strong man beats down the arguments of a wise

* Whence also arises the perfect indifference of a butcher to the feelings of his victim, if it be not from the idea of his own perfect security?

man by violence ; a wise man thinks himself entitled to ridicule a weak one ; the rich domineer over the poor ; and the unfortunate are often obliged to pocket contempt. No doubt this is but one view of the subject. Magnanimity and forbearance is another path which leads to the same object of self-gratification. We are, also, often, independently of the value which we put upon the esteem of others, sufficiently enamoured of our own quiet not to disturb that of our neighbour. Or we may recollect that those who are stronger than ourselves may follow our example, and inflict upon us those evils which we inflict upon others. But where any bad consequence would result from any action, we may be said not to possess the power of doing it.

For violence, there is no other remedy than violence. When one man forsakes a peaceable conduct, another must do the same.

Passion is in morals, what motion is in physics. But passion is kept in check by passion. Men, by the warfare of self-interest, ascertain their mutual strength, and adopt certain modes of conduct towards each

other for common convenience. Hence arise *justice*, and those general rules called *laws*; which are merely a species of prudence, by which we anticipate and supersede contention.

Laws are nothing more than the measure of the power of individuals. This power is continually varying; and consequently there are different laws for different times, and different societies. In most cases, a distinction is made between the higher and the lower ranks. In some countries, the latter are slaves; in others, the former have only peculiar privileges. But it is seldom that the law applies in the same manner to both; and when it does, it is still more seldom that it is impartially executed. Nothing is better understood, at least in practice, than that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor.

Laws are always the result of contention, and exist only where they can be enforced. Among nations, although books have been written on the subject, we perceive no other law or right, but the law of force, and the right of the strong to oppress the weak. Whatever is gained by one over another.

is fairly gained. Conquest is the title, "cannon the argument of kings."

Among individuals, the same principle of aggression is generally adopted; and where successful, uniformly sanctioned by the approbation of mankind. The violence of the strong, and the pretensions of the impudent and artful, become so many rights when acquiesced in; and how often do we see successful villany command applause, and impunity in the greatest crimes respect! It may even be established as a maxim, that nothing is disgraceful which is not punishable, and that every thing is honourable which is irresistible. The means are generally overlooked in the end; and power and wealth, being things estimable in themselves, seldom lose their influence by reflection on the mode in which they have been obtained.

Men are governed by two motives; and love is no less powerful than fear. Yet while persuasion acts unseen, the force of compulsion is always obvious and striking. Heroes and conquerors, and the general destroyers of mankind, never fail to meet

with admiration, while benefactors are treated with neglect. So likewise, in common life, it is, by no means, rare for men to be more respected for their vices than for their virtues. Innocence is, indeed, sometimes taken for an indication of weakness, and to be injured is often a sufficient cause for contempt. The value of men, therefore, reverts always to their power; and security and consideration are to be found only associated with courage and strength.

Men, without doubt, have an interest in the practice of benevolence; but it exists only in the absence of direct interest. Could, indeed, their own good be obtained without the injury of another, they would always prefer a benevolent conduct. But this is impossible. Political society is, therefore, nearly "a state of war;" and men, like many other animals, are, in a great measure, reduced to the necessity of preying upon their own kind. As the labour of one individual is of little more value than that of another, the chief means of advancement is for one person to appropriate the labour of another; which is

accomplished by affixing a high degree of value to his own. This, however, is not always left to the ingenuity of individuals ; but is often more effectually regulated by laws. Notwithstanding the praise of that liberty which consists in an equality of rights, so frequent in poems and rhetorical declamations, little of it has appeared in the world. The smallness of the number of the higher ranks of society, their superior intelligence, and instinct to combination, on the one hand ; with the greatness of the number, the ignorance, and difference of opinion of the lower ranks, on the other, have, in all countries and ages, rendered the latter an easy prey to the former. In most cases, the lower ranks have become a kind of property, their labour has been appropriated to objects with which they had no concern, and they themselves have been led out to slaughter to gratify the whims and caprices of their masters, while they have been taught to believe it was for their own honour and glory. Thus it happens that the higher ranks, while they subjugate the lower, destroy industry, bring all

to a level, and produce their own degradation along with that of society.*

Self-love, through all circumstances, pursues a direct course. But its impetus is greater or less according to the nature of the resisting medium. A difference is to be remarked between the morality of nations and that of individuals. One cannot among the latter, as frequently happens among the former, defy the combination of the whole. The violence and injustice of individuals are either of an indirect, encroaching and legal nature, or confined to those circumstances which general rules can never reach. The internal aggressions of society may be divided into three species;

* The poverty of the lower ranks, arising from their multiplying too fast, and by that means reducing the value of their labour, is not here spoken of, but the inequality of laws, such as prevails on the Continent of Europe, or the improper execution of them, such as takes place in Britain, by which the labour of the people is transformed into pensions to reward men for betraying their rights. The evil, in this case, is not so much the loss of the money, as the service performed. To obtain a few pounds, a person will vote away millions, and even conspire to reduce unborn generations to a state of slavery. Compared with such a crime, murder is but as one to a million. But it is not thought shameful, because it is common, and cannot be punished.

first, those of the higher ranks generally against the lower; secondly, the injuries arising from circumstances which enable one person to take the advantage of another, in which may be ranked

“ The oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes ;”

and lastly, open roguery. When, indeed, men abandon character, and set the world at defiance, they must be considered as playing a desperate game, in which the risk of failure can be compensated only by the greatness of the gain which success would confer. But, as the regulations of society are so contrived that the severity of punishment shall far exceed the advantages of guilt, the chances are, in all crimes, against offenders.* Even in the most minute immoralities, as the comfort of one man de-

* It has often been enquired why we respect a conqueror and despise a successful robber. In the first place, the latter only imitates or attempts what the former carries through, being never able completely to set the world at defiance. Again, the difference between them seems to be the difference between great and small. We admire a lion, but despise a cat; although both are of the feline species.

depends very much upon the good will of another, a person generally diminishes his own enjoyment in the same degree in which he lessens that of his neighbour. As praise is reward, so the very disapprobation of mankind acts as a sort of punishment, and serves to keep unruly passions in check. So important is the good opinion of our fellow creatures, that it may be considered the chief object for which every wise man contends ; for what is all vice, but to prefer money, power, or other limited enjoyment, to reputation ?

But while some have founded all morality upon a principle of disinterested benevolence ; others have explained self-love so as to reduce friendship and honour to mere hypocrisy and imposture, and exclude virtue altogether. These are, however, extremes. There is undoubtedly a disposition which has for its object the good of others, without any direct aim at self-advantage ; while there are false pretences which have nothing else in view. But in neither, are all human motives comprehended. Virtue has for its object not solely

self-good, nor solely that of society ; but that of both. Virtue is a mode of obtaining advantage through the medium of that of mankind ; a relation between our good and that of others ; a species of conduct for adding their exertions to our own in the pursuit of pleasure.*

Virtue is that rule of conduct by which we suffer a small degree of pain, and obtain a great quantum of pleasure ; vice by which we acquire an inconsiderable immediate good, and lose a superior future advantage. Both proceed from one motive, and are but different modes of obtaining the same end. But as the former is much better suited to its object than the latter ; it may, with little licence of language, be said that whatever is contrary to virtue is inconsistent with self-love. The moral world is, in short, actuated and governed, with so great simplicity and excellence by this principle, that we cannot too much admire its wis-

* Lord Chesterfield wrote a system of narrow virtue, or *selfishness*. But nothing more is necessary to shew its folly, or that the world were not imposed upon by the noble Lord himself, than the letter of Dr Johnson's giving up his friendship.

dom. By it, activity, honesty, and industry, are associated with pleasure, good, and happiness; and, in the common concerns of life, employment and prosperity are synonymous terms.

Hence self-love, rightly understood, is the motive of every virtue, and never becomes vitious but when it becomes imprudent. It is the privilege and wisdom of every person to enjoy himself as fully as he can; but if he exceed the limits of his power, his enjoyment must be lessened to that degree which the hatred and opposition of the injured can effect. If he seize an immediate benefit without regard to consequences, he must suffer the diminution of advantage in proportion as his conduct has been premature; or if he encroach upon that which belongs to his neighbour, he will be punished with the loss of that to which he is justly entitled. When, therefore, his actions become imprudent, he will immediately be informed by the conduct of others.

Self-love, when it does not exceed those bounds which a knowledge of our own

worth, common practice, and general good, have established, is the basis of all virtue; and is commended instead of being detested by mankind. For, while we pursue our own interest with prudence, we also pursue that of society. But when it exceeds those limits, it becomes vitious. Self-love becomes criminal and hateful when it exceeds what is common, what we are entitled to, or when it prompts us to seize upon the rights of others. It is, in fact, never amiable but when it induces us to render the good of others subservient to our own. To assist a person in distress, to obtain his friendship, is a virtuous action; but to seize violently upon his property a vitious one.

Universality excludes singularity; a constant habit of acting according to this principle precludes novelty. Although it is the spring which puts all human nature in motion, and a rule by which every action of mankind is easily explained,* only when

* Fielding seems to discover an uncommon degree of sagacity and penetration in his novels. Yet the whole mystery consists in tracing the single principle of self-love.

it predominates in an extraordinary degree can it be perceived. The first causes of nature do not appear to the bulk of mankind to extend farther than the sphere of their immediate action. The law of attraction cannot be conceived, in the general, by those who compose the crowd of mankind; but they can form an idea of up and down, weight, rising and falling. Vulgar ideas are not taken from principles but from particulars; and, as various particulars arise from the same principle, one principle is, by them, divided into a thousand. The lower orders of mankind know the difference between objects, but no more. Their ideas of generosity and selfishness do not extend to system, but are bounded by the prominencies formed by individual interests and actions, the excesses of which only, in respect to each other, and in comparison with common practice are marked with their approbation or disapprobation. The most active part of mankind are not at pains to enquire into the original causes of things; but what is by all admitted and practised they consider right.

Abstract principles are unwieldy, and unfit for common use. To facilitate intercourse with each other, as we use coin to represent commodities, we divide self-love into a number of slighter ideas, which always bear an allusion to the objects or actions from which they arise. Instead of saying, metaphysically, that a person is the cause of good or evil to us, we say, in common language, that he is honest or dishonest, benevolent or malicious, grateful or ungrateful.

To distinguish the various operations of the principle of self-love, it is sufficient to distinguish the objects of them. Passions take their names from the circumstances from which they arise ; and there are some particular interests among mankind which never vary. The strongest affection which does not refer to our own persons, is that which is felt by a parent towards a child, because a child may be said, more than any thing else, to be a part of the parent, a second-self, as in the former the latter perpetuates his present interests. This affection does not require to be reciprocal, and

cannot, like love, be destroyed, though it may be diminished, by discord ; for whether the child love the parent or not, the object of the parent is still in his power and still the same. It is even to be doubted, whether it be what is properly called affection which attaches a parent to his offspring, for it has often been remarked, that he is more attentive to their interest than to their happiness. As a child can have no future care or anxiety for his parents, that degree of affection which he has for them, or interest which he takes in their welfare, must depend upon their immediate utility to him, or at most can amount only to gratitude for past kindness. The passion of love, or of the sexes, though less forcible than affection towards children, is one of the strongest abstract passions, or which do not arise immediately from the senses. It is sometimes called the noblest, because the most agreeable, not surely because the most disinterested ; for it is no more than a contract of minds, which violation on either side will render abortive. There are few who can love without being loved ; and if any do,

they think the possession of the object of their desires can yield a pleasure which will overbalance hate. Friendship, benevolence, and generosity, are less degrees of the passion of affection. But friendship, without the prospect of an equivalent, is contrary to all the principles of the mind. The most universal benevolence is but an extension of self-love. Benefits are bestowed only where we expect a return of one kind or another. They never appear where the object of them is expected to be ungrateful, or where the pleasure arising from his gratitude would be less than the inconveniency of bestowing the gift. Gratitude, or a return of favour, again, arises from the desire of obtaining the further benefit of the good will of the person from whom the gift came. For, it is to be expected that a person, who has been once generous, may, when he meets with a due return, be still more generous, in expectation of raising a higher gratitude. Even among the nearest relations, self-love is as strong as natural affection. The only difference is, that the friendship or connection is closer. An ex-

act return of benefits is always expected ; and no more is given than received. Sometimes, indeed, through all the hypocrisy of decent lamentation it is not difficult to perceive that a person is not displeased with the misfortunes of a relation or friend which contribute to his advantage. The prospect of succession, it is said, diminishes grief. Nature has so determined that it cannot be otherwise. But so general and intricate is the operation of this law of the animal creation, that to pursue the various appearances which it assumes through life is impossible. Anger or hatred is one half of the passions, and proceeds so directly from self-love, that any illustration, to shew the connexion between them, is unnecessary. Vanity arises from a combination of self-love and false judgment. Modesty is a passion, which, of all, has the greatest appearance of being disinterested, because it discovers a diffidence of ourselves, and a higher opinion of others. Its operations, however, are involuntary, and contrary to our inclinations ; and it is an agreeable quality to others, because it flatters their self-love, and never interrupts the

pleasure arising from a contrary disposition in them. The nearest affection to disinterestedness, or the most extended feeling of self-love, is that which is purely speculative. But to say that any passion is disinterested, is to say that there can be an effect without a cause. Sympathy with distress arises merely from the consciousness of being liable to it. All our passions may be strong or weak, or of greater or less utility to others; but no passion can be disinterested, for passion depends upon interest.

SECTION III.

BESIDES the peculiarities of self-love arising from the general peculiarities of things, and the stronger differences with which the universal laws or necessities of nature have marked this principle, every animal has a natural instinct which distinguishes its species, and every person a peculiar constitutional character, which, though they do not essentially affect self-love, at least variegate its appearance. The prudence, or manner of pursuing pleasure of one differs from that of another, according

to the strength of their judgments or the nature of their imaginations. All men, indeed, agree in pursuing good and preferring that which is best; but they differ very much in opinion with regard to what is good and best. Different things have different degrees of value to different persons. The happiness of one may be to gain good will by good nature; and another may feel more enjoyment in the majesty of churlishness. (*Prudence**)

* *Section 1.—Prudence.*

WITH regard to Prudence, we fail more in execution than in design. Every person knows that form of conduct which is most prudent; but few are able to act according to their own ideas of rectitude. In most cases, determination is easy, but practice difficult. It is difficult for an irresolute man to be firm; a timid man to be brave; a man given to indulgence to be temperate; or for a proud man to be submissive. But it is easy for him to see the necessity of these virtues. In short, as the gratification of every passion is pleasing according to its force, no man can sacrifice present enjoyment to future prospect so far, or put such restraint upon his inclinations, as that some part

That difference of thinking, of ability, and dissimilitude of passions which are

of his natural disposition will not appear. All men, therefore, in a great measure, wear that character which they originally receive from nature.

Hence, *Prudence* of conduct must depend upon firmness more than upon judgment;* and firmness *depends chiefly upon the strength or weakness of the passions.*

Where passion is not concerned, the judgment will, no doubt, act, in chusing between right and wrong, good and evil, according to its force. But in what case of human affairs is passion not concerned? in what case is the understanding unbiassed by circumstances? When are our means of judging such as to permit an unprejudiced decision, and the free exercise of reason? and how seldom do wise determinations produce prudent actions?

The operation of the judgment is, without doubt, very much circumscribed by the nature of our feelings. The power which it has of foreseeing, and correcting, the inconsistency of our affections, and the change of circumstances, when exercised with such a degree of firmness as few possess, operates within a very narrow circle. Perhaps, every effort

* Judgment and prudence are thus far to be distinguished; -- Judgment is a *decision*, Prudence an *act*; but we often act wrong while we know that we are doing so.

found among men, constitute variety of character, distinguish them from each other,

of reflection is merely to make the most of events, and to chuse the best of those things which fortune presents to us.

It will, indeed, be found, on examination, that the principle of necessity is of very extensive application; and that our virtues, as well as our vices, are within its comprehension. In every form of conduct, there is more of necessity than choice. The motives of prudence and indiscretion, virtue and vice, are, in most cases, nearly the same. In all these, we chiefly follow our inclinations, and character is, generally, fixed by constitution. Most men are temperate because they hate excess, and most are given to excess only because they are unable to practise temperance; most men are good humoured because they cannot be bad, and bad because they cannot be good. It is even, sometimes, from difference of constitution, which induces peculiar habits of mind, that some men are more covetous and dishonest than others.

It is well known that the value of things arises less from their own nature than from the state of our feelings, that they appear quite different to different persons, and even to the same person, at different times. An object which pleases in health has no attractions in sickness, and that which we

and diversify their pursuits. The same passions do not reign in every person with

pursue with eager enthusiasm at one time is indifferent or disgusting at another.

Our passions are entirely the produce of our senses, or of circumstances. No man can command them at will, or make any object appear either beautiful or disagreeable by the authority of reason. Hence, the value of things is altogether accidental, and independent of our determinations. But, as pleasure is the sole object of the mind, the understanding must confirm the representations of the passions; for what is pleasure if it be not the gratification of the passions! If any man relinquish an agreeable, to pursue a disagreeable, object, he prefers the bad to the good, and acts contrary to his conviction.

The object of prudence is, indeed, by sacrificing a small degree of good, to obtain a greater. But, in every case, reason has to decide on the evidence of passion.

The understanding may, in fact, be said to be the sport of the passions. How often do men of judgment, from the instability of their passions, and the variation of their affections, act inconsistently! and how often is our conduct rendered imprudent by false appearances! The judgment can however, hardly, in any case, be said to be preju-

the same force, and sometimes one passion extinguishes another. An ambitious man

diced by the passions, without calling all good and evil prejudice. As the passions are the sole evidence of good and evil, every effort of the understanding, with regard to prudence, is only to prefer the gratification of one passion to that of another, or to obey the influence of that passion which produces the greatest degree of pleasure. The understanding is, therefore, compelled to humour the passions ; and it often happens that our judgment is just, while our actions are wrong. The passions are continually deceiving the understanding, and leading us into imprudent actions, by bestowing a false lustre on objects, which is sufficient to betray us into misfortune, but not to confer happiness. It is seldom that all the efforts of judgment are able to distinguish the appearance of good from the reality, or that gratification which will end in calamity from that which will continue to produce pleasure. In short, such a variety of hues do the ebbs and flows of our passions impart to things, that we can never be said to see them aright.

Passion is, however, *the origin of virtue*, as well as of vice. As all our exertions arise from our passions, the object is not to extinguish passion, but to regulate it, so as to procure that useful medium called virtue. If our passions are strong,

prefers glory to comfort ; a lover despises all other interests for the object of his af-

we have much pleasure in their gratification, but are in equal danger of suffering from violence of conduct. If they are weak, we have every chance to escape pain, but then we have no pleasure. Thus, good and evil always compensate each other, and a state of mediocrity is the nearest approach to perfection we can make.

It may, however, be inquired what is passion? and what is reason? Passion is our present feelings; reason is founded on the recollection of feeling.* Hence, we are induced to bear some feelings from the recollection of others, and to resist the present from the dread of the future. But it frequently happens that our present sensations are sufficient to overbalance the prospect of future, or so strong as to render us regardless of consequences. It is, therefore, often difficult for one man to judge of the conduct of another, or to estimate motives with which he is unacquainted. We see the affairs of our neighbours in quite a different light from that in which we view our own. In the one case, we imagine interest can be commanded or dismissed at pleasure; in the other, we feel that it is independent of ourselves.

* What is called comparing ideas is, in fact, nothing more than a transition from one original or recollected sensation to another. Reason is the impression left by this transition.

fection alone; an enraged man values revenge more than personal safety; a miser

Even that superiority of mind which serves to retrace a wide experience, and compare many circumstances, does not always enable us to distinguish temporary from lasting advantage, nor does the understanding always act as the corrector of the passions. Prudence of conduct consists in accommodating ourselves to the motion of things, and depends as much upon mediocrity of understanding as on moderation of passion. What is commonly called *strength of mind*,* as applicable to morality, is, in reality, often *weakness of intellect*. For, in proportion as the mind is extended, it furnishes objects of temptation, and solicitation to gratification. When magnitude of comprehension and strength of passion are united in the same person, the one inflames the other.

Men of talents are, perhaps, more liable to imprudence than those who possess only inferior powers. The weaker and smaller the mind is, no doubt, the less capable is it of abstaining from indulgence, or of performing those duties which we owe to ourselves and others, and which are sometimes contrary to our passions and inclinations. But the passions of small minds, though irresistible, are small and few.

* *Viz.* The absence of passion or feeling. It is this which chiefly gives self-command.

disregards the opinion of the world, and every comfort of life, for the sake of accu-

Men of genius are subject to more variety and violence of action from the superior exertion of their thought, are hurried on to more extraordinary pursuits from the extent of their prospects, and are liable to more impetuosity from the distinctness of their determinations than those whose capacity is less.

Whether a great mind be melancholy or sanguine, it is equally liable to be impelled to inconsistency with the common progress of things, and to become the dupe of its own exuberances. If sanguine, it leaves its present situation for one which it cannot reach; or if melancholy, by wandering into futurity, creates to itself groundless fears, and renders itself unfortunate by premature prudence.

Persons of little thought are calm and cool from want of ideas, and are incapable of violent misconduct, because destitute of temptations to influence it. But a vigorous mind must always be employed upon something. As its exertions do not keep pace and agree with the nature of things, it overshoots itself. Hence, those who, it may be said, do not think at all, whose judgment is confined to a very narrow circle, who take the fashion of the day for the principles of their conduct, who are

intulating riches; a vain person foregoes every pecuniary advantage for the love of magnificence and splendour; and some sacrifice every other enjoyment to the more immediate gratification of the senses. But self-love is the general parent of all passions, however little its offspring may resemble each other. (*Taste.**)

governed by habit, who give themselves up to the guidance of chance, and pass through life without any extraordinary exertion or anxiety—certainly act most fortunately, if not most prudently, and have the best chance of happiness.

* *Section 2,—Taste.*

Taste is a term which has been much abused and misapplied by the enthusiasm of its votaries. By some, it would be deemed as sacrilegious a crime to call taste a species of judgment, as it would be by another set of enthusiasts, to call faith a species of reason. There is no subject on which men are so dogmatical as on that of taste; because on no other subject does the evidence appear so satisfactory, and at the same time so mysterious. Every person is certain with regard to his own inclinations. Now what can seem a stronger proof of the perfection of any thing than our taste for it?

The dispositions of men may vary, but self-love does not; though their pursuits

Those unaccountable impulses which we feel towards some objects, and that undefinable disgust or dislike which arises from others, appear sufficient evidence of perfection or imperfection to ourselves. Hence, vanity inclines each to persuade himself that whatever is inconsistent with those sensations which are peculiar to him, is wrong. The advocates for the mysteriousness of taste have, indeed, one remarkable instance in their favour, that is, that the tastes of two persons may be contrary and yet both be just. But all opinions are undoubtedly founded upon facts and circumstances; every thing can be reduced to a science; and where there is a difference between things, there must be a discrimination, and an appeal to reason. Reason is, in this, as well as in every other case, our guide. To it only can we have recourse for an explanation of the mysterious operations and peculiarities of taste. But to submit the evidence of his feelings to the examination of reason is what a person always reluctantly does. Whatever we admire, we are unwilling to analyze. Taste, as well as genius and faith, men, in the zeal of their adoration, have agreed to think incomprehensible. But when the authority and jurisdiction of reason are denied, there is an end to all distinction. As

may differ, pleasure is always their object. The actions of mankind are, indeed, often

long, therefore, as men dispute concerning what they do not define, each may, with equal justice, lay claim to the preference in correctness of taste, if each determine from his own feelings.

The only difficulty which this subject exhibits is the vague and indeterminate meaning of the word taste, and the idea that taste is independent of judgment and a separate faculty of the mind. This fancy is carried so far that some even imagine that a fool may excel a wise man on this subject, and that a person may possess a just judgment without a correct taste. But if this opinion be brought to the test of reason, it will appear that a person prefers one thing to another only because he believes it to be better. It is, therefore, evident that taste is merely the result of judgment, or that peculiarity of relish for things which arises from the nature of opinion.

The term taste is, indeed, appropriated to that degree of judgment which appears in distinguishing beauty; and men of superior understandings are often deficient in discriminating those nice shades which separate the graces. But it is evident that superficial distinctions escape the man of great powers, merely because they are too small for his mind to take hold of, and that this peculiarity

of so opposite a nature, that they not only become objects of surprise and derision to

does not form a contradiction to judgment in its general nature, but merely a modification of it.

Taste is of two kinds; first in sensual, secondly in intellectual, gratification. The pleasures of sense are chiefly confined to *Tasting* (those which arise from *Seeing* and *Hearing* being of a superior cast,) and correspond with appetites. When we are induced by any motive, distinct from such natural desires as hunger or thirst, to prefer one object of sense to another, it certainly arises from peculiarity of organization, or from habit. But that more refined species of enjoyment which proceeds from the affection of the intellect depends chiefly upon the expanse of the mind. Difference of judgment, again, must arise from one person's possessing a greater degree of natural capacity, or having received a better education than another; and, in this case, all habit must be considered the same as education.

That taste or relish for things which belongs to the mind consists in being affected agreeably by them. Every peculiarity which it possesses has a reference to the nature and operation of the intellectual powers. The interest which we take in any occupation, depends upon its forming a certain medium between difficulty and facility. The

each other, but did we not know that pleasure lay in us and not in the object, we

mind has a relish for no pursuit which is either labour or incapable of stimulation. Some things are, therefore, disagreeable or indifferent, because superior to our capacity, and others because inferior; while in other cases, habit renders arduous things agreeable by diminishing their difficulty, and trifling things interesting by confining the attention to them.

Again, all objects of beauty or deformity, grace or inelegance, are rendered such merely by opinion, which likewise arises from the capacity or habits of the mind; the former acting as the power of deciding our relish or dislike for things, and the latter as the means. Our judgment is formed according to our talents and opportunities, and our inclination for things always corresponds with our opinion of them.

A good understanding and a correct taste, indeed, never fail to accompany each other. We often hear of refined taste, of just taste, and the due proportion of the principles of taste; but all this leads merely to a definition of wisdom. The wisest conduct, again, is to do that which is proper, neither to fall short of the mark nor to go beyond it; and true taste, as well as wisdom, consists in propriety. What is grace in motion, sim-

might almost be inclined to doubt the universality of the principle of self-love. Our

plicity in writing, or elegance in conversation, but that happy medium in which consists all perfection!

As taste, therefore, depends upon judgment, it must keep pace with the expansion and improvement of the mind. The more extensive the range of our reflection, the juster will be our conclusions.

Taste has always a reference to knowledge and experience. No two men have the same view of things; each sees more or less, in one position or another; each sees differently; and each has, therefore, reason to form a different opinion. Every person reasons and believes according to what he knows; the knowledge of each is different; and the opinion and taste of each individual are formed according to his knowledge. Hence that variety of tastes which we find in the world, and hence the reason of that contempt in which one holds the taste of another, in the purity of which all are, with equal reason, confident.

The same causes which operate in diversifying the taste of individuals also affect that of nations. In all nations, there are periods of youth and maturity. Some are farther advanced in one science than in another; some nations farther advanced in general science than others; some place perfec-

passions operate with such vicissitude, that one may this moment possess the mind

tion in a higher, some in a lower, degree. In different periods, opinions have prevailed, and have been admired, which would now be ridiculed; and customs prevail at present in some parts of the world which in others are the subject of contempt. Elegance and beauty are different in Asia from what they are in Europe; that which is refined in London is gross in Paris; and that which is interesting in Paris is trifling in London.

Taste has differed in different ages, and a person, at different periods of his life, has differed in taste from himself, but the rules whereby he judged have never differed. Men have changed their opinions as they knew more of facts and things; but it was always according to their most uniform experience that they determined. In the same manner, however much the tastes of men may have differed from each other, or the taste of one person from itself, they have always been formed on the most general view or situation of things. The present probability is the rule of present belief; and the present view or situation of things, the law of present taste. But a few persons, compared with the mass of mankind, bestow much reflection upon the fine arts; and of those few, the greater number confine their attention to a single

quite contrary to that which occupied it before. Self-love, indeed, always dictates

branch ; some to painting ; some to music ; some to poetry ; and some to an individual species of poetry. A person who has studied only a particular subject, may be best qualified to decide on that subject ; but he whose view extends to the great as well as to the minute, will have the most exalted and just ideas of nature and things.

The object of taste is beauty ; the chief law of beauty, association : When we find two objects or qualities generally united, we are inclined to think they should be always so. Hence the power of custom, and hence the origin of that taste which may be called national. Fashion, again, arises from a modification, or narrower application, of the law of association. With riches, we associate gentility and propriety. Whatever is common among men of rank, soon appears graceful, beautiful, and becoming ; and this rule extends even to articles of utility. Fashions can, no doubt, with propriety, take their origin only from general principles ; but after being established, though in contradiction to expediency, so great is the power of this association, and so far superior to every other species of utility the necessity of conformity to the ideas of our neighbours, that all the variations of fashion ought to be complied with. The *change*

the change; but we are often led to think, that, as our pursuits are inconsistent, their

of fashion is to be approved of on every principle of beauty, from the variety and spirit which it gives to life.

There are some things for which nature gives no law, and which are to be determined by custom alone. The meaning of words is established by general consent, and it is general use which determines our choice with regard to purity and elegance of language. The same word which signifies good, might signify bad; and the only reason why it does not, is that men do not chuse that it should.

It is also to be observed, that the generality of mankind look no farther than custom for the rule of opinions regarding truth as well as beauty. Hence it is, that whatever is new appears wrong; that the ideas of a philosopher appear ridiculous to a clown, as those of a clown appear absurd to a philosopher.

As beauty arises from several causes, and taste may be decided on different principles, it often happens, from peculiar passions, habits, or circumstances, that a person may be induced to prefer one species of beauty to another. Some place beauty entirely in colours, and others in form; some in uniformity, and others in variety. Unless,

motives cannot be the same. So far we are right, that the particular and peculiar mo-

therefore, we are acquainted with the general analogy of nature, that our views may balance each other, and that we may preserve that medium which runs through the whole creation, we are often in danger of wandering from reality, and forming extravagant opinions and tastes. Different species of beauty cannot, indeed, be compared, each possessing perfection in itself; that object is only to be preferred which contains the greatest number of beauties with the fewest faults. But it has often happened that a person, by pursuing one idea, and neglecting all others, has lost all notion of absurdity and propriety, and formed a set of opinions and habits from which he has become most supremely ridiculous to his fellow creatures.

Some false tastes are like some false opinions, which are justifiable to a person's self, because consistent with his knowledge, and those alone which he can form in the circumstances in which he is placed, but which are, at the same time, inconsistent with a more extended view, and with the general nature of things. It is always with the conclusions of taste, as with those of reason; their correctness depends upon chusing a centre within the expanse of our knowledge; as our view is

tives of contrary actions must be contrary ; but the general motive is not. Self-love,

extended; this imaginary centre is removed ; and the meridian of our taste is ever altering as intellectual acquisition is increasing.

Hence, it is not from want of judgment, or true taste, that one man conceives opinions or sentiments contrary to another, when such opinions are formed according to the standard of generality within the compass of his knowledge, but from want of information. Before, therefore, we conclude against any person's understanding from his taste, we should examine whether it be agreeable to his knowledge. It can be no imputation against a person's judgment that he has formed erroneous opinions by being misinformed, if such opinions be consistent with his knowledge, and proper according to the view which he had of things.

It has been remarked that men hold the same general language concerning beauty and deformity where their particular ideas of it are different. All agree in praising elegance, grace, and propriety, but differ in the ideas affixed to these terms. The cause of this difference is the difference of their abilities, or of their experience ; both ending in one of two results, either in expanding or contracting the view. The most beautiful object is

though it may vary its manner of pursuing pleasure, does not deviate from its original purpose, or change its nature.

the nearest to perfection of the class to which it belongs. This perfection generally consists in medium. When we perceive a higher degree of any quality, we are inclined to shift the point of perfection, without perceiving any other reason for it.* But if all objects which please are not allowed to be equally beautiful, and if a standard, to decide the differences of taste among men, be demanded, it cannot consist in general approbation. Multitudes may agree in one opinion of beauty, and yet their knowledge be confined. Now all beauty is an excellence, or an idea derived from several others. To select the most beautiful object, we must compare many. This comparison, again, is the nearer to perfection the farther it is carried. Thus, judgment and taste unite in conclusion, taste being only our judgment of beauty. As the accuracy of our opinions depends upon forming general ideas, so *the criterion of our taste must always be the extent of our principles of judging.*

* Thus, if we happen to see a person of a fresh complexion in company, it will receive our approbation; but if another enter whose complexion is florid, we will be apt to consider the complexion of the first person as too pale.

Some men can extract pleasure from what is pain to others; and some renounce all other enjoyments for that of being admired alone. The Stoics abjured all sensual pleasure for the very glory of the difficulty of rejecting it; and men cheerfully expose themselves to dangers, and undergo fatigues, for the honour attending heroism.

But still pleasure is the object of all the pursuits of mankind, however different. The Stoic philosopher may find as much satisfaction in the magnanimity of despising, as the Epicurean in enjoying, corporeal pleasure. Man cannot act without motives, nor form any motive different from his own good. Language will not express it; and it requires only acuteness to discover self-love under every form of human conduct. When Regulus returned to Carthage, in defiance of torture, and in compliance with a vain principle of honor, it is apparent that he proposed, as a reward, the veneration of mankind. When Brutus sacrificed his two sons to justice, he evidently expected as a recompense for so extraordinary a virtue, the approbation of future ages; and

his motives were obviously the same with those of the person who devoted himself voluntarily to death by setting fire to the Temple of Diana. It is evident that Diogenes pursued pleasure and fame, in his hypocritical and impertinent contempt of all those things which other men value; and that when he despised the favours of the greatest prince upon earth, he expected to obtain glory equal to the sacrifice. The integrity of Cato was founded upon the approbation, or at least the self-satisfaction, which accompanied it; and is an example to prove how consistent the most exalted moral qualities are with self-love. Even the celebrated Lucretia preferred reputation to virtue, and might have preserved her chastity at the expense of her fame. But as admiration is the object and reward of all heroic deeds, they are performed only when they are to be known.

Pleasure is always pleasure in whatever shape it appear. He who burns to signalize himself in the dangers of war, and he who sighs for the retirements of peace, have the same motive; and the happiness

of the one is different from that of the other only as their different dispositions are more or less gratified. The mind of man never furnishes arguments nor declaims to itself against what appears pleasure, because it really is such. A person can, in reality, never be happier than in the gratification of his inclinations whatever they may be. No relation of things can diminish the importance of what is really pleasing or painful to the mind. Every thing is good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, merely as we feel it.* Now, as what may be agreeable to one may not be agreeable to another, we cannot, on account of the persuasion of the wisest of men, reject the present object of our passions for any thing different, until we see it in the same light, and think as they do. The attacks of moralists should, therefore, be made against the imprudence of pursuing such enjoyments as are ultimately destructive of pleasure, not against pleasure itself; for what pleases above other things is best,

* "The mind is its own place, and in itself

"Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n."

and every attempt to induce us to give the preference to any thing else must be vain. Hence, all morality is but the skilful prosecution of the views of self-love, and the prudent pursuit of pleasure. To act morally is but to act wisely; whoever acts best for himself acts best for society; and wisdom and virtue are always consistent.

Various dispositions are necessary for the different modes of action which different circumstances require in the world. Self-love, though the same in general, may be more agreeable and useful in some of its diversities than in others, or as the pursuits of individuals unite. Our own good may be involved in the good of others, and the path which leads to their happiness may also lead to our own. A man cannot, indeed, be said to be less selfish because he loves virtue. But it is surely a fortunate circumstance for society, as well as individuals, when the inclinations of men induce them to the practice of those actions which tend to the good of their fellow creatures; when they delight in the pursuit of fame, feel a pleasure in friend-

ship, or derive a gratification from the practice of benevolence. Nothing, again, can be more unfortunate than when self-love is contracted to so narrow a circle as to exclude the interests of others, and permit the mind to be occupied only by those mean and sordid passions which debase all the actions and sink all the ideas of mankind.*

Those personal good qualities which are incident to the nature of things, or arise from peculiarity of disposition, however,

* Nothing seems, in the present day, to be valued but *riches*; and this sentiment is very openly professed. Riches are indeed the representative of all the necessaries of life (as well as of all sensual gratifications); and to prefer the rich is, perhaps, the best spur to industry, and, on the whole, most calculated for the good of society. Besides, a rich man is valued for the same reason as a benevolent man; that is because he possesses good qualities. So great a portion of the happiness of mankind is included in riches, that a rich man must have many bad qualities before he becomes disagreeable, and a poor man must have a multitude of good qualities before we are pleased with his company.

But if we esteem men for their riches only, we infallibly teach the same vulgarity of sentiment to others, and destroy all intellectual good qualities, such as benevolence and generosity, from the exercise of which exalted minds derive a high gratification.

cost us nothing, and procure advantage without sacrifice. Thus, mental capacity, personal strength, beauty, or agility, qualities proceeding from adventitious circumstances, and cheerfulness, good nature, and temperance, arising from the accidental nature of our dispositions, are valuable to others without being injurious to ourselves; while honesty, fidelity, and honour, qualities resulting from the efforts of the mind, are agreeable to others only by being disagreeable to ourselves. These last may be called *artificial good qualities*, being acquired by restraining our inclinations. But, as no man voluntarily counteracts his passions in one case without the prospect of gratification in another, the devices the world fall upon to induce men to those actions which they find agreeable, are innumerable. While those who practise indulgences, injurious to every one who does not participate in them, are punished, proscribed, and stigmatized with every degrading epithet which hatred can dictate, those who sacrifice their own gratification to that of others are caressed, flattered, and honoured with every

term of distinction which ingenuity can invent. While treachery, cowardice, and parsimony, are branded with the terms baseness, meanness, and narrowness of mind; patriotism, integrity, and generosity, are dignified with the appellations of magnanimity, greatness, and elevation of soul. In short, the more we bend our dispositions to the will of others, the more we are flattered, and the greater honour and applause we receive. Hence we are often induced to neglect the pleasure arising from things for the pleasure arising from praise. But while we serve others, we serve ourselves. Our intentions are always the same, however variously they may appear in our actions, and although we may be sometimes mistaken in our calculations.

The fine spun principle of self-love has a variety of beautiful shapes and names. In the mazes of worldly interest, it appears in as many different forms as ever did the amorous Jove, but, like him, still under its native disposition. In the common course of life, we may, in appearance, often sacrifice a portion of our own good to that of

others ; but it is always with the prospect of an accumulated return. The intention of procuring a succession of agreeable sensations or ideas will, by constant and minute observation, be perceived to guide even the most trifling actions of life.

SECTION IV.

No emotion can be felt but on our own account. All feeling arises from what occasions agreeable or disagreeable sensations to ourselves. No affection can be disinterested. Even that sympathy which we have with a person who will never know it, with an inferior animal, or a fictitious account of distress, must arise from our own interest ; for we can no more be affected without interest than we can feel without pleasure or pain. Such interest is excited by changing situation, in imagination, with the sufferer.* Its degree then depends

* It is sometimes necessary to answer an argument, not because it is strong, but because it has the appearance of truth, which, with a great many, passes for the reality. Against the doctrine that sympathy is founded on self-love, Dr Adam Smith says—“ I consider what I would suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I

upon the perfection of the analogy between his circumstances and our own ; for we can conceive and feel no distress unless we are conscious of the possibility of being subject to it ourselves.

The sensations which arise from this species of probability, or from sympathy, are produced by the greatest extension of interest, or by imaginary interest, and are, therefore, the weakest of all. But all our feelings, even in the affairs of others, arise from our own interest, and before being affected by their pains or pleasures we must transfer them to ourselves. It is from the appropriation of the passions of

change persons and characters. How can that be regarded as a selfish passion which does not arise even from the imagination of any thing that has befallen or that relates to myself in my own character, but which is entirely occupied about what relates to *you*." This is merely a jargon of words about *I* and *you*. In his premises, he considers *I* as changed into *you* ; but he draws his conclusion as if no such change had taken place. He does not seem to perceive, although his words express it, that, under every change, each person feels only for himself. If *I* be completely changed into *you*, *you* certainly feels for himself without any reference to *I*. In short, the whole of this passage approaches very near to what is called *nonsense*.

others, that we derive entertainment from the various circumstances and incidents which the history of mankind displays, and the transactions of daily life exhibit. It is from sympathy, that all generous moral feelings, such as enmity towards the unjust, detestation of the ungrateful, and indignation against the mean and narrow minded, arise. It is from appropriation and assimilation, that we hate tyranny, and feel for the objects of it, as he who oppresses others would, if we were within the reach of his power, oppress us. From transferring misfortunes and enjoyments to ourselves, arises the pleasure of doing good in secret; it is the motive of that charity which has the prospect of no future recompense, and of that trouble which we take for the entertainment of others which is independent of vanity or the prospect of reward. We are always willing, if it cost us nothing, to enjoy the pleasure of relieving the distressed, and of adding to the gratification of the happy. To relieve distress, raises in us the same sensation as if we were relieved from

distress ourselves, and what is added to the enjoyment of mankind, may, by sympathy, be added to our own. We are, also, often, induced to respect the feelings of others lest we do a violence to our own.

The sensations which arise from sympathy are always proportioned to the connexion in which the object of it stands to us. We are more affected by the death of a friend than by that of a stranger, and by the death of a human being than by that of any other. The accidents of the human race are, indeed, always matter of serious consideration, while the sufferings of inferior animals are seldom thought worthy of reflection.

The feeling which arises from sympathy is of the same nature with that which arises from real interest, although weaker. It is impossible to sympathize willingly with any but agreeable circumstances, unless we imagine that our sympathy with distress occasions any alleviation of it.* In affairs

* This, indeed, seems to be the cause of those agreeable sensations which we derive from sympathizing with painful circumstances; but still our pleasure may arise only from their affecting the mind moderately at second hand.

in which we are actually engaged and interested, or which are not created by imagination; and afford no opportunity of changing bad into good, we sympathize with the happy, and partake of the good fortune of the successful, as much more readily as pleasure is preferable to pain. It is, in short, only the real or imaginary power which we have of converting distress into happiness which, at any time, influences us to sympathize willingly with distant or supposititious unfortunate characters. If we did not associate with sympathy towards distant or imaginary misfortune, the idea of the relief of its object, we could no more voluntarily sympathize with it than we could love pain; and that sympathy which we have towards real evil is very nearly connected with fear.

Painful objects are always hated, and pleasing loved, whether real or imaginary. The fortunate are surrounded with companions; but the unfortunate are avoided as much as those who carry pestilence along with them. Unless, therefore, those to whom we propose to complain are interest-

ed in relieving us, repeated observation has proved it uniformly to be the wisest conduct to conceal our misfortunes and preserve the appearance of happiness.

We always reluctantly sympathize with the misfortunes of others when they are closely connected with us, or when such sympathy occasions any violent degree of mental affection. Distresses, to which we are united only by analogy, we never willingly sympathize with, when that sympathy turns those misfortunes which were but imaginary with respect to us, into real, or occasions to us any actual danger, or loss of property.

The smallest portion of reality never fails to overcome the greatest of fancy; the smallest degree of real, the greatest of imaginary interest. We often seize inconsiderable advantages which may produce the utmost calamity to others, without feeling any sympathy with their distress. The most trifling interest of our own when put in balance with the highest of others, easily preponderates. A man will kill a brute for

amusement, though every animal is of the same value to itself.

It is impossible that we could, in any case, sympathize willingly with distress, were there not enjoyment to be derived from it. We never voluntarily incur pain but with the hope of future pleasure. A person will give himself little trouble to serve another, and feel little anxiety with regard to his pursuits, where he has no prospect of reward, or has little expectation of participating in his success. We are generally unwilling to incur danger in relieving, or the pain of grief in sympathizing with, those who can never be of use to us. But we often wish to enjoy the reward of sympathizing with distress without suffering its inconvenience. When a person is attacked by sickness, he feels great pleasure in describing his pains to others, and readily gives credit to those who say they are affected by his distresses, because he is affected by them himself. But how false is his comfort! and how coldly do others take part in his misfortunes, when they have

no direct interest, and how hypocritical, generally, are their pretensions to sympathy!

We never feel without interest, and all feeling is proportioned to it. Although the most ardent lover were told by his mistress, that she was afflicted with a complaint which was violently painful, without endangering her life or diminishing her beauty, as he would not perceive his interest to be involved in the matter, and as her sufferings would seem likely to be entirely her own, he would not be greatly affected by it. But that he might not lose her regard by his indifference, he would probably pretend to feelings which he did not possess, and declare that her distresses gave him the greatest pain. If, however, he were threatened to be deprived of her by death, he would feel in reality, but, at the same time, make a merit of declaring his fears. When we die, or are absent, we are lamented, only for those qualities which were capable of contributing to the happiness of others, and which had their sole value from the wants of those who lament us. As, therefore, all grief is an evil as long as it is remembered,

we never think we can too soon forget those friends of whom death has deprived us. These are, perhaps, disagreeable truths, and imperfections in happiness which it would be better to hide from ourselves. But he who analyses his friendships and joys too minutely, will often discover that they rest on a very slender foundation.

We sympathize with agreeable objects or events on account of the acquisition, and with disagreeable on account of the diminution, of pleasure. The former circumstance is considered a good; and the latter an evil; but both proceed from self-love. We never sympathize willingly with the unhappy on account of their misfortunes, but for the sake of their valuable qualities; and we as often feel alacrity in persecuting, as in assisting, the unfortunate.* But no person, however contemptible he may be to others, can be reduced to such a degree of unimportance as not to be valuable to himself. Every person is incessantly employed

* Whether pity or cruelty become the passion in this case, depends upon which offers the highest degree of pleasure to ourselves.

in increasing his own happiness, or diminishing his miseries. Self-love is the spring of all the actions of mankind, pleasure the sole and entire object of self-love ; and so closely connected is self-love with consciousness, that no misfortune, or discouragement, can, for one single moment, suspend the activity of this principle of the mind.

CHAP. IV.

The Senses or the Means of Pleasure.

MATTER is known to us only by its qualities. These, again, are known to us by means of our senses. Sensation is produced by that mysterious connection between mind and matter which can be traced only in the correspondence of external objects with our corporeal organs and nerves. Sensation may be called the original impression of matter upon mind; and from it, all our ideas, even the most abstract, are derived. But, as the connection between the mind and its objects is accomplished by the intervention of the body, and other intermedia unknown, it is apparent that all the qualities of matter may be very different from what they seem to us. Besides, from our knowledge of some animals having fewer senses than we have, and the variety of qualities those we possess enable us to perceive in matter, it is not contrary to reason to suppose that we are capable of more senses than we really have. If, however, our nature admits of any new sense, the

addition cannot be great ; for the difference between the senses which we already possess, amounts to little more than perceiving the same qualities in different manners. We cannot, indeed, discover colour by feeling ; and hearing is confined to sounds alone. But we know the form of any body equally well from feeling and seeing ; and tasting and smelling have, in most cases, a near resemblance.

In judging of things, we are directed no less by our experience in an individual sense, than by the combined evidence of different senses. There can be no doubt that a man at a hundred yards distance appears of only one fourth the size he seems at fifty. But, having seen man near, as well as at a distance, and knowing perfectly what sort of being he is, we supply by recollection any deficiency in the evidence of sense, and view him always as of the same size. When, however, we are ignorant of the nature of the object, we are apt to be deceived. A fly passing suddenly close to the eye is, sometimes, taken for a bird at a distance ; and it is often difficult to distinguish a loud sound which is distant,

from a low which is near. But this, perhaps, belongs, properly, to another subject.

The senses always assist, and cannot contradict, each other, with regard to evidence and utility. But they often do so with regard to pleasure and pain. All are equally the means of both; and it often happens that the agreeable effects of one sense are interrupted by the disagreeable effects of another.

But the senses are limited, in pain, as well as in pleasure. There are certain boundaries beyond which human nature can no more suffer the former, than it can enjoy the latter. Even the most violent feeling, that which results from the operation of fire on our bodies (which is the most acute pain, as it proceeds from the most speedy dissolution of that matter of which they are composed) when pushed beyond certain limits, loses its excess, destroys the sensibility of the nerves, and extinguishes sensation. This shews that every thing in nature is limited, that the perfection of even pain consists in medium, and that what is exquisite is of short duration.

We are forcibly compelled, or powerfully bribed, to whatever we perform ; and those senses are strongest which are of most importance. The pleasure arising from the sense of tasting is greater than that which arises from the sense of smelling, because tasting is more necessary than smelling. In the exercise of the senses, there is always a great *quantum* of pleasure over what is necessary to influence us to perform those duties which the necessities of our nature require ; which shews both the wisdom and goodness of the Almighty. The duty of the senses few feel it a hardship to perform.

SECTION I.—*Feeling.*

FEELING is the strongest of all the senses. It is that by which the mind is most intimately connected with matter, and most distinctly rendered sensible of its existence. By it, we are best made acquainted with the form and dimensions of any body ; and it is one of those senses in which our experience approaches nearest to uniformity, and which is seldom guilty of deception. It is a sense so strong and closely connected

with the nature of all animals, that it seems impossible for any one to exist without it. It appears, indeed, that we can never be deprived of it so long as we are connected with matter, and continue in our present state of existence. Feeling is a sense which does not seem so necessary to us, as unavoidably to result from the nature of matter, and the connection of mind with it.

Feeling, if tasting and the sexual pleasure be not included in it, is the means of little enjoyment, but it is the medium of the highest degree of pain. It seems to be a faculty which is permitted to us, rather than designed for us, and which serves more for the regulation and economy of pleasure than as the means of such itself. The pains which arise from feeling, occasioned by wounds on the body, are very acute. But transitions from cold to heat, and from heat to cold, are the most frequent, and at the same time some of the strongest affections which we receive through the medium of this sense. With regard to it, cold and heat are more important than form and magnitude. The sensations which arise

from the latter, through the medium of feeling, are not so frequent as those which arise from heat and cold ; and these qualities seem to be not so immediately the cause of pleasure and pain, with regard to this sense, as they are useful in regulating those affections which arise from the temperature of the body.

The pleasure which is derived from feeling is permitted to us only in medium. Whenever our feeling passes medium, pain is a uniform consequence. That pain, again, which results from feeling is not like the pleasure arising from it, moderate, but is capable of the greatest excess with which we are acquainted. The sensation of heat or cold yields enjoyment only while it is mild and moderate, and is, therefore, incapable of excess of pleasure. But the pain arising from these sensations, as it never proceeds but from an extraordinary degree of either, is capable of being most exquisitely tormenting.

The highest excellence of feeling, and the greatest utility which it possesses, arise from the organ of it, the hand, in which all

the appropriate peculiarity of this sense lies, for that feeling which is diffused over the rest of the body, may be said unavoidably to result from the nature of things. The correctness of the impression of the forms of bodies which is conveyed to the mind by the adaption of the hand to their surfaces, does not seem to be acquired by habit. For, such perfection of feeling is not attainable by accustoming any other part of the body to the same operation. The hand is, therefore, properly the organ of feeling. It is from the peculiar form of the hand, the division of its parts, and the flexibility of its joints, that its perfection arises. Were there no other evidence on the subject, the wise structure of this member, its universal application and general utility, would, perhaps, be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an intelligent Author. The hand has been called the sceptre of man; and, from it, is derived no small portion of that superiority which he holds over the animal creation.

With regard to pleasure and pain, this organ is not so much affected by the forms

of bodies, as by the nature of their surfaces. It is smoothness and softness which are pleasing, and roughness which is disagreeable, to it.

SECTION II.—*Tasting.*

TASTING is a species of feeling, or at least very nearly connected with that sense. What we taste we feel. Tasting seems only an addition to the sense of feeling, or a more excellent species of it. All the senses may, however, be reduced to contact or feeling.

Tasting is, with regard to pleasure, a stronger sense than feeling, one which is capable of communicating a higher degree of enjoyment and less pain, and which is very necessary to our nature.

To support the corporeal structure, to preserve it from decay, to restore the waste of perspiration, and to continue it in vigour while the laws of the species permit, it is requisite that we add to it from other material substances. It is not enough that we perceive the necessity of such supplies to its preservation. Even self-love would not be a principle adequate to influence us to

the performance of such a duty, as it is too foreign ; but it is necessary that we have a sense appropriated to that purpose. Those duties of which we are sensible only from abstract considerations, we are very apt to neglect, and will very readily allow, notwithstanding any importance of consequence, to slip out of the mind, and be forgotten. But that of which we are continually reminded by disagreeable sensations, we feel a pain while we neglect, and a pleasure when we attend to. The body inherits the power of informing the mind of all the necessities to which it is subject in the most forcible manner. Hence hunger, which corresponds to the sense of tasting, makes one of the strongest and most pressing desires, and is capable of producing as high a degree of pleasure as any which belongs to the animal frame. Hunger and thirst may be said to be but one and the same sensation, both arising from the sense of tasting. But the gratification derived from thirst is inferior in excess and duration to that derived from hunger ; although we are incapable of enduring the former so long as the latter,

The sensations which arise from this sense are more advantageous to mankind than those which arise from feeling; because capable of yielding more pleasure and less pain, and because they are never so excessive in their torments, and sooner pass into easier modes of sufferance.

From the necessity of distinguishing that which is suitable for food from that which is unsuitable, arises the superior delicacy which belongs to this sense. In the exercise of the sense of feeling, we dread contamination with those objects which we consider unclean. But as any impression on that sense is less intimate than on the sense of tasting, the disgust must be proportionally inferior.

It seems strange, however, and irreconcilable to the nature and purpose of the senses, that any thing should be useful to the body which is disagreeable to the taste. But what is disagreeable to the taste, is, in general, useful to the body only while it labours under disease. The deviation of the latter from that condition of perfection which is necessary to animal economy may, therefore, be said to require the contradic-

tion of the former to compel it to return to its natural state.

SECTION III.—*Seeing.*

SEEING is one of the most important and agreeable of our senses, and yields a degree of pleasure equal to any of them; although the enjoyment which arises from it is much more abstract and mental than that afforded by tasting.

We are rendered sensible of the value of this sense only by a supposition of the want of it. There is no sense from which such a complexity of effects and multiplicity of sensations arise, which can be applied to so many useful purposes, or which furnishes a greater variety of enjoyment. The different tastes, and the different compositions which can be produced of them, the different notes of music, and the extent to which they can be varied, may equal the different colours and the shades which can be formed between them. But still, the different forms, and the infinitely varied groups of objects, which are, by the landscape of nature, presented to us, through the medium of

the sense of seeing, render it unequalled, by any other, in conveying pleasure to the mind. Perhaps, inferior animals, on account of their inability to conceive the idea of beauty, do not derive the same degree of pleasure from this sense as mankind. But were men deprived of sight, their condition would be like the universe without a Deity: all would be darkness, and nature a dreary wilderness.

Seeing is one of the two senses through which the mind is affected without the consciousness of an organic impression. It may, therefore, be said to be a sense farther removed from perfection than some others; as the perfection of the senses consists in the closeness of their intimacy with matter, and in conveying the most immediate perceptions to the mind. There are, indeed, no deceptions more remarkable than those of vision, because seeing depends upon the degree of light. But the evidence which this sense furnishes, when it has the proper means of exercise, seldom misleads. The impressions which we receive through it,

however distantly derived, are generally forcible and lively, and always permanent.

It likewise possesses this advantage over feeling and tasting, that the majority of the sensations which it affords are on the side of pleasure.* There is no comparison between the number of objects which are pleasant to the sight, and those which are unpleasant. There are few disgusting objects of vision; none are so much so that some degree of pleasure does not result from the contemplation of them in one relation or another; and there is, perhaps, no deformity in nature through which some rays of beauty do not shine.

Seeing is, besides, a sense, the exercise of which we are almost constantly enjoying. The same may, indeed, be said of feeling; but its general effects can hardly be said to amount to enjoyment. The utmost that can be expected and promised at any time from the sense of feeling is the absence of pain, comfortableness, and the permission

* There is only one object of vision, the effect of which is so excessive as to amount to pain. We are unable to bear the splendour of the sun, and cannot look steadily upon him.

of other enjoyments ; because its perfection consists in temperature, and uniformity. But it is quite the contrary with the sense of seeing. The more extraordinary are its effects, and the greater is their variety, the higher enjoyment it produces. As it has a preponderance to pleasure, and as its perfection consists in excess, it is capable of the greatest degree of pleasure, and of but a very moderate degree of pain. Those disagreeable sensations which arise from the sense of seeing, are, in general, no peculiarity of that sense, but proceed from its becoming the medium of the idea of those evils which may arise from the other senses. When we perceive danger, or are warned of future misfortunes or pains, by the sense of seeing, those evils ought no more to be imputed to it than to the mind, but should be ascribed to the senses from which they will ultimately arise.

Nothing can, indeed, be more noble than the sense of seeing. It embraces a great portion of matter, presents a multitude of images, and by it we seem to touch the most remote as well as the nearest objects.

The propagation of light is so rapid as almost to defeat computation ; but after light has reached us, sight has no dependence on its velocity. Images are then all equally near, however distant the objects they represent ; and these images are always distinct and free from confusion.

Seeing has another very great advantage over all the other senses, but that of tasting, by being more under the control of our will. We have the power of directing it in any manner we choose, or of suspending its action entirely.

SECTION IV.—*Hearing.*

HEARING must rank below feeling, tasting, and seeing. It is a sense which we could want ; although, without it, our nature and our conduct would be much more imperfect. It is also naturally inferior in strength, as well as in importance, and utility, to feeling, tasting, and seeing. Its impressions are less forcible, and are of shorter duration than those of any of those senses. The sensations arising from hearing are more of a passing and cursory nature,

than those produced by any of our other senses, except smelling ; and the shortness of their duration renders repetition continually necessary in order to produce a perpetuation of them. The extent of the action of sounds on the sense of hearing is not so comprehensive as that of light on the sense of seeing ; nor are sounds transmitted so rapidly as the images of sight ; although hearing and seeing resemble each other in this that we receive ideas through the medium of both without the consciousness of a sensible impression. That species of hearing which approaches nearest to perfection arises from only one sound at a time ; for if our hearing arise from many sounds, except in the harmony of music, they confound and destroy each other.

But hearing, notwithstanding its natural inferiority to the senses of feeling, tasting, and seeing, and with regard to brutes, has, by its incidental relation to the nature and circumstances of mankind, become, not only the most useful, but the most noble, and, in its effects, the most beautiful sense which we possess. By hear-

ing, thought, and matter are, in an abstracted and metaphysical manner, as closely connected as there is a possibility of their being. Of it, men have formed two distinct species, the one adapted to the understanding, and the other to the passions, from neither of which, we are almost certain, do brutes derive either benefit or enjoyment. This sense has added more to the importance and improvement of human nature, and to the comfort and enjoyment of mankind, than any other. To it, we owe all the advantages of education; by which the ideas of man can be extended, and corrected, till he become so much another being as sometimes to appear almost to have divested himself of his original nature, and reached a state more than human. From the sense of hearing, must be deduced all those philosophical inquiries by which we are enabled to discover the secret springs which move human nature, and those principles which most distantly direct matter, and which enable us to regulate both, and apply them in the manner most capable of forwarding our happiness, and extending

our enjoyment. From it, also, is derived, all that extensive acquisition of pleasure furnished by works of fancy; which exercise the mind by fictitious misfortunes and difficulties, and delight it with imaginary gratifications, no less strong than those derived from reality, and which have the additional advantage of being moulded to our will.

It is to be thought that mankind, although they had never enjoyed the privilege of speech, might have derived the means of the cultivation of the understanding, and the power of gratifying the imagination, from the experience afforded by the other senses. But how much assistance have both received from the faculty of speech, which corresponds with the sense of hearing!

The addition of speech to hearing is much more valuable than the original sense. Without an organ capable of speech,* we would be obliged to have recourse to the

* The peculiar form of the human tongue is, indeed, not the least bodily superiority which man holds over the rest of the animal creation.

sense of seeing for the communication of ideas. But how far inferior to language would signs be! to how much interruption and imperfection would they be liable! and in how much inconvenience would they involve us! The exercise of speech is liable to no other interruption than distance, or the intervention of dense bodies. Neither does it interfere with any of the other actions of life, but has organs appropriated to its purposes.

We do not, however, seem to have any right to claim speech as the produce of our own invention. It seems to be woven into the constitution of mankind, naturally necessary, and unavoidable, to human nature. There has yet been found no people in the world without a language, or names for objects and events, and the capability of communicating their ideas by speech. The invention of a language requires no effort from mankind. They naturally bestow terms on things; and the relations of objects regulate the combination of ideas, and become the principles and rules of syntax. Language is no farther arbitrary

than in appellations. The construction of sentences is unalterably the same, and the forms of speech nearly similar, in all languages; and it is as natural for men to speak correctly as it is for ideas to arise from objects.

Language is either prohibited to brutes, to preserve a distinction, and prevent an intimate intercourse, between them and men, or they are incapable of it. If the first be the case, it must have been intended to deprive them of the means of expressing those painful sensations which they suffer to supply the necessities, and gratify the cruelty and the amusements, of mankind. For, could they express their feelings in a distinct manner, it would be almost impossible for the most barbarous and cruel of mankind to remain unaffected, or to torment them in that degree which is too often practised. But that they are incapable of speech seems to be the true and original cause for their want of it. The separation which this circumstance induces between them and mankind, is, perhaps, only a beneficial consequence of that im-

perfection ; as it appears that a person who is born dumb and deaf, and who wants the sense of hearing and the faculty of speech, still retains, in a certain degree, the power of educating himself, and of communicating his ideas by means of his other senses, while beasts that can pronounce words have no idea of their meaning.

Of the other purpose, however, to which men apply the sense of hearing and the perception of sound, music, we are not equally certain of inferior animals having no ideas, as of their having none of speech. But from the greater part of them discovering no marks of pleasure from that music which is calculated to produce delight and ecstasy in mankind, or from any music at all, it appears that, in general, they have no conception of it. If, indeed, any individual species form an exception to this rule, their ideas of it must be as indistinct and weak as that degree of reason, by which they understand the cry of alarm from their fellows ; by which a dog, from hearing his name, conceives that he is the object of attention ; or by which a horse, from the in-

fluence of the bridle, learns the will of his rider. That fondness which is apparent in most birds for singing, seems to contradict the idea of brutes being, in general, insensible to music. But it is to be doubted whether even birds are so much delighted by their own music as we are, and whether it be not the performer exclusively that receives pleasure from its own music, as no sign of attention is discovered by others.

But the power of music on the human heart is wonderful, and the perfection to which mankind have brought it a remarkable proof of the comparative superiority of their abilities. The correspondence between notes and words, and between tunes and language, is amazingly correct, and impressive on the mind. The pleasure afforded by music does not, however, like that of language, arise from the objects and ideas, which different sounds represent, but from its melody and variety. The effect of music is also much assisted by association; and by that principle is capable of exciting every passion of the mind.

SECTION V.—*Smelling.*

THE sense of smelling is the weakest of all our senses. One which we could easily do without, and which we owe solely to the bounty of the Almighty: It is a sense which produces neither much pleasure nor pain, and which is not violent in its effects either the one way or the other. But it is surely, making all due allowance for the partiality with which we remark the idea of pain, and neglect that of pleasure, capable of producing more pain than pleasure. It is certain that disagreeable smells are stronger than pleasing. The sense of smelling is never very strong but when it is disagreeable. No smell can, in reality, be agreeable and at the same time strong.

When the organ of smelling is but a very short time exercised, it loses the capability of sensation. The strongest agreeable smell becomes soon imperceptible. But disagreeable smells have more force, and continue longer to impress their effects upon us.

The sense of smelling is but of little use to mankind, in enabling them to judge of

the qualities of objects, in directing them to agreeable, or warning them of disgusting, things. But, so far as it furnishes new ideas, it is the means of adding to our knowledge, and extending our minds.

It is a faculty which is much stronger in some brutes, especially in the pointer species of dogs, than in the human race, and is more necessary and useful to them. Some it enables to find their food, and others to avoid their enemies. But it is strongest in beasts of prey; and when it enables any animal to avoid evil, it is always given for another purpose.

That the mental superiority of man frequently compensates the deficiency of his corporeal qualifications, has often been remarked. But in nothing is this more strikingly evinced than in his conduct with regard to this sense. The imperfections which he labours under in the sense of smelling, he supplies by the excellence of that sense in inferior animals.

SECTION VI.—*The Sense of Beauty.**

THE perception of beauty is a sense produced entirely by the abstract exercise of

* *Section 1.—Beauty.*

As beauty forms a peculiar source of pleasure, it may be proper to ascertain those principles from which it is derived.

The sense of beauty is entirely independent of the corporeal senses, is formed by the action of the mind alone, and is what is called an internal sense. Beauty is not a sensation but an idea, and must, from the weakness of their intellects, be nearly unknown to the brute part of the creation.

The term beauty is used in a very vague sense, being extended not only to every object of vision, but also to sounds, and even to morality and science; but when applied to the latter, it is certainly figurative. The appellation ought, undoubtedly, to be confined to objects of vision, and, even in that case, distinction is necessary. The sense of seeing, like other senses, is capable of furnishing different ideas, and, therefore, does not always please in the same manner. Sometimes a prospect is agreeable by its variety, such as a landscape, and certainly colours also please from their variety. To a landscape, we cannot refuse the appellation of beautiful, because it pleases through the medium of the

the mind, which has no connexion with the body, and which is peculiar to man-

eye; yet it appears to possess no peculiarity different from the operation of the principle of variety in the other senses.

Every object of sight, again, which gives pleasure is not beautiful. Some objects of vision please from their deformity. The sight of an execution, or a shipwreck, may also give pleasure; but still neither can be called beautiful. These latter objects, together with those of *magnitude*, seem to belong to the class of *sublime*.

Beauty, however, in the most restricted sense of the term, can, with difficulty, be reduced to one principle; at least it is necessary, for the sake of distinctness, to divide it into different classes, although all these sometimes unite in one object. The species of beauty are three, viz. of *form*, *colour*, and *action*. Of these, that which belongs to form is the most complicated, and may be divided into *proportion*, *uniformity*, and *variety*.

It next remains to be inquired what are the principles which produce the several species of beauty. Proportion consists in a relation of parts, and derives its beauty chiefly from the *fitness* of the structure to the end proposed; uniformity, in a similitude of parts, and is agreeable by its *facility* of conception; variety, in a difference of parts,

kind. It is what is called an internal sense, and the passion which corresponds to it is

and pleases by the *exercise* which it gives to the mind; but if the term beautiful be extended beyond variety in an individual object, it changes its meaning. *Intricacy* of form is also a species of beauty, deriving value from the *difficulty* of its conception, but evidently included in variety. *Imitation* may also be said to be a second hand beauty, and depends upon *resemblance* to the original. The beauty of a single *colour* arises from its *vivacity*, of several from the same cause added to *variety*; but, in most cases, beauty of colour is determined by association. *Motion* is not *graceful* by being rapid or slow, but by being in a *medium* between the two.

The grand principle of beauty is *association*. Thus, with a ruddy complexion, we associate health; with a superb building, the power and wealth of the owner, design, and fitness for the end proposed.

But the principle of beauty may, perhaps, admit of greater simplification, and it may still be asked, what is association? Having found two objects frequently united, when one appears we expect the other. Association is, therefore, nothing more than the *custom* of observing the union of certain qualities. Hence it is remarked that different

admiration. Seeing, although beauty is peculiar to that sense, is only the means of it.

forms and colours are admired in different species of things. Every species, it is observed, has its own particular form; the proportions which are valued in one are quite different from those which are esteemed in another. The most general form of an individual, again, becomes the standard of beauty to the species to which it belongs. The most beautiful feature is a medium between all other features. All approach it in resemblance; and, although it differs from all, it is more like any one than they are to each other. Opposite species, it is said, do not assist us in judging of the beauty of each other. But it is as easy to fix a standard for those which are similar, as it is for the individuals of any particular species. Thus, although we can form no comparison between the beauty of animals and plants, yet we may compare one species of animals or plants with another, and ascertain the central species of either.

The same principle extends to objects of use. The beauty of utility is, in the first place, undoubtedly, produced by a comparison between the means and the end; but custom must come in to consummate the rule laid down; for even on a change of structure for the purpose of rendering any thing more convenient, it is sometime before

It is, in reality, no more produced by seeing than by any of the other senses. That

we can reconcile ourselves to the new form. Among those things, the beauty of which consists in a relation of parts, the exact *proportion* is fixed by the *medium* of many. To those also, the beauty of which depends upon *form or magnitude*, the same rule applies. In the structure of buildings and ships, in the disposition of gardens and fields, there is always an established form which is the standard to others. Furniture and dress are, again, by that particular modification of association called *fashion*, continually varying; but the *present* form always appears the most beautiful. In different countries, not only do all these vary, but even the conformation and complexion of human beings in the highest degree. But whatever is common in each, no doubt, appears most elegant and beautiful to the inhabitants.

As the beauty of every object is ascertained by comparing many, the most beautiful object is the nearest to perfection of its kind, and, therefore, must be different from all others, and must possess singularity. Thus, it is always variety which produces pleasure, and beauty is but a particular species of novelty. At first view, it seems to be the reverse, because a beautiful object is formed of a selection of common features, but that selection is a

there is nothing intrinsically beautiful in objects, and that beauty is merely an idea,

very extraordinary circumstance. Beauty is what is common and uncommon at the same time, or it is general features combined in an individual.

The variety of nature is immense, the variation of the forms of its objects innumerable. No two of them, in all their qualities and relations, can be found perfectly parallel. From that general resemblance to others in which the beauty of one consists, all others are perpetually declining into remote degrees of beauty, into the most distant variety, into contortion and deformity. Still, however, the beauty of an individual is derived from the deformity of others, and depends upon that contrast which it forms with the infinite variety of degrees by which they approach, or recede from it in resemblance.

But, as all contrast which is violent to a certain degree produces pleasure, beauty and deformity sometimes change relations, and the former gives a value to the latter. If deformity be at any time more extraordinary than beauty, the latter, in that case, becomes the basis of the value of the former; and the principle of pleasure is exerted in a contrary manner.

The idea of beauty arises from what is most consonant, and that of deformity from what i

arising from relation, are facts completely proved by the circumstance of a person

most contrary, to common appearance. Both produce pleasure in that degree in which they are extraordinary. As the marvellous and miraculous, which are always contrary to the uniformity of experience, rank with the greatest truths and most eminent discoveries, so any very extraordinary deformity, or uncommonly irregular feature of nature, becomes as gratifying, and capable of yielding as high enjoyment, as perfect and regular beauty. There arises as much pleasure from deformed as from beautiful objects, from ridiculous as sublime things, and from awkward as graceful actions, if they are deformed, ridiculous, or awkward, in an extraordinary degree. For, it is only when things are not deformed enough to raise wonder, or actions ungraceful enough to move risibility, that they are harsh and disagreeable. Any wonderful variation of nature, or deformity, is pursued with as much eagerness as the most beautiful of its productions, and as they are both equally extraordinary, they both produce equal degrees of pleasure. Such deviations from the laws of nature are, however, upon the reverse side of the principle of variety from beautiful objects. Instead of being combinations of common qualities in individuals, they are assemblages of uncommon.

having often changed his ideas of the beauty and deformity of certain objects, while they, in reality, remained always the same.

Thus, the different qualities of nature reflect a value upon each other. By passing from deformity to beauty, and from beauty to deformity, a transition of sensation is established, similar to that which takes place in the alternate changes of motion and rest, or of hunger and satiety. Contrast operates in beauty and deformity as in other things. Each receives its influence from the other. Beauty and deformity are relative, and, therefore, connected qualities; and without the one, it is impossible for the other to exist.

CHAP. V.

The Passions, or the manner of Pleasure.

ALTHOUGH the passions originally arise from the senses, the senses are to be considered only as the medium of the passions. It is chiefly the situation of objects, and the relation of circumstances from which they are derived, and by which their importance is regulated.

Passion is affection of mind, and but the the manner in which pleasure or pain is conveyed to us. The passions may be said to be formed more by the abstract operation of objects on self-love than by the immediate effects of the senses. Most of them have no intimate connexion with any particular sense; and from the different relations from which they arise, the majority of them receive their denominations. Their number is not regulated by the senses, but they are as numerous as there are very different or extraordinary combinations of objects or circumstances; and it is here proposed to mention but the most remarkable of them.

To enlarge on the mixture of the affections would be to describe cases rather than to delineate principles; and is unnecessary, as those who can conceive them in their simple elements, can easily comprehend their various modes of operation when compounded. On this point, it may be sufficient to say, that the agreeable, as well as the disagreeable passions, associate most readily with those of their own species; and that when passions contradict each other, whether pleasing or painful, the weaker always yields to the stronger,

Most passions are, indeed, incompatible, only one existing at a time. But contrary passions generally destroy each other. Fear sometimes extinguishes anger, and anger sometimes overcomes fear. They may take possession of the mind alternately; but both cannot exist together; unless the degree of each be moderate, and in that case a mixed affection may be the consequence.

SECTION I.—*Love.*

LOVE, taking it in a general sense, is one of the two divisions of the passions. Love

and hatred are two of the strongest affections of which the mind is capable, and, in fact, include all others. Love has no peculiarities arising from its own nature. The only varieties which it exhibits are the degrees and manner of it, which are produced in an infinitude of ways by the different situations and interests which occur in life. All the other passions which have any portion of pleasure in them are but branches or shades of it, diversified by circumstances; and they are distinguished according to the different objects and relations by which they are created.

The pleasure which objects promise is the strongest provocative which we can receive to action. They are, therefore, desirable, and capable of producing pleasure, in the same degree in which they are necessary and beneficial to our nature.

The mutual sympathy of the sexes is, perhaps, the strongest degree of this passion which is occasioned by any relation of the interests of mankind; and the multitude of circumstances in which it is diffused, and the different appearances which it assumes,

form one of the most delightful systems in the whole compass of human affairs.

SECTION II. — *Hatred.*

THE best illustration of hatred is love. Hatred is the second division of the passions, and the very reverse of love. Like love, it has no peculiarities, arising from its own nature, and is varied only by the different degrees of the disagreeableness of objects. Hatred, and all those secondary passions which arise from it, confer benefit, as well as those which produce pleasure. Both have their value from the necessities of our nature, although they influence, and serve, us very differently. The effect of those passions which produce pleasure is generally to promote our exertion, or to induce us to acquire some supply which our bodily conformation requires; and of those which produce pain, to compel us to avoid those things which would hurt and injure us. Both are equally strong and equally useful. We are as forcibly compelled to seek ease from pain as to pursue pleasure. To rid ourselves of pain is not, as some have

called it, a negative pleasure, but only in expression and mere words. To be freed from pain, is to acquire pleasure by the contrast between them. There is, indeed, never any pleasure obtained, but by the destruction of a desire or want which has given pain.

Hatred, from the highest to the lowest degree, is always occasioned by what is hurtful, and is great in proportion as the object is injurious, or unsuitable to our nature. We view with pleasure that which is perfect, fresh, and wholesome, but, with disgust and horror, that which is noxious, putrid, and corrupt.

To this, however, there are some exceptions, which are sufficient to shew that all things are ordered for the best, and regulated in that manner which alone corresponds with perfection. Thus, however much we may abhor and avoid pernicious things with which we are unconnected, we are generally satisfied with that which belongs to our own persons of whatever quality it may be. Even some things which are hurtful to ourselves, and disagreeable

to others, when resulting from the peculiarities of our own constitutions, are unattended with disagreeable ideas.

SECTION III.—*Joy.*

Joy is a passion which may be said to arise from love; but which more properly belongs to things in motion than at rest. It is a species of love adapted to the attainment of any thing agreeable, to the accomplishment of any difficulty, to relief from pain, or escape from danger; and it must be considered a mode of pleasure different from the enjoyment of what we already possess. The pleasure of joy is the greatest of all, because it arises directly from the original cause and principle of all pleasure, variety.

Joy corresponds with success; and is always the result of something new and unexpected. When any thing difficult is accomplished, or when an agreeable event suddenly happens to us, the mind becomes, as it were, dilated and extended, our hope and expectation becomes more lively, our sensations more awake to pleasure, and

we feel a greater enthusiasm for action. The imagination then dwells entirely on those objects which are agreeable, and the mind, from the impulse which it has received, continues its exertion with a higher degree of vigour. When the mind is accustomed to joy and gratification, it is bold and daring; but when it is accustomed to misfortune, it is spiritless, hopeless, and fearful. Hence misery, as well as happiness, may become habitual.

The duration of joy is short, because it is exquisite. It is always succeeded by a vacancy of mind which we are impatient to fill up by some new effort and acquisition.

SECTION IV.—*Grief.*

GRIEF is the counter passion of joy. The one arises from agreeable, and the other from disagreeable, events,—the one from pleasure and the other from pain,—the one from good and the other from evil. Grief seems to be a passion which is more hurtful than necessary to us, and which has not been intended as any appendage of our na-

ture, but unavoidably to result from hatred or that which is disagreeable.

When any misfortune happens to us, grief, like a dark cloud interrupting the rays of the sun, overspreads the mind, and gives to every thing a gloomy and horrid appearance. Grief deprives objects of their beauty, weakens hope and expectation, and retards, and diminishes, action. Grief lessens our confidence in our own abilities, suspends the anticipation of pleasure, and turns the mind entirely to the contemplation of disagreeable objects. While the mind is under the influence of grief, it is deprived of the capability of pleasure, and of incentive to action. The creation then contains no attractions. Things which formerly gave delight, pass over it without impression. One misfortune deprives all objects of their beauty, and extinguishes every charm in nature. When a person meets with an unfortunate event, his imagination represents all those which futurity contains as similar, and, upon any new misfortune, all former misfortunes rise up in the mind. Nature then forms a group of

objects similar to those which compose the kingdom of Pluto; and the mind believes, and dreads, in the same degree in which the objects of its fears are terrible.

When the mind is habituated to grief, it becomes weak, timid, and irresolute, from the custom of experiencing misfortune, and expecting evil, and feels a languor and inclination to inactivity. When we have once sunk under misfortune, the spirits rise only by the same progress in which they fell. Every succeeding action awakens feeling, and calls forth effort. If grief, therefore, be occasioned by the recollection only, and not by the continued endurance of misfortune, the perpetual obtrusion of pleasure upon the senses, and those new interests which the mind, by the change of objects, is compelled to form, will soon restore it to a healthful condition.

In conquering grief, our own efforts assist the effects of external objects. There is nothing which we are more anxious to escape from, which we are more willing to forget, or which the mind either recollects or dwells upon with more reluctance than

pain and misfortune. The great aim of the mind is happiness. Disagreeable ideas are admitted with reluctance; no person will feel a misfortune if it be in his power to avoid doing so, and every one strives to escape from grief of whatever nature. The mind, indeed, when it is habituated to misfortune, searches for gloomy objects, but it always dwells upon them with pain, unwillingness, and a desire of bursting the chains which tie it down to them.

SECTION V.—*Anger.*

ANGER is a passion so strong that when a person is angry, it is thought sufficiently precise to say he is in a passion. It arises directly from hatred and disagreeable objects; and is so purely original, and closely united to self-love, that any analysis of it is impossible. It is the vigilant protector of our rights, and the avenger of our injuries. It must, however, be distinguished from mere dislike. For, there are many things disagreeable in others, such as misfortune, disease, and incapacity, which provoke no resentment. Anger is a species of

hatred applied to conscious and active beings, and refers entirely to the intention to offend.

It is impossible to conceive the idea of an injury without feeling anger and an inclination to resent it. It is impossible to forgive an injury, so long as it appears an injury, until time has deprived it of its force, until it is worn out of the mind and is forgotten. He, therefore, who does not feel anger does not feel injury. 'Those who are good-natured, or are not easily provoked, enjoy that happy disposition which is incapable of feeling the sting of any but uncommon misfortunes or injuries, and, by it, anger is repelled with a blunted edge. Hence good nature depends upon the dulness of the disagreeable affections; but insensibility to great offences is a weakness of no greater magnitude than irritability in trifles.

Anger is not without enjoyment, but contains a mixture of pain and pleasure, in which pleasure predominates. It is remarkable that an injury towards ourselves should be compensated by one towards another

person, and the loss of pleasure restored by the effects of retaliation. The motive of anger, and the purpose of revenge, is not merely to prevent a repetition of injury; but we feel a gratification in the punishment of those who have offended us, and a satisfaction in the idea of having diminished their happiness in the same degree in which they had lessened ours. For, even where there is no possibility of a repetition of injury, we seek revenge, and desire to inflict punishment.

SECTION VI.—*Fear.*

FEAR is the passion of self-preservation; and, although it is more passive and produces less agitation than anger, it is one of the strongest affections of which human nature is susceptible. Sometimes it overthrows the mind, and amounts to madness. The advantage of fear is that it influences us to avoid evil, and those things which are injurious; but it is, in its own nature, a passion entirely on the side of pain. Shakespeare calls it “a too-intensely thinking upon the event.” When, indeed, the mind

dwells too intensely upon any event, and separates, too distinctly, the fortunate from the unfortunate consequences, the transition from the good to the bad side is easy, and probability is lost between them.

Fear is the most uncomfortable of our passions. In that disposition in which it predominates, all enjoyment is banished. It is a passion from which mankind suffer more than the inferior ranks of the creation. They are, indeed, often alarmed by vain fears, but such alarms are soon forgotten, and their minds are tranquil while their bodies are at ease. But the imagination of man wanders into futurity, and he tortures himself with fears as vain as those of inferior animals, and much more numerous.

The stronger the mind is, the more acutely it can think, and the more intensely dwell upon any thing. The more attention it gives to misfortune, the more it suffers from it. A mind which is capable of little thought and little attention, soon allows itself to fall away from any disagreeable object, and to sink into peace. There are

some minds which have not strength enough to be unhappy, and which are too small for misfortune to take hold of.

There is also a certain warmth of constitution which repels the dread of misfortune, and prevents it from interrupting enjoyment. This happiness of character, which is peculiar to youth and a sanguine disposition, is occasioned by that glow of passion which exists between external objects and the internal feelings; by which we are enabled to fix our minds on the present to the exclusion of the future.

There can be nothing more uncomfortable and tormenting, or which is capable of rendering a person more miserable, than that disposition in which fear or anxiety is the predominant passion, and which induces a person to analyze his enjoyments, and examine his prospects with too critical an exactness. Fear, and all other disagreeable passions, arise from an incapability of changing our ideas. It is wonderful with what an appearance of certainty melancholy impresses the dread of distant and improbable events upon the mind. A melan-

choly disposition depends originally upon deficiency of animal spirits, or want of elasticity in the constitution to return the shock of impression, but is much increased by contemplation and reflection. Abstract principles and causes, as the bones are made on account of the external structure, are designed for the sake of common appearances. As beauty and pleasure float upon the surface of things, he who thinks too profoundly or too intensely is sure to miss them. Too intense a degree of thought is always accompanied by dreads, jealousies, and anxieties. If, therefore, he who is distrustful with regard to the intentions of mankind, or sceptical and doubtful as to future success, could obey instinct, feel more, and think less, he would perceive a wonderful addition to his happiness.

Man wants only the command of his own mind to be perfectly happy. If a person had the control of his passions as much as of his actions, he would allow nothing to interrupt his tranquillity. Hence we meet with many fine pieces of morality advising us not to feel pain ; which would certainly

be very wise if as practicable as desirable. Those high-sounding maxims, which inculcate the doctrine that a wise man should be above being affected by good or evil, are, however, to be considered merely as moral quibbles or rhetorical flourishes which teach an apathy inconsistent with the nature of conscious beings. The mind is governed by principles not less fixed and determinate than those which govern matter; and the same relation of cause and effect exists in the operations of the one, as in those of the other. With respect to good and evil, man is entirely passive in mind as well as in body. He must feel events according to his situation, the nature of his senses and passions, and the qualities of objects.* When we sustain any irreparable injury, or receive an affront, our minds dwell upon it with the most intense thought. However vain it may be to continue to think upon that

* On the subject of liberty and necessity, all that can be said in favour of necessity, is, that the mind is governed as regularly by its own principles as matter is governed by those which belong to it; and all that is to be said in favour of liberty, is, that the principles of the former are different from those of the latter.

which is disagreeable, or however desirable it would be to forget that which we cannot amend, it is impossible, by any effort of will, to dismiss painful ideas.

But if man had the entire command of his own mind, or the power of changing his ideas at pleasure, he would be too independent of this world to take any interest in its concerns. Such, therefore, is the perfection of its construction, that we cannot improve a part but at the expense of the whole.

SECTION VII.—*Pity.*

PITY is a passion very nearly connected with fear. Those misfortunes which approach our own nature and condition, most readily command our sympathy; and those persons who suffer what we ourselves dread and fear, most naturally exact our pity, because we can most easily conceive their circumstances.

The unfortunate associate with the unfortunate, and condole with each other; but the happy hear tales of distress with impatience, and are unwilling to have their

enjoyments interrupted by them. Those who suffer evils which we do not dread, which we think ourselves secure from, and which we have never experienced, we seldom pity. A person of a disposition insensible to fear or pain, or who is accustomed to happiness, is very rarely capable of sympathizing with the distresses of others. Those only who know and have experienced misfortune can conceive pity, and feel the power of sympathy.*

Pity is a passion from which a very great degree of pleasure can be derived. To feel the misfortunes of others in a degree nearly equal to what they themselves feel, and to have it in our power to alleviate their sufferings, either by sympathizing with or actually removing them, is, in effect, to experience the same joy which they feel on

* As both the virtues and the vices may arise from the same cause, it is often difficult to discover the particular principle on which individuals act. Thus both cruelty and humanity may originate from fear. It is natural for the most timid to be most malicious, because they have suffered most; and it is also natural for the most timid to be most humane, because they have the greatest chance to stand in need of humanity.

being relieved, without the reality of their distress, or at any time the prospect of its continuance. When our pity is excited, we associate with it the idea, or at least the wish, of the removal of the evil, which affords a self-approbation productive of the highest pleasure. Hence pity is a passion which, in every case, proceeds more from inclination than compulsive duty.

SECTION VIII.—*Envy.*

ENVY is the reverse passion of pity. We pity the unfortunate, and envy the successful. Envy and pity resemble each other in the reverse, as black and white have a corresponding equality. As the condition of those whom we pity must approach our own to admit the capability of sympathy, so there must be some equality between us and those whom we envy to admit the idea of rivalship. Those who are situated far above, create as little envy as those who are far below, us. Both extremes have the same effect, and are equally indifferent. That which is far removed from our situation on either side, we are not in the habit

of being interested about, and have no ideas concerning. It is only when interests are the same and situations different, or among those whose circumstances were originally equal, but which afterwards became comparatively unequal, that envy exists.

Envy is a species of hatred for an undue preference, like that which arises from an undue punishment. It is sometimes a fine sensibility of mind, occasioned by acute reflection, and intense thinking, on the merits and successes of others, in comparison with our own. Envy and emulation are often nearly allied. In some circumstances, it would perhaps be unnatural and an imperfection to be without the former. Where the pursuits of two persons are similar and their success different, envy is a necessary consequence. It is, indeed, impossible for persons of keen feelings not to suffer this passion when circumstances afford a comparative inequality of merit and good fortune.

There are, however, different species of envy. Some gross and vulgar; which arise from the expectation of the most immedi-

ate good to ourselves, without the deduction of recompense, or the exchange of mutual benefit. Such envy results from that littleness of mind which is incapable of conceiving the relation of moral duties, and the dependance of individuals in society, or which induces men to judge of every action by the standard of self-advantage. Those, therefore, who allow such unreasonable and unbecoming passions to occupy their minds, are truly despicable.

But if the world would consider rightly of the matter, they would, perhaps, find nothing unreasonable in the conduct of even the most contemptible of the envious. Envious persons are, for the most part, as unfortunate as criminal. Their conduct to the world, as well as the conduct of the world to them, arises from the want of those qualities which both value. Of all passions, envy is the most unhappy. The envious have not even the common privilege of the unfortunate—a claim to our pity. All the world hate and despise them; and is it to be expected that they will repay hatred and contempt with love and admiration!

SECTION IX.—*Vanity.*

VANITY arises from the superiority which we suppose ourselves to possess over others. It is a mental or abstract sensation, and a peculiarity of the human race; or if inferior animals possess any capability of it, it must be in a degree as much inferior to that of mankind as their minds are to the minds of men.

Vanity is universal, in the same manner as other passions; but, like them, it predominates in a greater degree in some minds than in others. Flattery has been called the passport to the human heart; and every person possessed of candour must confess its power of pleasing. To receive flattery, even when we know that the commendations which are bestowed upon us are false, is agreeable; because it shews a desire to please us, and an attempt to gain our friendship, which are of themselves very powerful recommendations. We are even vain of the reputation of virtues which do not belong to us, and imagine that those who flatter us are deceived though we are not

deceived ourselves. Besides, the very supposition of the possession of those things which we value has a pleasant effect on the mind. Flattery, like poetry, is not the less agreeable because fictitious.

Vanity must, however, be distinguished from the desire of approbation; and commendation, or an acknowledgment of merit, from flattery. An acknowledgment of the abilities, useful or agreeable qualities, which we possess, is but praise. He is, therefore, a hypocrite who denies that he receives pleasure from it, and a fool who calls it flattery. Those who are deficient in acuteness, and incapable of distinction, often confound one quality with another, and generally take every virtue for its neighbouring vice. Economy they call parsimony; prudence, cowardice; and the acknowledgment of the pleasure which arises from just commendation, vanity. But a person who can accurately separate the virtues from the vices, will disregard prejudice, and adhere to what his reason teaches him is just and right in defiance of the opinion of the shallow and narrow minded. There

are certainly occasions on which a man must vindicate himself by mentioning his services or good qualities, and on which self-praise becomes even a duty. Of this Socrates's defence furnishes a great example. It must, indeed, always be very difficult, for men to speak with justice concerning themselves; but have they not the greater credit who accomplish so arduous an undertaking?

Vanity is, however, a ridiculous passion, which we are often betrayed into while we do not imagine it. No person, therefore, can be too careful not to transgress the bounds of modesty. Vanity is a species of false merit by which a person loses as much reputation as he acquires by real. Hence, we should be assured, from indisputable evidence, of our own merit before we are dogmatical concerning it. To those, indeed, who suspect their own firmness, as there is a greater probability of ridicule following misconduct, than praise merit, it is always more prudent to risk the loss of applause by silence than to incur the danger of contempt by judicious egotism.

SECTION X.—*Modesty.*

MODESTY is certainly very nearly connected with timidity. Both depend upon acute thinking, or that excess of sensibility by which we receive too strong an impression of the objects on which the mind is employed. But, like fear, the capability of feeling uneasiness from whatever is improper or ridiculous, can certainly be conquered by custom.

Modesty is sometimes, like its contrary quality—insensibility, guilty of excess. The sensations of modesty arise probably as often from imagination as reality. But this shews its independence of the senses, its peculiarity to human nature, and that it is a passion proceeding from the vigour of the mind alone. Modesty may be called a sense, with an equal degree of propriety as a passion, shame being still a passion resulting from it. But between those passions and senses which are mental or internal, there is very little difference. The sense of modesty, and the passion of shame are, therefore, scarcely to be distinguished.

Modesty and shame are passions capable of furnishing very little pleasure. The sensations which they produce are almost entirely composed of pain. If any degree of pleasure arise from them, it proceeds, perhaps, from the self-approbation of self-condemnation. A delicate dread of disapprobation, of contempt, or of becoming the object of laughter, is one of the acutest feelings of which the mind, without the assistance of the senses, is capable. Shame is, indeed, one of the strongest pains which a reasonable being can suffer.

Modesty is one of the most favourable indications of character, with regard to both understanding and moral qualities. But we must beware of being imposed upon by the assumed appearance of modesty; for it is a quality too valuable not to give temptation to forgery and imposition.

Modesty is certainly a moral quality alone. The discoveries which it makes with regard to the understanding proceed from the acuteness of moral sensibility being always in proportion to the extent of mental comprehension.

All moral ideas of right and wrong are abstract perceptions. Men only are capable of virtue. Brutes are not. They act merely from the immediate impulse of their senses, without regard to the rights or claims of each other. But men are capable of a more abstract and extensive system of action, and of being governed by the most distant relation which things bear to each other. That celebrated rule of our religion, "do as you would be done by," is the perfect and complete theory of social duty; and in proportion always as the mind is extended, it is capable and sensible of morality.

SECTION XI.—*Admiration.*

THE astonishment which arises from any new or extraordinary event is common to brutes as well as to men. But the perception of beauty is entirely a mental sensation, of which inferior animals do not seem capable. Astonishment proceeds merely from the effect which the object is expected to have on the mind. But the sensation of

beauty is generated by thinking, and is the offspring of intellect entirely. The pleasure resulting from beauty rises immediately from reflection, without the assistance of any of the external senses, farther than that connexion which perception, without any particular sensation or idea attached, forms between the mind and its objects.

That which is soft to the touch, gratifying to the taste, soothing to the ear, or agreeable to the smell, is not beautiful, but only possesses qualities which have a pleasant effect on the sense which corresponds with it. While such might properly be distinguished by the term agreeable, that of admirable might very aptly be exclusively appropriated to beauty, as it implies some effort of the mind.

Although the eye is the organ of sight, and necessary to the perception of beauty, yet it is unable, without the assistance of reasoning, to produce any such idea. Beauty is, therefore, independent of that organ. The idea of beauty is not an effect arising from the sense of seeing, but from the operation of the powers of the mind in

the selection and comparison of features and forms.

SECTION XII.—*Hope.*

HOPE is purely mental, and attached to human nature, as it proceeds from the abstract action of the mind, of which inferior animals are incapable. Any similar sensation which they possess may be distinguished by the name of expectation, as it arises from the most immediate perception of the situation of objects.

Hope appears to be the purest, and is perhaps the only, enjoyment which we experience. It is, in fact, a passion as incapable of pain as love is.

Hope is raised equally by good and bad fortune. The greater our success is, the more favourably we hope; the greater evils we endure, the more we have recourse to hope for their support. When deprived of hope, our existence becomes insupportable.

SECTION XIII.—*Disappointment.*

THE sensation arising from disappointment is a species of astonishment, or that kind of admiration which is common to all animals.

The theory of disappointment is *change*. The reversal of interests is always occasioned by the fluctuation of objects. We draw our ideas from what is before us, and form futurity according to the present, to which it may, perhaps, have no resemblance; or when we are absent from things, we represent them as we left them, and expect to find them in the same situation at our return, regardless of change. Our expectations are, therefore, disappointed accordingly as they are ill-judged, vain, or foolish. But if we miss pleasures with which we flatter ourselves, we are, from the same cause, recompensed with others which we never had in view. Good as well as evil may come unexpectedly.

Every one who is sensible of the fluctuating state of things, and the irregularity of the motion of nature, should be prepared

for disappointment. No wise man will, indeed, allow himself to be surprised by it. But the chief evil, in this case, is, that, while things lose their value after acquisition, they receive an addition to it from disappointment of obtaining them.

SECTION XIV.—*Despair.*

DESPAIR, at first view, seems only a deeper shade of disappointment. But there is this difference between them, that, while disappointment proceeds merely from the absence of expected good, despair arises from the pressure of positive and continued evil.

There is no passion so dreadful as despair. For, as we are enabled to bear all evils only by the hopes which futurity affords, how terrible must those misfortunes be which totally exclude hope, and furnish only the prospect of unremitted misery! Despair is the summit of calamity, and the utmost bounds of misfortune; a passion which continues evil without the contrast of good, and exists only by varying the agonies of the mind. Yet there is no passion from which we suffer so little as des-

pair, because it is rare in the same degree in which it is terrible. There are few so miserable as to be deprived of all comfort, whose circumstances totally exclude hope, or whose misfortunes are so great as to admit of no alleviation.

SECTION XV. — *Laughter.*

LAUGHTER is one of the most extraordinary of passions. It is confined to the human race, is generated entirely by the mind, and produced singularly in the body. There is no apparent peculiar necessity for it to human nature. It seems, indeed, a gift of generosity from the Almighty. The object of laughter is incongruity of ideas, or inconsistency of actions or things. But the former produces this passion only by representing, or referring to, the latter.

Laughter is also a passion which represents joy, and which it has the power of expressing as well as the effects of wit and humour. The means which brutes have of expressing satisfaction are by the eyes, leaping, or the movement of the tail. But the chief expression of joy in mankind, in-

dependent of speech, is by laughter, or that lesser species of it, smiling. .

The power of denoting joy, or a state of pleasure and satisfaction, is, however, the least important purpose of the faculty of laughter. It is chiefly useful for expressing those sensations which arise from wit, humour, inconsistency, and absurdity.

Laughter, by some, has been thought to to have an affinity to vanity. Laughter, it is true, is sometimes occasioned by what is ridiculous in ourselves, as well as in others ; but in that case, it must be in something upon which we do not value ourselves. Laughter, indeed, generally denotes triumph and exultation ; and may, in every case, be reduced to an expression of contempt.


Laughter has not the smallest appearance of arising immediately from any external sense. Sensible objects obtrude their effects upon us, without the concurrence, assistance, or even knowledge of the mind, until they are felt by it. They always command attention, and produce the same effects on the same senses. But if our inclinations

be unsuitable to the perception of an object of laughter, it is beyond the power of any of the senses to communicate an idea of it to the mind. Laughter is a passion arising from a sense more purely mental than even that from which the idea of beauty arises. It has no dependence upon any particular corporeal sense, and has not always an immediate connexion with external objects, but is often produced abstractly by the action of the mind, or the operation of one mental faculty upon another. A person deprived of every sense, supposing such a thing possible, would, if the means of communicating ideas to him, and of expressing the passion in the body only remained, still be capable of laughter.


Laughter is a passion which yields nothing but the purest pleasure, and which is incapable of producing pain. The pleasure which arises from laughter is the highest species of joy, as it proceeds from the greatest and most refined degree of novelty.

SECTION XVI.—*Secondary Passions.*

AMBITION, jealousy, avarice, parsimony, revenge, cruelty, benevolence, &c. are but secondary principles and the shades of the primitive passions. Their predominancy in some minds more than in others is occasioned by peculiarity of constitution, habit, education, or accident.



PART II.



CHAP. I.

Variety, or the Theory of Pleasure.

As man draws all his ideas from nature, and has all his interests and concerns in it, such connexion and dependence render it absolutely necessary that the mind should, in its operations, be consistent with nature, and keep a continual instability, like its other objects.

All nature preserves an unremitting motion and activity. Hence it happens, as a useful stimulus to the industry of man, that his inclinations suffer continual variation; that he always wants, always desires; never is satisfied, fixed, or contented. This disposition is sometimes taken for a proof of our superiority to nature; but it results merely from our circumstances, and that conformity to external objects which is required of us. The necessity of it to influence action is evident from a view of the contradiction and dissimilarity which a contrary disposition would have to the system of things.

Objects are continually changing their situation, and varying the scenery of nature. The mind of man draws all its ideas from material objects, and while they are in a state of motion it cannot remain at rest. His thoughts involuntarily accompany nature in all its variations; and his ideas are subjected to the same changes which it continually undergoes. When new objects present themselves, new ideas arise from them.* The body of man requires consistency with the state of things; and his mind must accommodate itself to the situation of his body. The ideas and pursuits of man are as fluctuating as the objects of nature. All our ideas arise from our present interests and views. From a change of situation, arise new interests; from new interests, new ideas; and almost every attainment which the mind makes is balanced by the loss of some former acquisition.

The capacity of the mind of man is limited, and his powers of retention have cir-

* As the mind receives all its ideas from material objects, it can no more enjoy perfect liberty than an effect can be produced without a cause.

cumscribed boundaries in their perfection. While recent events are bright in the mind, present are scarcely visible; and when we look forward, past things are effaced by futurity. But still as we advance in the progress of life, the imagination increases its acquisition of images, and the judgment enlarges its theatre of speculation and reflection.

The mind is kept in continual action by the motion of nature, and the incessant changes of the forms and appearances of its objects. It is solicited by the beauty of some, and repelled by the deformity of others, is pressed on every side, entangled in successive difficulties, kept in a continual state of exertion and warfare by obstacles to its views, and in perpetual suspense from the latent events which the changes of nature may unfold. As these events operate upon the passions, it experiences alternately hope and fear, joy and grief, elevation and depression.

The balance between all nature is just. That every creature may be kept in a continual state of exertion, and that its exer-

tions may be sufficient for its exigencies, the necessities of the whole order of the animal creation are proportioned to their abilities, and their abilities to their necessities. All are properly situated. Each species is formed for the element it inhabits, and for the particular kind of food its circumstances afford. Some animals derive their security from their magnitude, and others from their diminutiveness ; some live long, and produce slowly ; others are short lived, but possess an extraordinary fecundity. Of the larger kinds, there are always few ; and of the smaller, many. The propagation of the whole presses upon the supply of food, and the want of food limits their increase. The intellectual capacity of man is kept in check by similar means. The activity of the human mind furnishes new wants as often as former are extinguished, and the supply, again, is regulated by the demand or market.

Thus, all nature is a combination of opposing springs which receive elasticity from mutual compression. The mind and the objects of nature incessantly affect each

other, and a state of action is the perfection of both. A person is miserable while unemployed, and never more happy than when agreeably engaged.

Every difference of ideas arises from the difference of things ; and every variation of affection of mind depends upon the change of its ideas. The distinguishing quality of the mind is consciousness ; and all pleasure and pain may be resolved into variation of thought. We are certain that pleasure and pain depend upon interest or affection of mind, that they are mental qualities, and that nothing similar exists in matter. The body is incapable of feeling either, and is merely the conductor of both to the mind. The extent of our pleasure or pain does not depend upon the size of our bodies. Pleasure, or pain, is but an affection ; and every difference of affection depends upon its change. All pleasure and pain consist in the quickness of the succession of ideas. An elephant, from the superior size of his body, has no more enjoyment, nor is capable of more pain, than a mouse ; and kings derive no higher gratification from the con-

quering of kingdoms than other men do from ordinary acquisitions.

That the senses are the means of pleasure must be allowed. But it will by no means follow that the sensations arising from them are independent of the mind. It is the mind only which thinks, and feels; and even the mind cannot feel unless variously affected. It can with difficulty be conceived, and is, therefore, barely possible, that one sense alone, even with the assistance of the mind, could produce any degree of pleasure. It is inconceivable, and therefore impossible, that the unvaried action of one sense, or a continuance of the same degree of sensation could produce either pleasure or pain. Hence it is necessary to both, that the mind perceive objects by different means, through different senses, in different relations, and that it pass from one quality of them to another.

Both sensation and abstract ideas are thoughts of the mind, arising from things; the former from the immediate contact of our senses with their objects, the latter from the recollection of that impression. All ab-

abstract affection of mind is, indeed, only the representation or copy of actual sensation. But as abstract ideas are as much thoughts of the mind as the closest sensations, and as the most intimate sensation is merely thought of the mind in common with abstract affection, the importance of both, with regard to the intellect, is originally equal, and becomes different only by the casual variation of experience.

Brutes form few ideas but from sensation, and their sensations are certainly superior to any abstract idea which they can form. But it is not so with regard to man. The vigour of his mind is such, that, having once received ideas, through the medium of sensation, he can, with the utmost precision, combine and distinguish their relations, and foresee and preconceive their effects to the greatest extent. Among mankind, animal passions soon give place to artificial. There is no person who is not more governed by ideal considerations than by sensible impressions, or by his hopes and fears than by his present feelings. As, therefore, the importance of every thing

consists in the degree in which it influences the mind, or the vigour of thought which it engages, every object is to be estimated, not by its distance or proximity, but as it affords a variation of sensation or change of ideas.

The effect of every quality of matter on the mind depends merely on the relation which it bears to another. All qualities which are important are relative or comparative, and all distinctions arise from difference. The mind is affected only by what is new; and, therefore, has a natural tendency to change its ideas. No quality can retain its attention but for a moment, and it is perpetually changing from one to another. Hence anticipation, for the most part, exceeds reality. Whether we are induced to hope or to fear, to expect favourably or unfavourably, we are generally mistaken with regard to the degree of actual good or evil. Pleasures which are expected, and pains which are dreaded, are generally superior in idea to what they are in reality.*

* We can have no hesitation in believing that a condemned criminal suffers more from the idea of death than during his execution.

The effect of a succeeding sensation, or idea, depends solely on the contrast which it forms with a preceding. The importance of every change of objects or circumstances, arises from the sensations which they create, or the ideas which they furnish, different from former. Pleasure and pain are relative qualities; and the degree of the one is merely the result of the other. Every distinction is made by comparison, and by the efforts of the mind. It is by comparing effects that we become sensible of any effect at all. In the difference, therefore, between effects, or in contrast, of which variety is but a continuance, consists the essence of both pleasure and pain. The agreeableness or disagreeableness of all bodily sensation, or mental affection, depends upon its moderation or excess; which depends solely on the comparative differences of experience. Novelty is necessary to all sensation; and the existence of pain, as well as that of pleasure, requires change. Every affection of the mind is a change of its ideas, arising from an alteration of external objects; every variation of things af-

fects the mind as the succeeding are contrary to the preceding; and from the limited nature of the human understanding, and the imperfection of the circumstances of mankind, arises the perpetual fluctuation of ideas and things.

It is want which creates desire, and ignorance which stamps the value of novelty. These are the causes which prompt the mind to pursue, and inspire endeavour to obtain, every thing which we do not possess; which induce us to admire things beyond our power, and to examine and fear what is unknown.

Whatever we possess we cannot desire. However important or great any thing may have been while it was beyond the reach of our power, as soon as we obtain it, it loses its importance, and we our desire for it. As soon as any thing is fully possessed, there remains nothing in it to be desired. As soon as the qualities of any thing are enjoyed and known, its greatness and importance are at an end; our desires leave it, because it then contains nothing desirable; and we fix our affections, wishes, and

desires, upon something yet unknown and yet unenjoyed.

Every event and circumstance of the life of man confirm the observation, and shew it to be true while it is common, that nothing can fix his mind for a moment. Such is the inconsistency of his ideas of good and evil, that he continually quits what he possesses to obtain what he does not possess, continually enjoys and continually experiences disgust. It seems now to be an opinion very generally adopted, that contentment is equivalent to happiness, or only another name for it. A method, therefore, of obtaining pleasure without novelty or change, of converting one thing into every thing, or of producing variety out of that which does not contain it, is as desireable as the philosopher's stone which turns every thing into gold. But they are two things as rare as precious, and the pursuit of the one seems to promise the same success as that of the other.

Contentment is inconsistent with the nature of the mind, and uniformity with variety. Nothing but change can give pleasure.

The desires of man are perpetually on the wing; he is capable of enjoying rest no longer than he is ignorant of it by his acquaintance with labour; and he seeks rest, again, only to raise the desire of being busy. Incessant desire and incessant disgust are the chief springs of his action, the principles which govern, and the impulses which direct all his motions. Man's incessant desire of novelty, or the perpetual greatness of what he is ignorant of, is the motive which impells him, or the charm which attracts him, in every exertion. The minutest actions of his life are, by the love of novelty, continually varied. Whether he walk, sit, stand, or lie, the desire of variety, or the disgusts of uniformity, render continual change necessary.

Possession will destroy any effect however great, and custom reduces every impression to nothing. The mind soon becomes exhausted by attention to one object. It requires a continual change of ideas to preserve it in health, and feast of variety to give it pleasure. It is, by necessity, obliged to quit the sublimest idea; and, from dis-

gust, becomes inclined to quit the most pleasing. The sweetest thing will cloy, beauty palls, and perfection wearies. Even all the glories and wonders of nature are daily beheld without astonishment.

Change seems a law prescribed, not only to the ideas of the mind, but to all things. Physical and inanimate beings languish by uniformity of condition; the body suffers, if confined to one species of food; the breed of animals degenerates without mixture; and plants decline, if continued in the same soil. Nature itself wears out, and requires perpetual renovation.

SECTION II.

BUT although all good arises from change, so likewise does all evil. Pleasure may be destroyed by too great, as well as by too small, a degree of mental affection. Change is agreeable only when it is not excessive. A certain degree of irritation of the senses, or of affection of mind, is pleasing; more, is painful. That change of the relation of qualities which affects the mind only to the degree of moderation, is pleasing. But

when it is too sudden, or too great, it agitates the mind in a degree which is painful.

Moral evil is of the same nature. *Vice* is but *an excess of* those qualities, which, in moderation, are *virtues*. Thus generosity, carried too far, becomes prodigality; economy, parsimony; courage, rashness; caution, timidity. It is the same with all natural appetites. Eating and drinking, when indulged in moderation, are a source of pleasure; but when carried to excess become vitious, and breed disease and pain. Pain is, however, relative as well as pleasure. Without contrast, we become insensible of the former as well as of the latter.

The mind is affected only by what is new. Hence the same cause* which renders it insensible of the pleasure, renders it insensible of the pain, arising from any object or idea. Every man knows that he must die; but instances of death, because familiar, inspire no terror. Even although a person were certain that he would be put to death at a particular period, it is probable, if that period were distant, the impres-

* *Viz.* possession, custom, or uniformity.

sion would be strong only at first, keep possession of his mind but for a moment, and by custom would soon be obliterated.

The mind has a natural propensity to pleasure, hatred to pain, and an unwillingness to become unhappy. Any grief however great, if it be at first but barely sufferable, and the distress from which it arose past, and not continued, incessantly diminishes and gives place to pleasure, until our thoughts are no longer occupied by it; and when the mind is once at a considerable distance from a painful object, it feels a reluctance in returning to it. No person therefore, however useful he may be to the world, need flatter himself, that his memory will be perpetuated, unless, by rendering a posthumous continuation of benefit to mankind, he fix himself in their interests. To supply the deficiency of those of whom death has deprived us, we are obliged, if we have depended on them either for useful or agreeable qualities, to look around us for others who possess similar accomplishments, or to turn ourselves to new views; and soon either do not feel the necessity, or forget

the want of our former friends, by changing one person or one pursuit for another.

As objects change their relation, they change their value. Hence many of our passions are owing to those accidental situations into which we are thrown. From trivial and sometimes imperceptible causes, we are led to turn our ideas towards, and fix them upon, things which were formerly uninteresting. The mind is, again, drawn from these by other circumstances, equally trifling in themselves, but important by their gradual progress towards that value which they ultimately give to some particular object. When, therefore, a person is rendered unhappy by the disappointment of any of his views, it must always be a source of comfort to know that a change of circumstances must produce a change of opinions and pursuits, and reverse the value of things, diminishing that of some and raising that of others.

Any thing which has formerly given us pain is recollected against our inclinations, any thing which has given us pleasure with avidity. But both lose their force from

continuation, as the mind is soon necessitated to remove itself to other objects.

The duration of extremes is proportioned to their excess. The most contrary things soon lose their repugnance, and unite together. Pleasure and pain are but different degrees of affection of mind, and less or more of the same thing. The degree of all affection of mind depends upon its novelty. Novelty produces all sensation, and custom destroys it. Custom and novelty carry on continual war against each other.* Custom renders pleasant things insipid; disagreeable, pleasing; violently painful, tolerable. Any situation however miserable, or any pain however great, if we could at first but barely bear it, would, by custom, become light. Custom, according to Milton, will even make hell tolerable;

“ ————— inured not feel,
Or chang'd at length, and to the place conform'd
In temper and in nature will receive
Familiar the fierce heat, and void of pain
This horror will grow mild, this darkness light.”

Stagnation of ideas is inconsistent with affection of mind; variation ends where un-

* Custom is merely the absence of change.

iformity commences ; every effect is obliterated by continuation ; and every distinction destroyed by possession. Pleasure is at first created by interest, and is augmented with it until the sensation is turned into pain. But after affection of mind has amounted to torment, pleasure is produced in a contrary manner, by the reduction of interest, and increases as it diminishes.

Custom is contrary to all affection of mind, and is equally destructive of pain and pleasure, and capable of reversing both. For, as custom diminishes pain, it increases pleasure ; and as it diminishes pleasure, it increases pain. The power of custom is directly contrary to the power of novelty. As the latter exalts, the former degrades ; as the one increases, the other diminishes. When an object which was at first unusual becomes common, it loses the power of affecting us with usual sensations. When that which was at first designed to distinguish becomes familiar, it changes its nature. An epithet which has been used only on great and uncommon occasions, when applied to every matter, no longer conveys

distinction, or carries with it the effect which novelty gave it, to express the idea either of extraordinary pleasure or pain, beauty or deformity. When its signification becomes common, it can no longer signify what is uncommon.

Every thing, after it is possessed, loses the power of affecting us. When the pleasure arising from its novelty is over, it immediately falls into neglect. Nothing can be long great, or the greatness of any thing will diminish the longer it is possessed. As every distinction between objects, with regard to us, is made by novelty, the distance which one object holds from another, by its own local situation or relative circumstances, is easily overleaped. Men make but faint distinctions between things when custom and the knowledge of them have made them equal, and when ignorance does not create a difference between them. It is only by the first ideas which arise from any thing that we can distinguish. After the acquaintance of sometime, or at least after intense thought, the mind can make no

distinction between probability and possibility, between reality and fancy.

As pleasure and happiness depend upon change, no situation can long be great or delightful to any man. When a person is raised from an inferior to a higher station, the intoxication of his pleasure can exist only while the comparison between his present and his former situation remains upon his mind. This, again, can only be at the moment of his passing from the one to the other, or while the novelty of the change continues unimpaired.

When we have possessed any thing for a time, our minds become extended, fitted, and habituated, to it. The disproportion between it and other things, which created in us an uncommon degree of pleasure, happiness, or pride, ceases. We again have the same ideas, feel the same sensations, and enjoy the same degree of pleasure, as formerly. Our happiness, at any time, increases with our acquisitions, and exists after change only till the novelties of our situation are exhausted. On close examination, we find as few men proud as happy,

and as few satisfied with themselves as with things. Men are seldom elevated by perfections which they are accustomed to perceive in themselves, however great; and seldom value themselves much upon any superiority which is generally allowed them. Pride most commonly arises from recent acquisitions or improvements. Men very frequently despise those talents which they possess, and affect those which they do not possess.* Hence the weaknesses of the great, and hence the foibles of the eminent.

Every thing, after possession, becomes little. It is the mind which possesses it. As the change, therefore, from a lower to a higher situation, can produce only temporary sensations and transient affections, neither eminence nor obscurity, riches nor poverty, can render one person permanently more or less happy than another. Happiness does not depend on the proportion and relation which one thing bears to an-

* It was thought an elegant compliment to Dr Johnson, to say that he rode as well as the most illiterate fellow in England.

other, but on the proportion of the mind and the relation of the disposition to external objects. It is not the difference of things, but the difference of minds and dispositions which distinguishes the happiness of one person from that of another. (*Happiness.**)

* *Section 1.—Happiness.*

HAPPINESS is a continuation of pleasure. But happiness can no more be uniform than an unvaried degree of affection of mind could continue to be pleasant. Pleasure is undoubtedly a positive sensation, which at first proceeds from moderate affection of mind. But if that affection remain without variation, it is reduced to indifference; and if increased, it amounts to pain; pain is likewise often extinguished by continuance; until our passions having performed their revolution, return to the point at which they commenced. When good and evil succeed each other in equal degrees, our affections may be said to be balanced; for the greatest pain is, in some measure, compensated, when succeeded by the contrast of pleasure. Yet, as violent affection of mind is destructive of pleasure, extremes are to be avoided. The contrast

As we can only desire what is without our power, every thing which we do not

of good and evil, in moderation, is, perhaps, the greatest happiness of which our condition is capable. In short, nothing can be added to the common definition of happiness—tranquillity of mind.

There are some persons, by original conformation, incapable of enjoying pleasure, and others naturally incapable of feeling any misfortune which does not affect their senses. Happiness does not depend on situation, but on disposition, as the novelty of every situation soon wears off. Every thing has ultimately a pleasing or disagreeable appearance according to cheerfulness or gloominess of temper. Place a person of a melancholy disposition in that situation in which he has the power of satisfying every passion and desire, and he will still be unhappy; place a person of a cheerful disposition in any scene of wretchedness, and he will still carry with him that enchantment which renders all circumstances agreeable.

Peculiarity of disposition depends, in the first place, upon the nature of the body; and secondly, upon the extent of the mind. As the constitution is the medium through which all sensation and ideas are conducted to the mind, and as the charms of every object arise from its correspondence with the senses, happiness and misery depend much

possess, or of which we have yet had no more experience than a bare knowledge of

upon the vigour or imbecility of the body, and the perfection or imperfection of the animal economy. Thus youth is generally the season of enjoyment, and old age of indifference; and our desires, for the most part, decay with our constitutions. But there are some who do not perceive attractions in objects at any period of life in the same degree as others. Corporeal peculiarities have, therefore, a very important influence on happiness. Vain are all the charms of nature if we have no taste for them. The mist of a phlegmatic constitution dulls every prospect of the mind, and extinguishes the sunshine of nature. But that lightness of sensation which induces cheerfulness, converts every thing into beauty, and hurries a person through life in a perpetual blaze of merriment. The cheerful man dances along from one thing to another without anxiety, and in the enjoyment of the sweetness without the bitterness of things. "He that is merry of heart hath a continual feast."*

* Yet as those who are most accustomed to pleasure are most easily affected by pain, and as the smallest pains are most important to those who enjoy uniform pleasure, there are few who do not complain of unhappiness. Hence, the distribution of happiness, or of pleasure, is more equal, than, at first view, appears. The smallest trifles amuse women; but also often interrupt their happiness.

its existence, is great to us. If we acquire a knowledge of the existence of any thing,

But the constitution is still subject to the power of the mind. Every corporeal peculiarity is liable to be modified by it. Happiness bears a reverse relation to the mind to that which it does to the body. While it is created by the vigour of the latter, it is destroyed by that of the former. It has invariably been observed that mental exertion leads the attention from sensual gratification, that thought is the labour of the mind, that the more it thinks the more it suffers, that the less it thinks the more cheerful it is; that pleasure is light, and the impression of pleasing objects slender. The melancholy of an expanded mind arises from its being more engaged in judging of things than in tasting their charms. But as that obstruction to pleasure which proceeds from constitution is occasioned by the want of correspondence between the beauty of objects and stimulus of body, its effect is generally negative. For the greater part, it amounts only to indifference, if it be not accompanied with strength of understanding. That melancholy which proceeds from weakness of the corporeal frame is always far inferior to that which arises from extent of mental comprehension, in producing positive unhappiness.

that thing instantly becomes great in our estimation; and, if followed by another

Yet if ability can be supposed to exist unexerted, mental superiority may be possessed without any loss of happiness; and even a considerable degree of pleasure may be derived from mental exertion. But this chiefly happens to the studious, who, to excite their minds, like those accustomed to bodily stimulants, are obliged to have recourse to study. Their condition is not to be compared to that in which “the loud laugh speaks the vacant mind,” and in which the most trifling things are interesting.

Happiness, indeed, depends much upon a well regulated state of mind; and is, in a great measure, in our own power. But there are a thousand speculations and reflections which force themselves upon an expanded mind, and which serve to overturn the equilibrium of sensation. Great talents, for the most part, form a temptation to great exertions; and even the most moderate degree of reflection tends to destroy animal gratification. From the variety of proportions, therefore, in which the influence of intellect and of constitution may be mingled, arise the infinite diversity of dispositions, and inequalities of happiness found in the world. And, making allowance for the ex-

circumstance, we feel a desire to possess and enjoy it. But as soon as it is possess-

ceptions contained in general rules, the following maxims may approach the truth,

When qualities of a similar tendency, such as strength of mind and a phlegmatic or sickly constitution, or sensibility and melancholy, meet in the same person, that person must be in the highest degree miserable; or when imbecility of understanding and a constitution inducing cheerfulness compose the same character, that person must be eminently happy. When, again, qualities of a contrary tendency, such as lightness of constitution and extent of mind, or when dulness or weakness of constitution and intellectual deficiency are united in the same person, the effect of one must be proportionally deducted from that of another. When the constitutions of any two persons are the same, difference of happiness arises from difference of mind. When, again, magnitude of intellect is equal, the chief difference of happiness is created by constitution. When both the mind and the body of one individual are similar to those of another, the only distinction, with regard to happiness, which remains to be made, is difference of fortune; a distinction which is, however, for the most part, but temporary; and that only

ed, it loses the value which want of possession gave it, the mind is stimulated to pur-

which arises from disposition can fix a permanent characteristic of enjoyment or sufferance.

Section 2.—Sensibility.

SENSIBILITY occasions unhappiness by producing affection of mind in a degree inconsistent with pleasure.

It is that acuteness of sensation which receives the slightest impression, or that delicacy of mind which yields to the smallest impulse. Weakness of body sometimes supplies the want of extent of reflection in producing sensibility. In other cases, the strength of the mind overpowers and enervates the body. Many persons, from delicacy of constitution, possess great sensibility with little judgment, and while their feeling is acute the circle of its extension is narrow. On the contrary, grossness of constitution sometimes prevents a strong mind from possessing sensibility. But that it is chiefly a mental quality appears by its being greatly increased by study and reflection, and by literary men being found to possess a much greater degree of irritability, and a much more delicate frame of mind, than even the tenderest of women. Hence, in treating of happiness and misery, that sensibility derived from weakness of body must be sepa-

sue other objects; and to engage in fresh action.

rated from the mind, and whatever pain results from it, referred to the constitution.

Sensibility may be possessed in some degree without judgment, but judgment can hardly be possessed without sensibility ; or in the latter case, the mind must be clogged with an uncommon strength of constitution, or force of passion, in order to obstruct its exercise. A person of a comprehensive mind has within his view a wider range of situations and circumstances than a person of an inferior understanding, and is more capable of conceiving the feelings of others than those who are acquainted only with their own. Sensibility is the parent of every tender emotion, and the origin of every pathetic idea. It is impossible that any one can be affected by real or imaginary evil unless he be capable of conceiving it. No person can, in fact, sympathize with distress but only by appropriating it to himself.

As all mental qualities have a near connexion; extent of mind always acts more strongly in producing sensibility than grossness of constitution in preventing it from accompanying judgment: The cultivation of the understanding is also little affected by that rigidness of nerve which dulls sensation, or prevents the mind from receiving

As possession deprives things of the power of affecting us with the idea of great-

those improvements which sensibility may be thought to make upon it. However strongly such differences of bodily conformation may affect happiness, they little affect the expansion of the mind. No doubt, as all our ideas are derived from impressions, if the mind be prevented, by the grossness of the constitution, from receiving impressions, it must, in a manner, suffer injustice in its education, lose a source of ideas, and be obstructed in its improvement. The world seems to be wider to a person of sensibility than to one who wants it. But the effects of grossness of constitution, with regard to the improvement of the mind, are but slight, and easily conquered, as they do not obstruct sensation entirely, but only vary its degrees.

Sensibility is an extension of the mind beyond actual and immediate feeling, and a refinement on our senses which may be compared to the abstraction of ideas from objects; or it may be called the faculty of realizing impressions. How soon does sensibility realize what fancy conceives, and how great tortures do we not sometimes suffer from its representations! The chief characteristic of sensibility is the creating of pictures in the mind, and applying them to ourselves. But the pictures

ness, unusual sensations, or pleasure, man extends his desires with his acquisitions ;

of sensibility differ from those of hope, as much as pain differs from pleasure.

Those persons who possess the most comprehensive minds and the strongest judgments, have the power of enlarging the range of their interests, feeling and reflection, to the greatest extent, of divesting themselves of the prejudices of time, place and person, and of the insinuating fallacies and misrepresentations of self-love. They are enabled to ascertain the importance of every event at the greatest distance as well as when actually present. They can feel the misfortunes of others as sensibly as if they were their own, and estimate their own injuries and importance as if they belonged to others. It is evident, therefore, that judgment and sensibility improve the moral qualities of every character. Feeling is, indeed, thought to be the origin of all the virtues.

Those who are affected only by the objects immediately before them will not hesitate to seize the smallest advantage, although they know the consequences may be the destruction of another. But a person of sensibility, before committing such an action, would cast his mind on the other side, and shudder to think of seizing a small benefit which would occasion dreadful consequences to

the more he possesses, the more he desires; the more he excels, the more he wishes to

any one. A person of a contracted mind, often, cannot imagine any thing to be just which is contrary to his interest. But a person of sensibility, though he had suffered from the resentment of another, would still be capable of appreciating that person's motives, and making allowance for his conduct according to their force.

The inferior part of the creation are only sensible of the impressions and importance of those objects which are immediately before them, and act directly from sensation, without more prudence than the present requires. The great difference between their conduct and that of even the most ignorant and uneducated person, shews, that the more abstracted the scale is on which we think, the more our moral polity and virtue are improved. But in those sensations which are closest, and in which self-love is the predominant ingredient, as their force is greatest and their impression most violent, pleasure is strongest. As the mind removes itself to a distance from material objects, the less capable it becomes of receiving those enjoyments which directly arise from them.

It is certain that all strong minds and intense thinkers are melancholy; that the more the mind abstracts itself from the senses, or retires from the

excel. The destructive power of possession to novelty compels us to continual ex-

body, the more it recedes from pleasure. All our enjoyments arise from the beauty of the objects of nature, and all their charms depend upon the force of the sensitive passions. The passions produced by the activity of the mind are almost uniformly painful, and those only which proceed from the vigour of the constitution pleasing. Abstraction dissolves the hold which objects have of the mind, and introduces thought instead of sensation.

Sensibility, judgment, and melancholy, are nearly allied. The mind, when it becomes thoughtful, no longer passes from one object to another, wandering through a range of facts, and allowing one image to obliterate another, nor permits itself to receive the impression of the succeeding object with that brightness which the entire want of that of the preceding admits of. But it becomes stiff in its motions, immoveably fixed to one object or to a few, and wants that facility of change, and vicissitude of operation which lightness of reflection induces.

Vividness of sensation and contemplation are inconsistent. Where the one is present the other is absent. On the former depends our relish for pleasure. But the latter, by interrupting the versatility of our ideas, introduces melancholy, and

ertion. However great a person's acquisitions may be, he makes them only a founda-

leads the mind to disagreeable objects. Indifference shields us against the greatest misfortunes. But, by too keen a feeling, things, which are naturally agreeable, become painful. By expanding the scope, and adding to the minuteness of our reflections, sensibility is increased, and misfortune extended. The mind in which self-love receives all its impressions abstractly, and the interests of which are not confined to the sphere of actual existence, but are extended to every possibility of case within the reach of its knowledge, must suffer a very uncomfortable degree of agitation. That mind which is far extended, catches every impression; and that which is rendered dispassionate by abstraction, has room to doubt its own sufficiency, and cannot be rescued by self-flattery from feeling mortification and disappointment. A person of tender feelings is easily discouraged, susceptible of any impression, and continually agitated by passions which are disagreeable or too violent to be consistent with pleasure.

As happiness attends insensibility, misery often increases with knowledge. No doubt, whatever contributes to information, serves to enlarge reflection. But while knowledge produces variety, it annihilates novelty, and leads to anxiety and ex-

tion to build higher hopes upon, and his desires continue always with the same in-

cess of feeling. Philosophy, although it exalts us in the scale of dignity, and creates one species of gratification, certainly, at the same time, destroys another; and, by augmenting the delicacy of the mind, perhaps, upon the whole, diminishes the number of our enjoyments, and multiplies our afflictions.

As the mind of man is enlarged, he carries his reflections beyond the circle of his real action. When his imagination wanders into distant speculations, he looks upon the objects immediately around him with tasteless indifference. He despises before he has acquired, neglects pursuits, which, could to him, produce no gratification, and languishes for objects from the attainment of which he is excluded by his situation. A person who can view an extensive prospect, and anticipate futurity, exhausts the materials from which happiness is derived. The sphere of his mind is extended before his body; and the former outstrips the latter in such a manner as to leave an impassable gulph of disappointment between his real and desirable situation, or between those things which he can attain, and those which are capable of yielding pleasure to him.

satiable voracity. Ambition is a passion, which by being boundless, is, contrary to

In our endeavours after happiness, attention should, therefore, always be directed to domestic comfort, and the cultivation of those objects which lie nearest to us. For surely if familiar objects are capable of producing as much pleasure as remote, prudence dictates the choice of that pursuit which has the appearance of being most successful.

As nothing is so perishable as pleasure, those whose anticipation extends no farther than the organs of their bodies, besides having stronger desires, must have a more extensive fund of gratification, than those who proceed with a more rapid progress, and a more penetrating eye, to destroy possession and ignorance. A contemplative person first loses taste for one object, and then for another, till at last he abstracts himself so much from the proper concerns of his species, that the creation contains nothing desirable to him.

It is possible for a person to refine himself out of all human interests; for supposing him to have acquired all the knowledge of which mankind are capable, and to have experienced all the pleasures which the creation contains, he would require to be regenerated to become again sensible of the beauties of nature. Novelty depends upon ignorance, and pleasure upon the lightness of our re-

the nature of others, rather increased than diminished by gratification. In it, all hu-

flections. Enjoyment consists more in feeling than in thinking; and abstraction is as inconsistent with pleasure as it is with passion. Beauty lies in the outward structure of things; and we must be disappointed if we look for it in the anatomical.

That impression is always most pleasing upon which the least thought is bestowed. But the more vigour or desire with which we pursue any thing, the greater pleasure we derive from it. The force of the beauty of objects, and of all the sensitive passions, is seated in the body. The most ignorant, therefore, the most passionate of constitution and insensible of mind, however wonderful it may seem, are those who are best fitted to receive pleasure. As the nearer objects are to us, the more attracting, the brighter, and the more gratifying are their colours, if the mind can be occupied by one passion, or by the present entirely, without the debasing reflection of past disgust or of future disappointment, our enjoyment will be the more complete. A person of strong sensitive passions is blind to imperfections, hurried by their violence beyond doubt, and can persuade himself to the belief of whatever he pleases. But one whose passions are produced by the exertions of his mind dwells more upon imperfections, and is

man affections are comprehended. It is the sum of passions, and an incurable disorder of the mind.

more sceptical with regard to futurity than he has reason to be. Animal spirits create happiness, and a good stock of them is preferable to riches. They promote the exertion of the person who possesses them, bestow confidence and satisfaction on him in whatever he engages, and give a beautiful tinge to every thing around him. It is, therefore, certain, that all happiness arises from the constitution, and that the mind acts only negatively with regard to it; however much the influence of the latter may regulate the degree to which the effects of the former extend.

That mind which can be entirely occupied by one passion, which admits no two to oppose each other, and in which the present is so completely obliterated by the succeeding idea that no trace of it remains, is best calculated to receive uncontaminated the full force of every beauty, and the complete gratification of every desire. Ignorant persons, in whom the want of reasoning and expansion of mind leaves the deceptions of self-love undiminished, and permits every flattering insinuation to act with full force, are generally incapable of doubt with regard to the perfections which they imagine themselves to possess, or the acquisitions which

The digestion of the mind, by possession, preserves in it a continual hunger of novel-

they hope to obtain. Persons also of a vigorous constitution, whose confidence renders them insensible to every obstacle, who seize hope with the firmest grasp, who are blind to imperfections, and who disbelieve the possibility of disappointment, are generally those whose reflections are not so extensive as to permit the idea of distant misfortune. Those men who accumulate fortunes from beginnings which are but very circumscribed, or who toil contrary to probability, drudge insensibly, and attain their end without once reflecting whether the means be equal to it or not.

That person whose passions are quick, who is capable of flattering himself, and willing to be imposed upon by the praises of others, who can enjoy without exhausting, and retain in his mind after he has lost actual possession, lives in a creation of his own. For every folly he has an excuse, and under every calamity he can, like Hudibras,

“ Cheer up himself with ends of verse,

“ And sayings of philosophers.”

There are many persons in the world whose passions serve them instead of reason, who can persuade themselves that every thing will happen according to their wishes, and who, when events turn out the reverse, fall on shifts to evade the re-

ty. We always ardently pursue, desire, and devour voraciously, wonder after wonder,

ality of facts, and substitute an imaginary set of others more agreeable to their inclinations.

He who enjoys the present without regard to the future, and whose passions are ready to supply him with agreeable illusions on every occasion, must always be happy whatever happen to him. The soldier who enters a battle with the expectation of victory and fame, cannot be lamented as unfortunate although he should be taken off by the first discharge.

The happiness of the gay and the careless is so far superior to that of the thoughtful and feeling, and it is so certain that contemplation is repugnant to pleasure, that the reflecting often become a prey to unfounded fears and causeless anxieties. There is, indeed, hardly a mind of any considerable extent which does not always retain some evil spirit to torment itself, or which does not create some vain dread or imaginary imperfection to render it miserable. A melancholy mind searches for objects of horror; when it has found them, it dwells upon them; and when it is driven away from them by temporary enjoyment, it is not in its natural state until it return to them.

If a person of sensibility can imagine, he will believe and fear. The more delicate the mind is,

and look for strange things to be succeeded by others more strange.

the more ready it is to receive a slight and distant impression; and no force of reason can remove what once takes hold of a melancholy imagination. The more capable the mind is of attention, the more it is given to dread. The longer it dwells upon any frightful idea, the more that idea seems to start into fact, and the greater progress is made in fear and terror. If there be any difference between reality and the creations of sensibility, it is that the objects of sensibility are more dreadful than those of reality. As a picture produces a more striking effect than that from which it is copied, so any illusion of imagination, as we draw it according to the nature of our fancies, is more painful than actual existence. A horror entirely of the mind is more dreadful than what the object of our terrors would present, as it leaves room to assemble images which reality would not furnish. While we conceive an object in idea, it makes the same impression upon the mind as if it were really in existence. No conviction of reason that the distresses of lovers, of which we read in novels, or which we see exhibited on the stage, are fictitious, can restrain our sympathy and tears. Nor can any assurance that our fears are unfounded, deprive a dreadful idea of its effect. If a person of

It is the greatness of novelty, the desire of ignorance towards knowledge, the im-

sensibility should make any wonderful escape, the danger would, after he was in perfect safety, remain as fully impressed upon his mind as if it still threatened him. A high wind will make us tremble for sailors at sea, whilst we are comfortably placed in the midst of a great city ; and no confidence that ghosts are never seen by men can prevent the dread of them from haunting the imagination in darkness.

Sensibility, however much it may add to the facility of our acquirements, or whatever part it may form of them, is never a comfortable or desirable quality to its possessor. All the perfection with which we are acquainted consists in medium. But it is the defect of human nature to preponderate always to one extremity or another. The finest sensibility of the soul, if not properly balanced by grossness of constitution, will degenerate into a contemptible weakness, suffering torture from every object of nature, and from every trifling accident that can happen. Thus, too nice discrimination, or too great delicacy of sentiment, must daily induce us to repine at the imperfection of characters and the misery of mankind ; love may wander into sickly fancies ; benevolence pursue

pulses of curiosity, and the pleasure of wonder, which give currency to every improb-

visionary phantoms; and pity create to itself imaginary misfortunes.

But there are extremes of all kinds. Sensibility is not more strongly possessed by some than insensibility is by others. There may be a few of the most thinking part of mankind, though few indeed, who cannot hear a tale of woe without assembling its tender images, and allowing the mind to wander in speculative commiseration. But by far the greater part of mankind can hear relations of every evil, and every species of misery to which human nature is liable, without the smallest tender emotion. Every man, when another perishes, does not collect all the circumstances of the misfortune. He does not enter into the awful prospect of futurity, and those fears by which a dying man may be supposed to be actuated, nor the pains of death, and the poignant stings of grief which he must feel from leaving all that is dear to him. These, and whatever else is capable of moving pity, are never thought of, and are prevented from making any impression by the want of their presence or existence.

There are persons whose sensations are confined to so narrow a circle that they are incapable of suffering from any distant or abstract evil, and who

able story; which influence us to permit the delusions of divination, and impel the mind,

feel none for the misfortunes of their friends and intimates, nor perceive the approach of pain till it seizes on their corporeal feelings.

Section 3.—Bravery.

IT may be thought paradoxical to assert that the want, not only of the lesser feelings and faculties of the mind in an extreme degree, but also of sound judgment, has rendered persons eminent; and added more to reputation than the possession of these qualities could have done. The quality of bravery has, oftener than any other, been the means of dazzling mankind.

To acquire bravery, as to attain the stoical virtue, sensibility, with its concomitants, must be sacrificed.

It will readily be admitted, that bravery and timidity are contrary, that the hero and the coward cannot have the same ideas of danger. Hence, by discovering the nature of cowardice, we may, at the same time, acquire a knowledge of the nature of courage. The coward, by the minuteness of his reflections, proceeding from one step to another, builds a train of consequences which work an impression on a sensible mind too forcible to be resisted :

by a powerful propensity, to give credit to tales of apparitions, miracles, witchcrafts,

“ For who, to dumb forgetfulness a prey,
 This pleasing anxious being e'er resign'd,
 Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day,
 Nor cast one longin'g lingering look behind.”

As cold and darkness are nothing in themselves, and denote only the absence of heat and light, bravery is merely a name for the want of such reflections. These ideas being never presented to the imagination of a brave man, he can neither feel their force nor act from such motives. Where there is no struggle, there can be neither effort nor merit. As a person cannot be said to bear what he does not feel, he who is a stoic because he can be nothing else, deserves the praise of no exertion of mind.

There is a great difference between courage and fortitude.* Courage consists in being insensible to pain or danger, fortitude in bearing it. Men of courage are often as little capable of supporting present distress as they are of conceiving distant. There are many persons who have courage to face death with perfect unconcern; but who have not firmness to bear, without complaint and impa-

* Courage belongs to the body, fortitude to the mind. Falstaff's character of Prince Henry is “ an able body and a weak mind.”

and wonders ; and such are the causes which produce most superstitions. From the de-

tience, a lingering disorder, nor magnanimity to despise a continuance of pain. The same strength of mind which magnifies distant, diminishes present misfortune ; and the same weakness of mind which prevents a person from perceiving the approach of evil, incapacitates him from bearing it. Hence, to improve the mind, is to increase fortitude, and diminish courage ; and hence barbarous nations possess comparatively great courage and little fortitude, while civilized possess comparatively little courage and great fortitude.*

To give a high idea of a person's courage, we are often told that he is insensible to fear, which seems to imply that cowardice is something to be acquired, and that courage is a negative depending on the incapability of acquiring the positive to which it refers. Bravery is either an entire want of reflection, or it is the power of keeping the mind fixed on the favourable side of things, without allowing it to perceive the abyss of misfortune on the other. By taking our eye from the greatest

* The natives of North America form an exception to this maxim merely on account of that education which is accidentally peculiar to them, and those customs which happen to prevail among them. They are, however, incapable of bearing the fatigues of protracted warfare.

sire of variety, the wonderful narrations of travellers, and the pursuit of unnatural

danger, we may brave it. Courage has never failed to be the most ready consequence of absence of thought. For we find, that, in battle, soldiers and sailors apply themselves most vigorously to bodily exercises, in order to drown reflection, and prevent the imagination from dwelling upon the circumstances of danger.

It is, however, an indisputable fact, that all fools are not brave, and that all wise men are not cowards; from which it appears, that cowardice may sometimes arise from weakness of body, and that courage is not incompatible with strength of mind. Cowardice uniformly proceeds from attention to danger, bravery from indifference to it; and sensibility may sometimes proceed from weakness of body, insensibility from grossness of constitution. The only means by which we can conquer the idea of danger is by fixing our minds on other objects than those from which it arises; which we are enabled to do merely by their power of attracting the senses. When vigour of body is wanted, although there be no remarkable strength of mind, indifference to agreeable objects, attention to disagreeable, and cowardice, are necessary consequences. On the contrary, the body and the mind often oppose each other, and the peculiarities

productions, receive their whole value ; and although truth arises from what is most con-

of the one overcome those of the other, according to the disproportion between them. When strength of body is considerable, by the spirits which it furnishes, it may turn the attention of a powerful mind from disagreeable to agreeable things, and from ideas of danger to those of victory. But it is certain, that bravery is never produced by the vigour of the mind. Bravery proceeds always from the vigour of the body ;* and vigour of mind will always produce cowardice unless prevented by superior vigour of body, or that resistance to impression called strength of nerve.

Some have called bravery a greatness of mind which surmounts the consciousness of danger, and enables “ heroes to maintain their tranquillity and preserve the use of their reason in the most surprising and dreadful accidents.” But such would be a quality contrary to all the principles of the intellect, and in our examination of heroes no such magnanimity is to be found.

No effort of the mind can render it indifferent to what is of importance. The clearer our conceptions of danger are, the more we must be influenced by them. Bravery is, therefore, evidently a

* Of this, that courage which intoxication, by raising the spirits, produces, is a sufficient proof.

sistent with our experience, pleasure arises from what is most inconsistent with it.

quality which has no connexion with the perfection of the understanding, and which does not depend upon it.

Experience shews that the peasant is braver than the philosopher; and that courage cannot be acquired, but may be lost, by expansion of mind. Demosthenes was too wise to be brave.

Fear is always the consequence of reflection upon danger, and cowardice and sensibility are generally the offspring of understanding. There are situations in which to be without fear is to be without reason. Bravery, in fact, consists always in preferring the greater to the lesser evil.

All bravery is contrary to wisdom; and reflection operates upon courage as cold water does upon hot iron. A wise man, if he be not blinded by constitutional passions, must be afraid where there is apparent danger. As, therefore, the epithet cowardly implies ignominy, it should be used only to distinguish that degree of folly which is very similar to bravery, the being afraid where there is no danger; for the incapability of feeling fear from evident danger is a quality which seems to entitle its possessor to no higher degree of approbation than that of being afraid where there is none at all.

True bravery has been called a mean between

Whatever produces most pleasure is best. When, therefore, pleasure and truth come

fear and rashness. Bravery is certainly most useful when moderated or guided by reason. But to call that degree of bravery, false, which is too great to be useful, is to confound courage with prudence. They are, however, qualities which have neither connexion nor similarity, and which always act in opposition. For, a person wants bravery, in proportion as he has prudence; and prudence, in proportion as he has bravery. Bravery is a quality entirely different from wisdom. For, the degree of it increases with the degree of danger to which it is opposed; and consequently it is always proportioned to irrationality. The greatest bravery is to expose ourselves on the silliest occasion, and sacrifice ourselves for the smallest cause.

All *bravery* is uniformly of one species as well as danger is, and is merely *indifference*, on whatever cause that indifference is founded, or by whatever means acquired. A suitable original temperament of disposition is undoubtedly the best foundation for bravery. But where that is wanting, it is sometimes to be attained by habit. All affection of mind is diminished by continuance, and the importance of every thing is destroyed by familiarity. The nature of pain is changed by custom; and, by it, the dread of evil may be turned

in competition, the preference is always given to the former. As nothing but novel-

into indifference in those who were not originally insensible to fear. It is only the first of any thing that can make an impression on us. As custom, by depriving us of the power of distinguishing, or the original idea which an object presents to the imagination, destroys sensibility, it can confer bravery on those who do not inherit it from nature.

Definitions do not, however, alter the nature of things. Bravery, because it is useful and difficult, whatever cause it arise from, is valuable. A man may be justifiable to himself in preferring wisdom to bravery. But as it is necessary that a few be sacrificed for the security of the many, bravery is a quality indispensable to the world, and will always be honoured and rewarded in proportion to its utility and the dangers which are connected with it. Situations may also occur in which bravery may be justifiable to a person's self, and even consistent with wisdom, and in which life is of inferior value to fame, or death preferable to the misery of existence under the ignominy of cowardice. The only rational courage is that which appears, when a person, after weighing the punishment of cowardice against the risks of bravery, prefers the latter. This is the *courage*

ty can yield pleasure, the enjoyment derived from an account of things which are

of principle, and arises from a sense of duty, or from self-respect. But it consists not, like *animal courage*, in being insensible to pain, but in bearing it, and is, therefore, a species of fortitude.*

Danger is, in fact, an evil only to the coward. As the brave cannot feel fear, they cannot suffer from it. To such difficulty is but exercise, danger amusement; and a person of a sanguine disposition is capable of extracting enjoyment from any thing.

It may be said of some that they cannot take the trouble of being afraid of danger, or grieved from misfortune. A person of a careless temper has a double chance of happiness in comparison with one who possesses a considerable share of reflection and sensibility.

The effect of every thing depends upon the manner in which we feel it. As extreme sensibility renders things generally termed pleasant, disagreeable; so indifference renders those generally denominated painful, agreeable. Most things affect to the degree of pleasure; the majority, beyond it. As, therefore, happiness depends upon moderation, those who possess most indifference come nearest the central point. The indifference of a brave

* As this is evidently to endure pain for the benefit of others, and resembles self-denial, it is undoubtedly a virtue.

unnatural, or improbable, or contrary to reason, is greater than that which is afford-

man renders him insensible to distant misfortunes, and even lessens the effect of those things which would be actual evils to others, so much as to make them agreeable; a disposition which diminishes the evil, and increases the good, naturally incident to things, and which preserves the mind always in a state of serenity and satisfaction. A cheerful person possesses little sensibility to pain, and great sensibility to pleasure, or only that degree of sensibility which corresponds with pleasure. And it is better to be born with such a disposition than, without it, to be placed in the most indulgent situation.

He who is chiefly affected by the present, who takes fire from a spark, who has most spirit, whose fancy can keep longest on the wing in defiance of the repulses of disappointment, who can be heated by declamation, who takes part in every contest, who enters with enthusiasm into every project, and who is delighted with every thing new, but who is ready to change his opinion on the slightest pretence, and his pursuits from the smallest cause, whose imagination is filled with hope without any mixture of doubt, who enjoys the future without the alloy of the past, the present without the dread of the future, and whose mind is a blank ready to

ed by an account of those which possess all the advantages of nature and authenticity. We do not hesitate, at all times, to sacrifice judgment to imagination, the insipidity of reality to the novelty of fancy; and we are always unwilling to destroy sublimity and greatness by confronting them with reason. The pleasure of wonder is often so great, that men suspend the operations of some of the powers of their minds to obtain it. If the acquisitions of the imagination be but barely conceivable, the agreeable sensations of surprise which arise from them, supersede the faint pleasure which reality, as it implies experience, conviction, and knowledge, can produce.

Our propensity to every passion but superstition is discernible, and can be checked. To the gratification of any other passion it is sufficient if the judgment consent.

receive every impression with its full force,—is the man most capable of enjoying undiminished the strength of variety and change, who is best formed for every diversity of situation, and whose flexibility of character gives him the greatest chance of happiness.

But when fancy becomes the object of our enjoyment the influence of the understanding must be absent altogether. When a person receives an account of any thing remarkable, or hears a story of an apparition, however contrary to experience, his judgment is suspended, he feels a propensity to believe, and a reluctance to dissipate the pleasure of wonder.

But as human nature is composed of frailty and subject to weakness, as we are governed by our passions no less than by our reason, and as the mind must be sometimes unbent, we ought not to suffer it to become any detraction from the merit which a person may have displayed on other subjects, that, in an hour of langour, or when a desire of pleasure had debauched his understanding, he should allow himself to give credit to the tales of superstition, stories of ghosts, dreams, or predictions.*

Such are, indeed, the captivating charms of the wonderful, that even many events which can be accounted for by natural

* Some of the founders of English liberty were the most superstitious of mankind.

causes are referred to that source, in order to satisfy the prevalence of our inclination towards it. But if we could unveil the mysteries of superstition, represent miracles as having happened to-day, and bring the wonderful transactions of former times so near to us as to be viewed and known perfectly, those visions of enchantment would vanish. As they would be then recommended or rejected only by their agreeableness or disagreeableness to reason, we should not permit that which was divested of the greatness arising from antiquity and distance to triumph over our reason.

But some things are singular and great, by being superior to our faculties, and beyond our conception. From our ignorance of the Deity, arises some part of our veneration for Him ; although, at the same time, it, by no means diminishes but rather increases with that knowledge of Him which we derive from a contemplation of the works of the creation.

The variety of nature, the multiplicity of its objects, and the number of its qualities ; the greatness of the plan and the minute-

ness of the execution ; the general regularity, and individual nicety ; the harmony of the whole, and the perfection of parts, are sufficient to astonish human intellects. But to conceive that the latitude of the supreme mind must be equal to whatever is within the reach of our knowledge ; to every thing general and particular, minute and comprehensive, with which we are acquainted ; to every quality, modification, and intercourse of matter, within our view ; and to every operation and combination of the passions of mankind,—is probably to have but a faint glimpse of its expanse. Our knowledge on this subject teaches only what is to be learned, as to a spectator who looks upon the ocean, the farther he extends his view, the wider the prospect becomes.

Next to the Deity, space furnishes the most sublime conceptions. How space can be terminated, or how it is boundless, is beyond our conception ! It is from the ideas of space which we acquire from extension, that we form the idea of infinite space ; and it may also be said that it is from our experience of every object in na-

ture being bounded, that we acquire the idea of the finitude of space. Hence the finitude and infinitude of space are two ideas, which we are equally necessitated, and unable, to conceive.

Of the same incomprehensible nature are the duration of time, the infinite divisibility of matter, and the ultimate cause of the cohesion of its particles.

But every thing leads to infinity, and a first and eternal cause. Such is, indeed, the superior sublimity of the contemplation of the Deity to all other objects of speculation, that we can never think of him, or make any attempt towards a conception of his nature, without fear and horror. It is a subject so great as not to be dwelt on without giving pain to the mind. When we know a little of any subject, and that little demonstrates the existence of a great deal more, the mind is filled with admiration. So, in endeavouring to conceive the power of the Deity, our faculties are soon overpowered, and lost in wonder and astonishment. Hence the vanity of that presumption which induces

some persons to imagine that the Almighty will, in a future state, condescend to make himself more comprehensible than in the present, or that they are capable of conceiving his power in any other manner than by a knowledge similar to that which he unfolds of himself in this world, in the uniform succession of seasons, and the other means by which the creation is kept in perpetual youth and regular variety.

Every speculation which exhausts our powers of comprehension, which carries us to the limits of human knowledge, and leaves the mind suspended in uncertainty, produces awful sensations. But, perhaps, no subject is more fruitful in dreadful ideas than a future state. The regions of the other world are completely veiled from us. Whatever belongs to them is important, because unknown. All beyond the grave is sublime, because dark ; and every idea which we can form of it is great, because our knowledge of it is but small.

Whatever is abstruse, indistinct, or incomprehensible, is great. The illusions of legerdemain create wonder and curiosity,

by keeping the mind in doubt and suspense. In the same manner, we are prejudiced in favour of things by the distance and dimness in which they are viewed in antiquity, and by that obscurity which magnifies every thing, and enlarges the size of the smallest objects to the most enormous greatness.

The greatness of many things depends entirely upon ignorance, as a star has no lustre but from surrounding darkness. A chaotic confusion of materials, and qualities, with some glimmerings of method, is often the cause of much of our admiration of an irregular author, such as Shakespeare. Higher ideas of his beauties are raised by their being surrounded with faults, and by the confusion in which they appear, than if the whole were excellent, and reduced to exact regularity. His blemishes are not, perhaps, less admired than his perfections. Every obscurity which his works contain strikes us with reverence, and raises our ideas of him as much as he is beyond our conception. For, as every thing which is without the reach of our power is as much

above it, we attribute our want of comprehension rather to his greatness than deficiency. A glimpse serves only to inflame, and not to gratify us. The beauty of a mistress is often much heightened by the charms and magnifying quality of ignorance; and from nothing being great and good, which is, and from every thing being great and good which is not, in present possession, often arises matrimonial infidelity. The merit of a woman is enhanced by reserve, and her affections are most engaging when disguised by modesty. Female charms, like all other things, appear greatest through a veil, and are the more admired the less they are exposed, or when the magnitude of those which are concealed is known only by the paucity of those which are revealed.

Every thing to be great must be but barely known, unexperienced, and unenjoyed. Every thing great or desirable, therefore, must be new. Hence arise the wandering of our desires and the instability of our affections. Hence it is that life is one continued pursuit of novelty, and that

we are condemned to follow a fleeting form of happiness which eludes our grasp, and always flies before us. No man would choose to live his life over again. But every person expects, and is certain of pleasure from that part of his life which is to come, even although he be sensible that it will be more unfortunate than that which is past, because he knows that it will be different. If we continue to be pleased with the possession of any thing, the novelty of it must be unexhausted; and that which we wish to keep possession of, or which continues to please us for ever, must contain an infinite and unlimited variety.

In the first of every thing, consist the pleasure, enjoyment, and greatness of it. As soon as we possess any thing, or at the instant of possession, we lose our desire for it, and again feel the craving appetite of novelty.

Pleasure is as cursory as novelty; and novelty is destroyed when the object of it is examined. To preserve pleasure and interest, there must be a succession of novelty, or a continued mixture of ignorance and knowledge. Heroic poets are sensible,

that, the longer equality is maintained between two combatants, the longer the passions are arrested and the mind engaged. Suspense is the pathos and sublime of combat, and it is the uncertainty of victory which creates interest and pleasure in the spectator of a battle. The following is a fragment, in which fear and horror, depending upon the most obscure novelty and mysterious circumstances, are painted in as striking colours as it is possible for them to be, and which is capable of furnishing as much pleasure as any picture of the operation of these passions could yield :

—————“ Sir Bertrand turned his steed towards the wolds, hoping to cross the dreary moor before the curfew. But, ere he had proceeded half his journey, he was bewildered by the different tracts ; and not being able, as far as the eye could reach, to espy any object but the brown heath surrounding him, he was at length quite uncertain which way he should direct his course. Night overtook him in this situation. It was one of those nights when the moon gives a faint glimmering of light

through the thick black clouds of a lowering sky. Now and then she suddenly emerged in full splendour, from her veil, and then instantly retired behind it, having just served to give the forlorn Sir Bertrand a wide extended prospect over the desolate waste. Hope and native courage a while urged him to push forwards ; but at length, the increasing darkness, and fatigue of body and mind, overcame him ; he dreaded moving from the ground he stood on, for fear of unknown pits and bogs ; and, alighting from his horse, in despair, he threw himself on the ground. He had not long remained in that posture, when the sullen toll of a distant bell struck his ear. He started up, and, turning towards the sound, discerned a dim twinkling light. Instantly he seized his horse's bridle, and, with cautious steps, advanced towards it. After a painful march, he was stopped by a moated ditch, surrounding the place from which the light proceeded, and by a momentary glimpse of moonlight, he had a full view of a large antique mansion, with turrets at the corners, and an ample porch in the centre. The

injuries of time were strongly marked on every thing about it. The roof, in many places, was fallen in. The battlements were half demolished, and the windows broken and dismantled. A draw-bridge, with a ruinous gate at each end, led to the court before the building :—He entered, and instantly the light, which proceeded from a window in one of the turrets, glided along and vanished :—at the same moment the moon sunk beneath a black cloud, and the night was darker than ever.—All was silent.—Sir Bertrand fastened his steed under a shed, and, approaching the house, traversed its whole front with light and slow footsteps. All was still as death.—He looked in at the lower windows, but could not distinguish a single object through the impenetrable gloom. After a short parley with himself, he entered the porch ; and seizing a massy iron knocker at the gate, lifted it up, and hesitating, at length, struck a loud stroke—the noise resounded through the whole mansion with hollow echoes. All was still again. He repeated the stroke more boldly and louder.—Another interval

of silence ensued—a third time he knocked, and a third time all was still. He then fell back to some distance, that he might discover whether any light could be seen in the whole front. It again appeared in the same place, and quickly glided away as before—at the same instant a deep sullen toll sounded from the turret. Sir Bertrand's heart made a fearful stop—he was a while motionless; then terror impelled him to make some hasty steps towards his steed—but shame stopped his flight:—and urged by honour, and a restless desire of finishing the adventure, he returned to the porch; and, working up his soul to a full steadiness of resolution, he drew forth his sword with one hand, and with the other lifted up the latch of the gate. The heavy door, creaking upon its hinges, reluctantly yielded to his hand—he applied his shoulder to it, and forced it open—he quitted it, and stepped forward—the door instantly shut with a thundering clap.—Sir Bertrand's blood was chilled—he turned back to the door, and it was long ere his trembling hand could seize it.—But his utmost

strength could not open it again. After several ineffectual attempts, he looked behind him, and beheld, across a hall, upon a large stair-case, a pale bluish flame, which cast a dismal gleam of light around. He again summoned forth his courage, and advanced towards it—it retired. He came to the foot of the stairs ; and, after a moment's deliberation, ascended. He went slowly up—the flame retired before him, till he came to a gallery—the flame proceeded along it, and he followed it in silent horror, treading lightly, for the echoes of his footsteps startled him. It led him to the foot of another stair-case, and then vanished—at the same instant another toll resounded from the turret.—Sir Bertrand felt it strike upon his heart. He was now in total darkness ; and, with his arms extended, began to ascend the second stair-case. A death-cold hand met his left hand and firmly grasped it, drawing him forcibly forward—he endeavoured to disengage himself, but could not—he made a furious blow with his sword, and instantly a loud shriek pierced his ears, and the dead-hand was left powerless with

his—he dropped it, and rushed forward with a desperate valour.”

The test of all fanciful composition, is the power of moving the passions, but more especially sympathy and fear. By the story of Sir Bertrand, anxiety, suspense, and curiosity, are raised to such a pitch, that to gratify them would be to put an end to the pleasure arising from them. The story just stops where pleasure is at its height, and it could not go a step farther without destroying admiration and interest, and disengaging the mind.

From suspense, arise the anxiety of dread, and the itch of curiosity. Suspense between expectation and disappointment, and the continual recurrence of hope and fear, form the insinuating infatuation which leads gamblers to continue risk, and to build chance upon chance. They are induced to found their hope of the success of each succeeding appeal to fortune, on the equivocation of her countenance.

Novelty governs the pleasure which arises from every passion, and forms the substance of every enjoyment. No man is so anxious

to retain that which he possesses, as to acquire that which he does not possess. Hence, it ought to be a caution to every person, who wishes to preserve his affection for his mistress, always to hope for, and never to seize enjoyment, but to live in the pleasure of desire and expectation, and worship in ignorance what would lose its divinity by being known.

SECTION III.

WHATEVER originality* nature can furnish, or genius compound, is insufficient, without

* *Section 7.—Originality.*

THE variety of human ideas is confined to a very narrow circle. When science dispelled ignorance, it, at the same time, annihilated novelty. By tasting knowledge, we have lost the mysteries of superstition, the pleasure of wonder, and the beauty of diversity. There is no form which matter can take which does not fall within the reach of some mathematical definition, and no appearance which thought can assume that is not subject to some particular description of literature. But nothing, perhaps, discovers more the narrow extent of the materials of human invention than the fable

assistance, to furnish a stock of pleasure and food for the mind of man. The novel-

of a comedy or of a novel. The chief part of its texture consists in the crosses, difficulties, disappointments, hopes, and fears, of two persons who love each other to distraction, and who are at last rendered happy by mutual possession. For the farcical part of a comedy, mistakes and equivocal dialogues are sufficient. When the relative situation of the characters of either a comedy or a novel is known, it is an easy matter to prophesy the future circumstances, and to foresee the conclusion.

“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done, it is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun.” Nature preserves always regularity of motion, goes the same round, and produces a succession of similar events. The variety of the ideas of the mind, again, depends upon its objects and operations.

All our ideas are drawn from the imagery of nature. As we cannot, by any power of imagination, exceed the original stock which it furnishes, the extent of novelty is confined to the number of different objects in it. The activity of the human mind is such that no quality can escape it, no peculiarity of things remain long unexamined and

ty of the most extraordinary events to which mankind are liable, and of the most distant

undelineated. The mind of man seems capable of consuming an unbounded variety. From the limitation, therefore, of human knowledge, a person who has made great acquirements in science, is proportionally disqualified for receiving pleasure from any object or event which this world contains.

The originality of nature uniformly diminishes with the progress of science and learning. After curiosity has explored the boundaries of the creation, and exhausted the variety arising from the general system of things, without being furnished with something different from matter, or senses capable of enabling us to perceive new qualities in it, invention and genius can create novelty only by forming new combinations of the same objects or qualities, or by extending and diminishing them into all the declensions of variety. Primitive colours are few, but the shades between them innumerable. The letters of the alphabet are only twenty-five in number, but words are not limited by thousands, and the variety of their arrangement in works of literature appears infinite.

As originality depends on dissimilarity, it must be directly contrary to imitation and experience, beyond the reach of rules, and cannot be the effect

features which nature contains, is soon exhausted. As our pleasure perishes with

of labour alone, but must be produced by that co-operation of chance with fancy by which a scene of superior novelty opens to genius, which can neither be commanded, nor hoped again to be equalled. It is apparent that Cervantes could not have written any thing equally excellent with the adventures of Don Quixote, and entirely different; and it is not to be believed that any person ever sat down to compose a jest and succeeded.

Where there is nothing new, there can be nothing entertaining. We receive little pleasure from a delineation of the ordinary transactions of life, in which every person is daily engaged. But to those on whom nature has bestowed a fancy rigidly circumspect, and so prudent that it never ventures beyond domestic scenes,—to give an unrestrained rein to the imagination, and to leave probability and propriety in an extreme degree, seem to be a weakness, by merely permitting thoughts to arise in the mind contrary to the highest excellence of wisdom, conformity to experience of the usual progress of things. But such persons confound prudence with pleasure. It should be remembered by them that the end of poetry, and works of fiction, is to please and not to improve, that the department and privileges of fancy are neither

their novelty, we must lose remembrance of our enjoyment, in order to recreate it ;

subject nor amenable to judgment (for when works of invention are consistent they are perfect), and that the soberness of domestic duties can never become the test nor the guide of the flights of imagination. To afford pleasure is the principal purpose of all works of fancy. In such performances, neither reasoning, morality, nor probability are, directly, to be pursued or attended to, but only when they happen by chance to coincide with the fables, as they are but secondary principles where pleasure is the chief. It is a common maxim that we should do only one thing at a time ; and if two are attempted, both will be imperfectly performed. Invention and fancy should be the principles of such compositions as are designed for amusement, as virtue and prudence of those which are intended for the improvement of morality. If nature be copied accurately, in any work of entertainment, a moral will spontaneously interweave itself ; for whatever is consistent with nature is perfect.

He, therefore, who expands our ideas, and widens analogy, and the mechanism of our reasoning, by drawing from the exhausted source of nature, a fanciful original, finely conceived, and highly executed, is entitled to more approbation, from

and alternately change the scite of our desires between objects, to draw much variety

having enlarged the boundaries of our existence, than he who enables us only to preserve an inferior being. And every original is an acquisition to the human understanding, as well as a new source of pleasure.

There is, perhaps, no operation of the mind which requires a greater effort, and displays more genius, than that which is necessary to those productions which are so different from the ordinary course of things as seemingly to disdain common rules, and to rest on another basis, than nature. To judge of them by principles to which they are not indebted, would be to try great things by the standard of small. Perhaps, even to attempt a discrimination between works, the merit of which consists in difference, is vain. All things are good in their kind. We can prefer one thing to another, only where there is a connexion between them to admit comparison. All originals are, therefore, equally good, unless they differ in their degrees of originality.

As every work of fancy and entertainment is an extension of nature, or a combination of objects and events which are never united in it,—the originality of enchantment is derived solely from the regular operation of those general laws which

from few things. Any object upon which the mind is fixed, however lovely, cannot;

govern the creation, and the novelty of fable from the uniformity of the circumstances of mankind. It is always that object which is most extraordinary, and that transition from one idea to another which is greatest, that produce most pleasure. But in the transactions of real life, as happiness consists in moderate variety, extremity is avoided. However much, therefore, the uniformity of civilized society may be conducive to the gratification of the actors, it adds little to that of spectators.

Among mankind, the eccentric are those characters which engage any high degree of interest. Those which hold the middle place, and are situated within the bounds of medium, never attract attention. Mediocrity may be a very wise principle in the ordinary affairs of the world, and in those transactions which have a direct influence on the happiness of mankind. But it can itself never become an object of excessive pleasure or admiration. It is originality of thinking and acting only, that either raises the admiration or moves the ridicule of the spectators of real life. The flatness of dull medium can engage no passion, and produce no emotion.

In a society in which the whole business of life is reduced to system, and in which every indivi-

for any length of time, retain its force, and we our desire for it; unless we view it in

dual is unalterably fixed in the allotted department which chance has thrown him into, and custom established, a person is obliged to conform himself to reigning circumstances, and all choice of conduct is impossible. Men, in civilized society, depend so much upon each other, and their interests are so much alike, that each is compelled, by his own welfare, to please, to imitate, and to endeavour to be useful to another. In time, interest, opinion, and conduct, become uniform; and the little variety which is then to be found in human manners is under the arbitrary direction of those who are at the head of society. In a country which has made considerable progress in refinement, one person is constrained to think and act like another; an universal resemblance is diffused over all, and established customs become too strong to acknowledge any authority. In this state of mankind, change must be slow; and when it is introduced, society moves in a body.

In that community in which medium reigns, no person dare step aside from the beaten path of custom, without bringing upon his head both its ridicule and malignity. A dull propriety enervates the sinews of action, and renders languid and sickly the constitution of such a society. From

different relations, and change our ideas from one beauty which it possesses to another.

it, all variety of character, and every attempt to gain fame, or produce brilliant actions, are banished. No opinion dare be formed, which is not sanctioned by propriety, and every noble sentiment of the mind must yield to that principle. Men, who are governed by the maxim of mediocrity, would be ashamed to avow any extraordinary idea or sentiment, however just, or to perform any uncommon action, however noble. The opinion of the world so entirely dictates every form of conduct, and men are so much afraid of incurring public censure, when mediocrity is the prevailing principle, that they hardly act at all.

Whatever is great must be extraordinary. Politeness is the spirit of refined society. But as politeness implies a character so general as to have a predominancy of no quality, a person eminently polite can possess nothing great. It would be equally impolite to excel in one thing as in another. Flexibility of manners cannot exist where there is any particular bias. Gentility consists in taking no interest in any thing whatever, and in doing every thing imperfectly.

The polish of refinement has an evident tendency to remove the protuberances of life, and to

When we have entirely forgotten the possession and qualities of any thing, it, in

reduce human manners to an equality of surface. Ancient and modern philosophy seem to be of a very different nature. While the former points to the great, the latter regards only the useful. In the present day, mental excellence is considered but a poor compensation for poverty;* and talents which administer to luxury, and are best adapted to multiply and vary gratification, are most likely to obtain honour and reward. The present moment now engages all the care, and exterior appearances all the ambition, of the majority of mankind. All their ideas extend no farther than to live; and they are neither capable themselves of conceiving, nor will they permit any person to form, a thought beyond the conveniences of life.

Originality is found most predominant in that society which has made least progress in refinement. In a rude state, the principle of imitation has little influence. Character is, in it, formed by

* What sort of a figure would Socrates or Diogenes make in the present day? Would not the former be despised as a mean fellow, and the latter committed to Bridewell as a sturdy beggar? So great a disgrace is it now to be poor; so great an honour to be rich! Yet we are no more seriously despised for our poverty, than we are admired on account of our riches.

some measure, becomes the same as if it had never been possessed, and we are, again,

nature, without the intervention of art, and every person, both in action and sentiment, pursues the bent of his inclinations. It is in the dawn of learning, between ignorance and knowledge, that the human mind exhibits the most diversified aspect, and in which the most extraordinary productions generally appear. Of this, there is not a more striking example than the works of Shakespeare. Shakespeare is a poet whose genius has been restrained by no arbitrary laws or systems, but which has shot up luxuriantly amidst the wilds of nature. From the fetters of local prejudice, and that universal resemblance which prevails so much in an age which has made considerable progress in refinement, his mind has been entirely free, and at liberty to pursue its bent. These foes to nature and originality had not extended their baneful influence to his genius, but left him to nature and himself. His ideas have been formed upon the laws of things, not upon circumstances; upon those general causes which uniformly govern mankind, and not upon particular customs. His opinions and sentiments are universal as those principles from which they are taken, and they will continue to yield the same pleasure, so long as they are read. If he had lived

capable of desiring and enjoying it. Possession first renders pleasant things indif-

in the present period, much of his excellence had been polished away. We derive more pleasure, therefore, from his writings, in which there is much excellent and much indifferent, than we could from the most finished productions without his sparkling gems of originality.

The most characteristic excellence of the present age, is prudence of conduct; as the mind, by attempting nothing great, easily preserves the medium of propriety, and secures itself against any extraordinary bias. But to this quality, every other is sacrificed. In the present day, it would, perhaps, be thought a sufficient reason against attempting any great excellence that it were singular. Glory seems now changed for ease; and men appear to value domestic gratifications more than the fame of arduous actions.

Yet in this there may be a fallacy which does not appear at first view. Among the ancients, the extraordinary are those characters only with which we are acquainted. A minuter knowledge of their manners, might, perhaps, have taught us that the mass of mankind is the same in all ages. Great characters have undoubtedly appeared in the present, as well as in earlier times; but, com-

ferent, and afterwards disagreeable. But as the mind of man is always changing its

paring the former with the latter, the ancients will retain a majority.

Such, however, is the constitution of things that what is great must be rare. Of both ancient and modern characters, but a few are calculated to excite admiration. Those which are drawn purposely for entertainment and pleasure, must hold a greater distance from each other, and possess more distinguishing features. The characters of tragedy must be drawn more violent, and those of comedy more eccentric, than real life furnishes. The characters of tragedy must be exhibited as possessing the most heroic virtues, and as capable of sacrificing every other interest to the noble passions of love and friendship; and those of comedy, as generous to a degree of extravagance and profusion: characters seldom found in the world.

Life to be important should be agitated with a degree of motion like the waves of the sea; for a total calm in it occasions a stagnation of pleasure to both actors and spectators. Were it possible for mankind to undergo such sudden transitions of fortune, from poverty to riches, or from obscurity to eminence, and such a variety of adventures as the heroes of those amusing fables, the Arabian Nights' Entertainments; or if we could be engag-

manner of operation, and accommodating itself to different objects, the disgusts, as well as the beauties of things, may be forgotten. Those which formerly were indifferent or disagreeable, may, by a suspension of possession, regain the charms of beauty and importance. Of almost all common comforts we never know the value till we want them. But so much does relation prejudice, that we seem to estimate things too little while they are in our possession, and too much when we are deprived of them. When those which we formerly possessed are at a distance, or without our reach, we persuade ourselves that, if they were again in our possession, we would enjoy them more, and make a better use of them, than we did before. But such is the inconstancy of desire, and so much are both the future and the past preferable to the present, that, if we were again to possess them, we would treat them as at first, and again feel our

ed in the wild achievements and adventures of a hero of romance,—life would contain more contrast of good and evil, and be spent in a greater succession of variety and pleasure,

former indifference and disgust. We leave our homes and friends without regret, because we are wearied of them; we return to them with expectation; again become satiated with them, and again feel the desire of wandering.

Old men have so often experienced that every acquirement is succeeded by a fresh desire, and that every enjoyment is but a repetition of disgust, that they at last trust to the uniform experience of a whole life, and pursue, with laxity, the same phantoms of hope by which they have so often been deceived. But as the young are without the experience of disappointment, they enter, with enthusiasm, into the affairs of the world. A person's childhood is perhaps the most delightful period of his life; as his knowledge is then small, as every thing is new to him, and the unexhausted variety of the world lies before him. It is true, that, in childhood, the passions are but in infancy; but the means of gratifying them, and of enjoyment, are tenfold greater than in age. A child neither recalls nor anticipates pain, and his want of experience ren-

ders the most trifling things important. Every day produces to him something new, great, unknown, and unenjoyed.* The pleasure of manhood, again, is rather to be admired than to admire. If novelty be the pursuit of youth, ambition is that of mature age. Perhaps the impossibility of permanent enjoyment, an experience of the duration of the gratitude of mankind being as transitory as the duration of pleasure, and the consequent necessity of becoming an object of greatness and desire, together with that sourness of temper which frequent disappointment produces, are causes which dictate, by compulsion, that apathy, contractedness of mind, and parsimony, which are generally found to accompany old age.

After men are no longer actuated by those lively passions which proceed from the ardour of youth, the mind sinks into torpidity, and they are governed merely by irresistible habit and passive impulse. In the aged, every propensity to external gratification is blunted by satiety. Only those

* The great enjoyment of childhood consists in a quick change of ideas; and, indeed, happiness may be defined a habitually sudden transition of ideas.

to whom inexperience produces corresponding novelty feel the enthusiasm of exertion. Novelty is the soul of pleasure, and the origin of mental motion. As it decays, human action diminishes ; and as it increases, the motion of the mind is accelerated.

SECTION IV.

EVERY thing is interesting as it is new. But there is a point of ignorance, at which indifference reigns as strongly as at perfect knowledge. Ignorance, or want of possession, only gives value to acquisition. Hope must be added to produce endeavour. Whatever is capable of raising desire must be both known and unknown or unpossessed. Greatness and pleasure rest on the point between knowledge and ignorance, possession and non-possession. We put the highest value upon the acquisition of those things which are least known to us, and things are of greater or less value as they are less or more known, or possessed. But we can form no desire without some knowledge to create it, and no hope without some prospect of possession. Things, there-

fore, which are at a distance are rendered valuable by the knowledge of them which we derive from analogy, as much as by the difficulty of their acquisition. Of what we have not an immediate or complete knowledge, we can have some idea, and almost form a just conception, by the resemblance to some other thing with which we are acquainted. It is the mixture of information and ignorance regarding what is removed from us which raises the desire, and instigates the acquisition of possession or complete knowledge. We can form an idea of one country by another, and it is the similarity as well as the difference between them which creates the wish of visiting the one with which we are unacquainted. It is previous knowledge, also, which attaches us to places, friends, and acquaintance, and which renders them more grateful after occasional absences.

That which is merely known, or which is so far without our knowledge that its nature and tendency are entirely unknown, can raise no desire. Ignorance has, indeed, the same power to increase importance as

knowledge has to diminish it. Excessive ignorance has an effect on the importance of things diametrically opposite to possession. But as all extremes run into each other, both produce equal indifference. The first prevents, and the second destroys, desire. Excessive ignorance, like possession, annihilates distinction. By it, the smallest things are equalled with the greatest. The greatest and the smallest objects, the most important and the most trifling, accompanied with an equal degree of knowledge or ignorance, would, if we were only informed that they were new, raise in us the same degree of desire or curiosity. It is of no consequence to the greatness of extreme novelty whether the object from which it arises be really or substantially great or small with respect to other things; for, where there is no knowledge, there can be no comparison. Absolute ignorance reduces all things to a level. To be, in some measure, acquainted with the nature of things, is necessary to discriminate a variety among them. It is, in fact, only the different degrees of knowledge we have concerning them which can vary their importance. Whatever is mysterious can,

not be known, for it would be then no longer mysterious. Mysteries, as they are all equally unknown, are all equally great. The most trifling secret of science, and that of the extent of space, would be equally important if we had no knowledge of either of them, and could make no comparison between the universe and a part of it, between the things of this world and those which are beyond it.

The greatness of total or excessive ignorance creates neither love nor hatred, but generally a mixture of both; and these feelings, blended, produce dread and anxiety. Whatever is unknown is great, whether pleasing or painful; and we shun pain as much as we seek pleasure. Suspense is dreadful, and uncertainty is torture. But as the operation of pain and pleasure is the same, we are sometimes induced to examine things as much from fear as desire. The more we dread any calamity, the more we generally inquire into it. Every thing destructive, horrible, and monstrous, is sublime. As we are *all* to ourselves, the destruction of a person's self is the sublimest

idea he can conceive. Whatever has a tendency to injure us exacts as much respect from us as that which is of an agreeable nature. Tyranny, cruelty, a bad disposition, and every thing to be feared, partake of majesty and sublimity, and are as important by destroying pleasure as some things are by producing it. (*Sublimity.**)

* *Section 5.—Sublimity.*

SUBLIMITY is said to consist in *greatness*, whether of physical or moral qualities, as well in magnitude of matter as in amplitude of mind.

In matter, excess of *quantity, duration, or number*; in morals, of *talents, heroism, magnanimity, or fortitude*, is most sublime. But, perhaps, every great quality, whether moral or physical, may be reduced to a common principle. All sublimity arises from importance, and all importance from affection of mind. Now nothing can affect the mind, nothing is great in physics or morals, but what is new. Through the whole train of objects, and course of events, *things are sublime only as they are extraordinary*. But, as sublimity commences only where moderation ceases, it seems intimately connected with evil.

The importance of painful objects is, however, diminished by possession or habit, in

Pain is more excessive in its degrees than pleasure; and dangers and misfortunes furnish the sublimest objects. Pain, misfortune, and dread, can drive the mind to distraction. But pleasure cannot even amount to that lesser species of sublimity called the pathetic. Whatever produces any sentiment which is sublime to a great degree, has a reference to pain, fear, or dread. The greatest hazards to which a person can be subjected, and the greatest misfortunes which he can endure, form the sublimest objects of contemplation to himself and others. Those awful pauses of horror and terror which the mind makes on the approach of danger are the sublimest sensations, or perceptions, of which it is capable; and it is only because pleasure produces such agitation in neither the mind nor the body that it does not present equal sublimity with pain. Those passages in Milton which describe the excess of the torments, and the immensity of the misery of the infernal spirits, with the despair resulting from their total deprivation of hope, are the most sublime; and in proportion always as any piece of writing excels in describing violent passions it possesses sublimity. The sublimity of physical objects, such as a stupendous precipice, or a magnificent building, seems, also, to be nearly

the same manner as that of pleasing. Both suffer the loss of their interesting qualities

connected with evil; that of the former arising from its magnitude, compared with our circumstances; and that of the latter, from the same cause, joined to the power and wealth of the owner. In both cases, therefore, it is resolvable into a sense of our own inferiority.

With regard to that sublimity which directly originates in mental emotion, there is the same difference between the effect of actual and imaginary, as between pain and pleasure. Whatever enjoyment may arise from the singularity of the sufferings of others, none arises from our own. When evil is merely imaginary, or when we are only the spectators of the misfortunes of others, it produces pleasure by the interest and exercise in which it engages the mind. But when misfortune becomes real, it becomes painful. The novelty of an execution, a shipwreck, or a tragedy, affords pleasure to spectators, by affecting them in a degree which does not exceed the agreeable; but all is pain to the real sufferers.

It is only the *copy* of great mental affection which at any time furnishes pleasure. There is the same difference between the sensations excited by a poetical display of sublime sentiments, and the actual consciousness of strong feelings, as between

from a near view, and every thing appears greatest at a certain distance. It is only that which raises hope as well as desire

description and experience; and the same difference between the impression of the recital of misfortunes, and the endurance of them, as between a painted landscape and a view of real nature.

Sublimity, like all other qualities corresponding with mental affection, must, in some degree, depend upon the casual variation of circumstances. What was once great is not great now; what astonished formerly astonishes no longer. It is evident, therefore, that the same object may have different degrees of importance to different individuals, and that every person's ideas of sublimity must, in some measure, have a reference to his experience.

But although difference of circumstances may vary the measure of importance, and give different degrees of sublimity to different objects in the opinion of individuals, there are some general features in nature which suffer no change in their influence, and which preserve uniformity of sublimity. Death is an event which we can all but once experience, of which we are all equally ignorant, and which is equally awful to us all. There are also other circumstances which affect mankind in the same manner.

which produces pleasure. Those passions are, in fact, inseparable. Hope continues no longer than desire, and desire no longer than hope. Desire depends upon novelty; hope on the prospect of possession; and both are equally necessary to pleasure. The total want of the prospect of possession, although accompanied with the greatest novelty, creates neither; and possession destroys both. Every acquisition is anticipated by hope, and embellished by it with so many charms and beauties, that the object of our desires makes but a pitiful figure in reality compared to what it does in imagination. Hope operates in diminishing pain in the same manner as in increasing pleasure, and furnishes an equal degree of assistance to us in struggling against the former as in acquiring the latter. Without it, there can, in reality, be no agreeable sensation or idea. But even hope depends

By the theory of mental emotion, the theory of sublimity can easily be formed, and accommodated to every variety of circumstance. In novelty, consists every degree of good or evil, and in its excess that of sublimity.

as much upon difficulty as upon facility, upon want as upon probability, and upon the sense of present evil as upon the prospect of future good. When pain is removed, there is no longer room for hope to act as an auxiliary; and when desire is extinguished by possession, hope is at an end. Hope is ever employed; but ever on distant things. The excess of the pleasure of hope depends upon deception; which depends upon distance, and the want of possession. Hope always deceives us, and always agreeably; possession always disappoints us, and always disagreeably.

The mind may be as much affected by what is at a distance as by the closest sensual enjoyment. When we are certain of attainment, or have the prospect of acquisition strongly impressed upon our imaginations, the period and degree of enjoyment do not depend so much upon the contact of our senses with their objects as upon that point of futurity in which the mind is enabled, by the degrees of probability, to place its possession.

Pleasure is enjoyed more in expectation, and during the labour of acquisition, or in the desire of possessing, than in possession itself. How often do we receive the greatest pleasure from the anticipation of events, which we find unimportant when they happen ! and how often does possession prove the end of the most agreeable expectations ! The joys of the chase, terminate with the death of the fox ; the charms of wealth consist, chiefly, in the pursuit ; the amusement of beautifying an estate, lasts only till the work is completed ; and even the raptures of love, endure no longer than the difficulties and uncertainty of success.

By possession, great things are diminished ; and by hope small are magnified. Possession never equals the idea conceived of it ; nor is any object of hope and desire ever found to be what the imagination represents it. Our enjoyment is, therefore, generally at the summit when we expect the greatest addition.

It is a truth which every person, from the experience of his own feelings, is continually remarking, that pleasure is instantane-

ous and transitory. Pleasure is like wit; when examined, it is gone. Such is, indeed, the fugitive nature of pleasure, that, the more it increases the more it approaches to a crisis, and the greater its excess becomes, the nearer it advances to an end.

As all enjoyment depends upon affection of mind, when the acquisition of any thing estimable or desirable becomes probable, our pleasure increases with our hope, until it pass the point of attainment, and end in possession. There can be no better illustration of the desire of experiencing or knowing, and of the momentary enjoyment of possession, than a picture, or any sudden and extraordinary prospect; as the greatest novelty can be produced by a picture, and as it is the most easily comprehended, and the desire of beholding it the soonest satisfied. If a person be told that he will be shewn a picture, possessed of both originality and excellence, his curiosity will be instantly inflamed; (perhaps this is the moment or crisis of enjoyment, when desire burns with the greatest fury, accompanied with the prospect of immediate gratifica-

tion), but when the picture is shewn, he will be satisfied. However extraordinary it may have been, his pleasure will diminish with its novelty, and as his eye glances over it, his desires will keep an equal pace in extinction.

The destruction of pleasure, by actual possession, is instantaneous. But when we represent possession in our minds to create desire and instigate endeavour, our pleasure is continually preserved by the want of actual possession, and our enjoyment, whenever it is extinguished, is repeated by the remembrance of that want.

Every species of good consists in medium. Hope and desire exist between the prospect of possession, and the difficulty of possession. What is easily obtained is of no great value ; because it is as much inferior to us, and as little capable of engaging our minds, as the acquirement of it is easy. The principle of *value* is *scarcity*. Thus, the value of gold and precious stones arises from their rarity. Even that of what are called necessaries depends on the same cause. No person puts a price upon the air we breathe,

however indispensable ; water is, in most places, to be had for the carriage ; and were the soil fit for food without manufacture or preparation, or had a grain of corn the property of preserving life while the animal machine would endure, it is obvious corn would be of little or no value. Again, the more rare things are, the more difficulty there is in procuring them ; or the more curious and nice their construction, the more time is employed in their fabrication. Hence the correspondence between *scarcity* and *labour*, which ultimately is the only thing estimable ; and hence all the doctrines of *political economy*.

But where difficulty is so great as to preclude every view of acquisition, or ignorance so extreme as to present no qualities or circumstances, things have no value ; they excite no desire, and command no interest. Even the highest enjoyment, that which arises from the most unexpected acquisition and the greatest degree of novelty, is short in proportion to its strength.

Every pursuit must contain difficulty sufficient to give it importance, and facility to

permit hope. The pleasure of every pursuit consists in the difficulties of it,* or in the distance of its object, if these do not exceed a certain degree. But when desire is at its height, to increase difficulty is to destroy it,—to gratify desire to extinguish it. When difficulties are increased beyond probability, they preclude hope. And when they are surmounted, and our intentions accomplished, our desires cease, the object of them loses its value, we withdraw our affections from it, and place them upon something which will afford us the pleasure of exertion. For, as the mind is ever active, the loss of one desire is always supplied by another.

Excess changes the nature of all things. If ignorance be pushed beyond certain bounds, it destroys interest ; if probability

* Of the necessity of difficulty to enjoyment, a curious instance may be given. *One* of the pleasures of travelling in a coach is certainly a contemplation of the apparatus by which the difficulty of conveyance is overcome. When, therefore, we read in Homer of the chariots of the gods, their horses and doves, we feel the puerility of the description, arising from the want of the necessity of such machinery to the transmission of deities.

of success be increased till it amount to possession, it produces indifference. The greatest desire is extinguished by impossibility of attainment, and the greatest hope by possession. Every interest is created by a certain degree of distance and proximity; and the highest enjoyment arises from the most equal balance of probability and difficulty of attainment. What we possess we cannot enjoy, and what we do not possess we do not enjoy; so that enjoyment depends neither upon possession nor upon the want of it, but on that state which is between both. The certainty of attainment, and the sense of present want of possession, are two ideas, which, combined, form enjoyment.

Without perceiving charms in things, and without the prospect of possessing them, they could excite neither desire nor hope. If we did not represent in our minds the gratification which we were to receive from the accomplishment of any endeavour, or the success of any pursuit, as we should perceive no pleasure to be obtained, we should feel neither desire nor hope, and should

make no exertion ; or if we were satisfied or contented with possession, our activity would be at an end. Those things which are most difficult of attainment, are capable of furnishing the greatest degree of enjoyment, but, at the same time, they produce the least ; those which are most easy of attainment, afford the most frequent, but at the same time the smallest, gratification. The first may be said to create most desire, and least hope ; the second most hope, and least desire ; and, comparing advantages with disadvantages, both perhaps produce an equal degree of pleasure. With regard to importance, there is always a species of contradiction. What is easily obtained, is of little value ; and what is of great value, cannot be obtained. Such, indeed, is the unfortunate condition of human nature, that when we are very eager in pursuit, we are generally disappointed ; but when we become indifferent, we, for the greater part, succeed.

We are originally attracted towards things by their novelty, and induced to persist in the pursuit of them by the probability of their attainment. When

we obtain the prospect of the possession of any object, we fix our minds on the pleasure which we imagine it will produce ; the stronger our ideas of its perfections are, the greater are our desires ; and while we think of enjoying it, we actually do enjoy it. But in the realizing of desire and anticipation of enjoyment, we always exceed reality. When we obtain actual possession, we perceive that we have exhausted the charms of the object of our pursuit in premature conception. Instead of receiving from the consummation of our desires any additional pleasure, we find it the end of enjoyment, and the commencement of disgust.*

Pleasure is but a union of hope and desire, and both are but the anticipation of possession. Desire is an infatuation, the endurance of which is an evil, and the de-

* It cannot, indeed, be said that the pleasure arising from the objects of sensual gratification is *entirely* or *instantly* extinguished by possession ; but it must be allowed that it continues as long as sensation is varied in moderation. It is, however, apparent, from the circumstance of the actual possession of objects of sense never equalling the idea previously conceived of it, that the greater part of the pleasure derived from them is enjoyed before possession.

struction a greater. Every person pushes, with all his might, towards the goal of possession, in order to put an end to that desire which is both his torment and his pleasure. But no man ever wished that any of his passions should be destroyed but by gratification. Novelty is, therefore, rendered productive of pleasure only by hope. Or if we ever desire what we have no prospect of possessing, such desire, and the pleasure arising from it, must be of short duration. If a person had a near prospect of obtaining any thing on which he put a great value, his desires would be raised to the highest pitch. But if, from any sudden change of circumstances, he were afterwards disappointed, although it would be sometime before he could withdraw his imagination from the prospect of possession, in which the probability of the gratification of his wishes had engaged him, yet when he did so, he would feel neither desire nor pleasure.

No doubt, the greater number of our hopes are without foundation, the most agreeable objects of our pursuit mere illu-

sions of fancy, and the most delightful moments of our life only dreams of happiness. But still they are so far real as to depend upon the conviction of the mind. We may have received great pleasure from many things which we never possessed, but it is impossible we could have done so unless we had expected to possess them.

If, indeed, pleasure could be obtained without actual possession, exertion would cease as completely as if present possession alone could satisfy. A person would never be induced to quit his situation if he gained nothing by the change. He would only vary the objects of his gratification, in imagination, according to the different degrees of novelty between them. That, however, which we are persuaded is beyond the reach of our power, is almost as little interesting to us as what we have already enjoyed. When we have the opportunity of obtaining no other pleasure than the admiration of dignities which we can never reach, or of mysteries which we shall never have the power of unfolding, such soon yield to other objects.

Things unattainable, or unknown, may be great, but they cannot be desirable. We can, indeed, suppose ourselves to possess any thing, however distant. But although we may for a moment amuse ourselves with the idea that we are enjoying or possessing what we shall never obtain, or that we are placed in situations which we can never reach, the recurrence of fact soon dispels the illusion of fiction, and extinguishes pleasure while it recalls reality. On the other hand, the anticipation of possession, founded on probability, is supported, strengthened, and preserved, by reality. Although, therefore, enjoyment consists not in actual possession, but in the anticipation of it, anticipation of enjoyment must be distinguished from the supposition of, and from imaginary, anticipation.*

* If we could believe the most disagreeable thing to possess agreeable qualities, it would affect the mind in the same manner as if they really were agreeable ; but without some foundation for such an opinion, it could not be adopted. The mind cannot believe contrary to its conviction. Although that which is bad would really be good if we could think so, we cannot command our ideas so far as to change a disagreeable opinion for an agreeable, or to believe any thing to have qualities contrary to those which it evidently possesses.

That every part of the system of nature may be perfect, and that the desires of men may be of use to the world as well as to themselves, things are so disposed that we can enjoy no pleasure but by the anticipation of real possession. Our pursuits are, by this necessity, always directed towards that point which will render them useful. The novelty of romantic and wonderful adventures would, perhaps, give more pleasure than those occurrences which arise in the ordinary course of life; but, as we cannot hope to experience such events, they have no tendency to promote action. Pursuit, therefore, although at first determined by novelty, is secondly determined and supported by the probability of success. We are obliged to chastise our thoughts and desires, and to reduce them to the level of the sphere in which we happen to be placed.

Man generally directs his efforts, and applies his attention, towards the minutest affairs of life, and those objects which are nearest; because he can have greater probability of possession, and better foundation

for anticipation of enjoyment from them than from others more important or distant. The pleasure which we receive from things which are very far removed from us, is, in general, as small as the distance between them and us is excessive, and our hope of obtaining them weak. Every acquisition, however extensive, affords only a single sensation of pleasure. Those, therefore, who study the conveniences of life, have more repetitions and variety of enjoyment, than those who grasp at greater things.

Hence it is that the certainty of small enjoyments is more important than the probability of the greatest, and that whatever is in actual possession is of more value than what is not. Although we do not perhaps immediately receive pleasure from every thing which we actually possess, we are certain of deriving enjoyment from it at a future period. Thus, reality, and the closeness of possession, enable us to form a stronger anticipation of the enjoyment of its qualities, than we can of the qualities of those things which are not actually possessed. It is easy, therefore, to reconcile with

the love of novelty hitherto attributed to the mind, and repugnance to pleasure ascribed to possession, the universal propensity to retain things which are in actual possession, and sometimes to neglect others which are not possessed, and that reluctance which we have to change one situation for another.

- What is possessed by the mind, or what our ideas are fixed upon, and what is possessed by our power alone, without engaging our minds, differ widely with regard to pleasure.* The first cannot, after attainment,† retain its importance long; but, as every thing which we actually possess does not entirely lose the capability of yielding pleasure, but suffers only a suspension of that power, the latter may. The import-

* By possession which destroys pleasure instantaneously, is only meant that which engages the attention of the mind; although, as nothing can be said to be possessed without engaging the attention of the mind, this meaning is of very extensive application.

† After attainment, things change the nature of their importance. Their primary value arises from an original novelty; their secondary, from a revived. The latter cannot be put in competition with the former.

ance of every thing, without doubt, depends on its power of engaging the mind. But there are few things, especially objects of sense, which cannot recover the power of giving pleasure. The effect of actual possession is certainly, for a time, to destroy the charms of every thing, sensual as well as abstract, and to render it so long incapable of yielding pleasure, because the mind must have been, at some time, employed upon it. But when qualities are forgotten, and desire revived, that possession which consists in having things within the power of actual enjoyment, operates merely as a hope or anticipation of enjoyment, and produces pleasure according as the attention happens, occasionally, to be directed towards them.

Novelty is but a want of possession or knowledge. Every corporeal want, or constitutional necessity, therefore, acts upon its corresponding object in producing a novelty. Objects of appetite derive their value from the principle of rarity, in the same manner as things of a more general nature. For, so soon as any appetite is satiated, that

which previously provoked desire becomes indifferent, if not disgusting. After a hearty meal nothing is, often, more offensive than to see another person dine.

Novelty produces a want, and want produces a novelty. The effect of ignorance, or want of experience, is to render us sensible of the acquisition of knowledge, and of constitutional desire, that it prepares us for gratification. Both are evils which form a contrast with, and give a value to, their corresponding good. The objects of abstract gratification, such as acquisition of knowledge, increase of power, elevation of rank, or narrations of extraordinary things, are generally capable of affecting us but once; because their impression can seldom be again so completely obliterated as to permit a repetition of their original effect. The impression of knowledge or wonder, can be destroyed only by oblivion; and the effect of the acquisition of possession or power, by addition or deprivation. But as the pleasure produced by every sensual gratification arises from a constitutional necessity, and as that necessity is, by the nature


and laws of animal economy, periodically renewed, the objects of sense invariably yield the same degree of pleasure, and continue always of equal value.* Experience, therefore, teaches us that the nature of sensual wants and desires is such, that many of those which have been extinguished, or which do not exist at present, will afterwards be felt. Hence arises the retention of many things which would otherwise be neglected.

* The effect of novelty, or of anticipation united with want of experience or ignorance, is not, however, entirely without its share in sensual gratification. No object of sense affects the second time in a degree equal to the first, or is in reality what it appears in fancy. The only difference, therefore, between sensual gratification, and the acquisition of power, knowledge, &c. is that the former affects us with pleasure in the same degree (which is always considerable) the third and succeeding times as the second, and that the latter affects us with pleasure only the first. From the uniformity of the pleasures of sense, and from sensation being independent of reflection, the pleasures of sense were said, by Dr Johnson, to be the only real pleasures which we had. But this certainly was either but a splenetic expression, or proceeded from a partial view of the case; for there are certainly other pleasures besides the pleasures of sense. It must indeed be granted, that the pleasures of sense affect more strongly than others; but they are of shorter duration.

The desire of acquiring pleasure is, indeed, often overbalanced by the dread of incurring pain. Sometimes the change of habit affects too strongly to produce pleasure. The dread of pain or disappointment may frequently induce us to prefer trifling pursuits, on account of the facility of the acquirement of their objects, to others more important, and to drawl on with tasteless things which could be exchanged for interesting only by suffering a degree of exertion too great to produce pleasure. Although we would wish to enjoy things unenjoyed, we would not always choose, by leaving our present situations and engaging in difficult pursuits, to suffer pain and disappointment, or to risk the loss of that pleasure which things in our power, or which we have the means of enjoying, are capable of furnishing. Pleasure is a comparative idea or relative sensation, which cannot be felt without experiencing its reverse. Men, therefore, often fall into that state which is too inactive to yield pleasure, and too contrary to fatigue to afford them the means of extricating themselves from

it. Indolence is inconsistent with the nature of thinking beings, and can neither be endured with contentment, nor conquered without pain. The difference between the activity of man and that of other animals is as great as the difference between their intellects; and a civilized people excel barbarians in industry, as far as men excel beasts. The mind of man is, without intermission, engaged in one shape or another. But all its employment, interest, and pleasure, arise from the differences of things. Our ideas are sometimes furnished by objects which are distant, and at other times by those which are near, according to their qualities and relations; but contact, or the actual possession of any thing, cannot give pleasure, unless it contain novelty to engage the mind. The mind is influenced only by pleasure and pain, which are regulated by variety. All things are capable of pleasure as they contain novelty; and produce it as they afford hope, or anticipation of possession.

FINIS,



APPENDIX.



The Origin of Evil, or the Theory of Things.

BEING under the indispensable necessity of reasoning from what we know, and confined to a narrow world and limited state, it is impossible to attain, and vain to attempt so much as to form, an idea of infinitude or perfection. To conceive the correction of an evil by an alteration which occasions a greater, is but to exalt one thing at the expense of another; and, by no stretch of imagination, can the general system of nature be changed for the better.

If one body filled all space, there would be room for no other; or if one principle reigned entirely and solely, all would be at rest. Nothing would be attainable, because there could be nothing greater than what stood alone; and that which occupied infinity would leave no room for a power to lessen it. Or if there existed in space, a number of bodies which had no connexion

with, or influence over, each other, although their infinity would be destroyed by their mutual existence, still the whole would be at rest, and each stand inactive, and distinctly separated from the other.

Individual perfection must be sacrificed to general; and the plan of nature completed by *division* and *motion*.

Matter, as far as experience goes, appears minutely divided, and reason and analogy lead us to conclude that this division is infinite. The great divisions of nature are *earths*, and *airs*; *metals*, *minerals*, and *fossils*; *salts*, *acids*, and *alkalis*; *vegetables*, and *animals*. These again are subject to numerous *subdivisions*, each including an infinitude of *individuals*. To the whole is to be added an immense variety of what are called *modifications* and *relations*.

It is to be supposed that matter, in all its variations, is the same uniform substance, being probably composed of minute atoms, which suffer only a change of arrangement. It is also well known that inertia is one of the properties or attributes of matter, and that it remains always in the

state in which it is, whether of motion or rest. Hence, in the formation of the different species of things, it is to be conjectured that a portion of matter has been selected for each; that this portion, after receiving its due form, whether animal or vegetable, has been rolled out into existence, or put in motion as a ball thrown from the hand, and, nothing existing to impede its motion, has continued in the same course ever since. In other words, when one or two animals or vegetables, of a species, were formed, the race has, by the internal mould of the parent, been continued, without the necessity of a new shock or impetus. In the same manner, inanimate nature may be supposed, originally, to have been formed into the divisions above enumerated, the propagation of which is continued by the two great agents, heat and attraction. The connexion of attraction, again, with impulse is not so apparent, but certainly from that source must it be derived; for, as far as experience or imagination lead us, we can conceive matter to operate on matter only by impulse.

Matter, therefore, as all our researches prove, is of a homogeneous nature, possessing only one quality—*extension*, of which all others are to be considered merely as modifications. Hence, we are led to conclude, that all the *differences* of things are nothing more than original *impulses* preserving their nature, in the same manner as the heavenly bodies move round the sun, because there is nothing to interrupt their course. Again, any *general fact*, or *train of events* following each other in constant succession,—and of this kind is to be considered the propagation of both animals and vegetables,—is called a *principle*. But it is evident that principles are nothing more than *names*, as they neither add to, nor subtract from, matter.

After the division of matter has taken place, and the beautiful classifications and gradations of nature are accomplished, another quality remains to be added, and that is *motion*. Without this, all would be dead and lifeless. But, if a power of acting one upon another, each over all, and all over each, be given to things, a communication

and intercourse will take place between them, and motion be imparted to the whole. Where there is a universal subjection, if a motion be communicated to one thing, it must circulate through all. What acts must, in its turn, suffer, till mutual compensation be established.

The original principles, with which matter is endowed, are continually struggling for ascendancy over each other, and are continually gaining or losing it. The attack and resistance are mutual, and the superiority and subjection alternate. The whole creation is governed and balanced by the contrary forces of bodies, which, continually dissolving and creating new forms, preserve perpetual motion. The struggle for predominancy stimulates the qualities of matter to act against each other, diffuses animation through the whole creation, and preserves in it an equipoise, and mediocrity.

Matter is in continual motion, and the objects of it always in a state of progression, either towards perfection or decay. When the inherent qualities of one body

have yielded to the unremitted attacks of others, though it appears to be destroyed, it is, in reality, only newly modified. Those bodies, again, by which it has been overcome are themselves, in their turn, obliged to submit to others which have continued to act upon them. From the earth, plants arise ; which are devoured by animals ; which, again, soon perish from age or accident. From decayed animal substances, plants are again produced, to be destroyed by other animals, or by the attacks of the elements, which are themselves in continual fluctuation. The sun, in a uniform process, raises vapours, which interrupt his rays, condense, and fall by their own weight. The operation is again renewed, and again becomes necessary to vegetation. All the principles of nature carry on war against each other. Every thing, both animate and inanimate, governs, and is governed, by force and necessity. The morality of nature seems to be cruel, and to teach destruction. The majority of animals prey upon each other. Almost all have victims, as well as enemies. None

are so powerful as to be protected against every species of tyranny from others, or to be altogether exempted from evil; and none are so weak as not to have others, in some manner, subject to them, as to be without the means of offence and protection against the most powerful, or entirely destitute of comfort. The rise and decay of empires, the revolutions of morality and religion, and the instability of domestic comfort, all proceed from the general and unavoidable motion of things.

No part of the creation ever lies dormant. The whole, as each principle gains the ascendancy, is constantly changing, and kept in motion. By the operation of the principles with which it is endowed, matter continually undergoes dissolution and re-union, and is formed into objects, which, by changing their manner of operation on the senses, appear to us new. But whatever transformation matter may suffer, it is impossible to conceive the idea of the smallest particle of it being annihilated.

To prevent, however, the destruction of any of the active principles of matter, as

they are nothing more than impulses originally communicated to it by the Almighty, it is necessary that they should be equal to each other; and for the sake of motion and diversity, it is necessary they should be unequal. Principles are so disposed that, though their power is generally equal, a disproportionate distribution of that power renders principles and bodies partially and locally unequal, superior and inferior. The principle which is strongest in one place is weakest in another, and that which governs here submits there. If a portion of one principle or element be subject and inferior in one place, it will have the superiority in another. Where there is a quantity of land and a quantity of water, equal to each other in whole, divided into smaller quantities, unequal in respect to those of their own nature and to those which are different, it will produce a partial and particular superiority and inferiority of land to land, of water to water; of land to water, and of water to land. Thus, from similar individual disproportions, and scattered dispositions of parts, the same principles of nature are incessantly produ-

cing new combinations, and events unlike those preceding.

From the unequal distribution of parts, arise continual excesses. But the general balance prevents any thing very bad from existing long; as it would, if it possessed universal superiority, destroy all other things, and assume perfection to itself. Parts may change, but principles cannot. We can never, from the nature of things, expect to see such wonderful events as the extinction of the sun, the evaporation of the sea, or the entire extirpation of the animal race. One of a species may be destroyed, but the species will remain entire; or an individual plant may perish, but vegetation will continue unimpaired. "One generation cometh and another goeth, but the earth abideth for ever." Where we perceive any extraordinary appearance in nature, we expect that it will be balanced by a contrary. But should any principle once be extinguished, it could never be again restored unless by the original workman who fabricated the machine. For, as an active principle is merely an impulse

given to matter, when it is interrupted, it is annihilated. If the motion of the earth, or of any of the other planets, were put a stop to, it would remain in a state of rest for ever; or if the whole of any species of animals were destroyed, there would be an end to the propagation of the race; unless the Almighty chose to repeat the creation, and renew the impulse.

Hence, it appears, that a general perfection, and an individual imperfection, exist in nature; that, as the principle which is strongest in one place is weakest in another, a continual superiority and inferiority of action reign through the whole; and that the machine, from the equal balance of its principles, and unequal distribution of their parts, will continue to move of itself till that Being who formed it choose to put a stop to its motion.

Nothing happens by chance, because every thing has a cause. Causes, again, are linked together in the same chain. But where we do not see the cause which produces any event, we are apt to conclude that there is none. It is impossible to

trace all the events which we experience to the original causes from which they arise; because the disproportioned parts of principles, and heterogeneous qualities, are mingled together, in so inexplicable a contexture of contending forces, which add to, and diminish, the power of each other, according to their respective connexions and relations, that, from an incomprehensible combination of causes, is produced an unaccountable diversity of effects. Whatever fortune, therefore, befall a person, whether good or bad, he has very little merit or disgrace in bringing it about, or choice in procuring or avoiding it; but is, in a great measure, carried along without knowing how or whither.

Perfection is inconsistent with division and action. Where division and action are, there must be less than infinity. Perfection, accompanied with motion and division, is, therefore, impossible, in like manner as a part cannot equal the whole. Whatever is opposed, circumscribed, or, in any degree, lessened, is not infinite; and whatever is not infinite is not perfect.

What acts must be superior to what suffers; and hence arises disproportion.

From the necessity of motion, arises the necessity of imperfection and evil. If one thing had no power over another, the consequence would be universal inaction. But, as one thing is subjected to another for the sake of action, there cannot be an equality between them; and where there is an inequality between things, the one must be imperfect with respect to the other. From division, and action, arises comparison; and from comparison, arise the ideas of superiority and inferiority, greatness and smallness, goodness and badness.

The division of things also occasions immense vacuities in the system of nature. Between every two links in the chain of any order of beings, there is room for an infinite series. There is no being so small that there may not be a gradation of beings less, nor so great that there may not be an order greater. Existence is, therefore, merely a point bounded by the immense ocean of vacuity.

One thing is superior or inferior, great or small, good or bad, only with respect to another. The partial imperfection of things is merely a consequence of their relations. But if nothing be perfect, nothing is altogether without importance. There is no thing, however small, but which, if it have not power to subdue the effects of other things, must resist, and subtract power from them, in a degree equal to its own power of resistance. If perfection cannot be without infinity, existence cannot be without power.

Without partial evil, there would be general. If evil were not, or if the evil arising from motion were not, the system of things would be more distant from perfection than it is. Without evil, there would be but one thing, or one uniform state of existence. For evil, we are recompensed with action, and diversity of action. Motion and action are repugnant to material perfection, and it is contrary to the infinity of matter that it has been divided, or that one body can affect another. But all the mechanical powers depend upon

imperfection, or the action of one thing upon another.

Upon the inequality between parts and powers, arising from division, depend the degrees of good and evil, all comparative difference of qualities, and that VARIETY which is so valuable to thinking beings. Without imperfection, the mind would be without action, and its expanse contracted in a manner inconsistent with the nature of reasonable creatures; for, all the speculations of the understanding, and all the interests of mankind, arise from the different combinations of principles and relations of objects. From the disproportion between parts, arises variety; and from variety, discrimination; in which consists all intellectual employment as well as pleasure. Without difference in objects, it is difficult to conceive how the mind could think at all, and impossible to conceive how it could enjoy a change and succession of ideas. All secondary qualities of matter,* all degrees of primary, and all *moral qualities*, are *comparative*. From down, we

* *Extension* is certainly not a secondary or relative quality.

form the idea of up; from hard, the idea of soft; without darkness, we could have no idea of light; without vice, we could have no idea of virtue; without deformity, no idea of beauty. That idea, therefore, which involves contraries is the nearest to perfection which we can form.

Hence it is evident, that, as all the sensations and ideas of the mind arise from external and material objects, *moral evil*, is sufficiently explained by physical, if such a thing as physical evil can be admitted. Moral evil is *pain*. Pain, again, arises from an excess of mental affection, either action or sufferance; which leads us back to external objects, to division and motion, without which we could have no idea or sensation whatever.

Without evil, there could not be good. The idea of good is taken from the idea of evil. Were all things equal, there would be neither great nor small, high nor low. The meanness of one is, in fact, the excellence of another. All animals are not constructed with the same degree of art. Some are evidently depressed that others may be

exalted; some apparently destined to become the food of others. But if we suppose that the whole system of things is not made for any particular part, but each part for the whole, one thing will appear as necessary as another; the rugged rock, or barren desert, as the verdant plain. Even monsters and anomalies are defensible on the principle of variety, and serve to attest the wisdom of the Creator.

To intellectual or moral qualities, the same reasoning applies. Without pain, we could not enjoy pleasure. Pain fits us for pleasure, and pleasure for pain. Pain and pleasure are inseparable. It is impossible to feel the one without having experienced the other. Pleasure has no excess but from pain. The sweetness of all present enjoyment is proportionate to the bitterness of past pain. Without alternate interchanges of labour and rest, difficulty and attainment, disappointment and success, human life would be devoid of interest. The worst things, indeed, never fail to create as much good as they produce evil. Whatever increases our wants aug-

ments our industry. All the necessities of man tend to multiply his gratifications, as well as to exalt his nature. Even war, shipwreck, and the other great evils incident to the human race, serve to excite our exertions, and to produce all those splendid actions which fill the page of history.

All perfection or good, as well as all imperfection or evil, arises from division and motion; and all comparative ideas from the relations of things. We draw our ideas of good from the degrees of it which we find in nature; all which are, comparatively, merely degrees of evil. Whatever can be conceived is possible. But as we can form no idea of good without evil, or of pleasure without pain, it is impossible that the one can exist independently of the other. Without wants, we should have no desires; without desires, we should be incapable of enjoying pleasure. To experience extreme degrees of evil, is necessary to extreme degrees of good.* The contrast

* A man cannot be made very rich, if he be not very poor; he cannot rise very high, if he be not very low; he cannot be saved, if he be not in danger.

thus becomes strongest, and we are rendered the more sensible of the one quality by the other.

It is impossible that the condition of the whole could be perfect, if the condition of the parts were perfect. Because the perfection or happiness of the whole depends upon the imperfection and confined enjoyment of the parts. What has a tendency to general good, is often directly, and always in a great measure, contrary to individual. Every general virtue is a restraint upon individuals. Thus, if an estate belonged to a certain number of persons, it would be best for *one* to assume possession of it entirely; but it would be best for the *whole* that it were divided among them. In the same manner, it would be best for an individual (at least according to common notions) that the property of the rest of mankind were at his disposal; but it is best for society that he is restrained from depredation by the virtue of honesty.

The perfection of every quality of nature depends so much upon comparison that we cannot make one perfect without rendering

another imperfect. What we add to one, we always deduct from another. The partial superiority and inferiority of things, with respect to each other, is sometimes a convenience and sometimes an inconvenience, according as our circumstances require the superiority or inferiority of one to another. It is sometimes an inconvenience that iron is hard or strong, or that it resists fire ; but it would be oftener an inconvenience if it did not. Qualities are so suited to each other, that, if the partial magnitude or strength of one, were altered to inconsistency with their general equality, it would certainly, by the increase of excess, produce greater evil. Or if they were deprived of their partial ascendancy over each other, evil would be augmented by the want of motion. Contrast and change are united with moderation, by a general balance and individual inequality.

Whatever is bad in one respect is good in another, and whatever is inferior in one relation is superior in another. That iron can be cut is an imperfection, when the

thief breaks into the house, or when the prisoner escapes ; but it is a convenience when we come to manufacture it. With the whole of the contrary qualities of matter it is the same. The rigidity of minerals, the malleability of metals, the softness of wood, the friability of earths, the rarity of one element, and the density of another, all contribute to the various purposes of mankind as well as to contradict each other.

Good and evil are so mixed, that we cannot, for a moment, experience the one without suffering the other ; and as both depend upon contrast, they cannot exist without the inequality and fluctuation of things. That state of perfect happiness which Adam enjoyed, could not have been composed of the same materials or events which we, at present, perceive and experience. But our minds are now too much sunk in sin, and our condition in misery, to admit the idea of perfect virtue or happiness. We must, therefore, see another paradise before we can conceive it. The constitution of things, since the fall of man, is certainly changed :

although the imperfection which proceeds from action, and the idea of evil which arises from comparison, are very comprehensively expressed by the doctrine of original sin.

Without partial evil, there could not be general perfection. The more we increase motion, the more we increase acting and suffering, and consequently evil ; the more we reduce action and variety, the more we approach rest and uniformity, unimportance and nothing. We cannot, even in imagination, form an idea of perfection ; including motion without subjection, superiority and inferiority, because it implies contradiction, and is, therefore, demonstratively impossible. How there could be action without subjection, subjection without difference, difference without comparison, or comparison without the idea of evil, we cannot conceive. As perfection, therefore, is to be found neither in motion nor in rest, it must consist of a mixture of both, and hold the medium between extremities. From all that we know, indeed, and as far as we can judge, the present system of

things approaches as near to perfection as the materials of which it is composed are capable of admitting.

Evil is but a partial idea, and a comparison of a part with the whole. No such quality exists in the general system of things, and it is only by dividing the whole that the idea of it arises. Imperfection is to be found only in individuals: “*All is for the best.*” The ideas of good and evil arise from the difference of parts, and all qualities are comparative. Good and evil depend upon each other; and there can never be more good than evil, nor more evil than good.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

- P. 26 and 32, for *phænomena* and *phænomenon*, read *phenomena* and *phenomenon*.
 P. 36 and 60, for *Berkley*, read *Berkeley*.
 P. 60, l. 11, for *affect*, read *effect*.
 P. 88, l. 10. for *unvoluntary*, read *involuntary*.

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